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ARTICLE
THE ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Michael W McConnell*
The question whether the free exercise clause requires the granting of reli-
gious exemptions from generally applicable laws with secular purposes has
generated lively debate. Beyond a few narrow circumstances, the Supreme
Court and legal commentators have rejected claims to free exercise exemp-
tions. In this Article, Professor McConnell argues that this debate has largely
proceeded in an ahistorical fashion and has ignored the unique American
conception of religious freedom from which the free exercise clause emerged.
Professor McConnell discusses the approaches to church-state relations in
the American colonies and traces the development of free exercise provisions
in both the colonies and the post-independence states. Contrary to modern
perceptions, he argues, the impetus for free exercise provisions came from
the evangelical religious movements of the period, movements that espoused
the primacy of religious conscience over secular laws and that viewed the
constitutional guarantee of free exercise as protecting the right actively to
fulfill religious duties without state interference. He contends, moreover,
that the framers adopted the terminology 'Yree exercise of religion" in place
of the alternative, "rights of conscience," to ensure protection for religiously
motivated conduct and to make clear that protection would not extend to
secular claims of conscience. After discussing early nineteenth-century ju-
dicial interpretations, Professor McConnell concludes that an interpretation
of the free exercise clause that mandates religious exemptions was both within
the contemplation of the framers and consonant with popular notions of
religious liberty and limited government that existed at the time of the
framing.
IN the winter of 1812-1813, Daniel Philips entered the confessional
of his parish church, St. Peters in New York City, to confess to
God that he had knowingly received stolen goods. Under the tenets
of his Roman Catholic faith, Philips had to make oral confession of
his sins and perform appropriate penance before he could partake of
holy communion. Under centuries-old church doctrines, he could be
confident that his confession would remain between him and God -
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author gratefully acknowledges financial
support during the preparation of this paper from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation,
the helpful comments of Albert Alschuler, Akhil Amar, Jay Bybee, Gerhard Casper, Thomas J.
Curry, Richard Fallon, Edward Gaffney, Richard Helmholz, Stephen Holmes, Douglas Laycock,
Ira Lupu, Martin Marty, Henry Monaghan, Michael Paulsen, Richard Posner, Frederick
Schauer, Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet, and the research assistance of George Sanders and
Adam Wolfson.
Vol. 103:14091410
ORIGINS OF FREE EXERCISE
that the priest would not reveal to anyone what he had to say. After
Philips confessed his crime, the priest, Father Kohlmann, insisted that
he return the goods to their rightful owner. Under cover of confiden-
tiality of the confessional, Philips brought the goods to Father Kohl-
mann, who delivered them to the owner, James Keating. Keating
informed the authorities of these events, who in turn subpoenaed
Father Kohlmann to appear before the grand jury to identify those
responsible for the crime. The priest appeared before the court but
pleaded in these words to be excused from testifying:
[I]f called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament, in
which my God himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and inviolable
secrecy, I must declare to this honorable Court, that I cannot, I must
not answer any question that has a bearing upon the restitution in
question; and that it would be my duty to prefer instantaneous death
or any temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of the
penitent in question. For, were I to act otherwise, I should become
a traitor to my church, to my sacred ministry and to my God. In
fine, I should render myself guilty of eternal damnation.'
To this, the district attorney responded:
[T]he constitution has granted religious "profession and worship" to
all denominations, "without discrimination or preferance": but it has
not granted exemption from previous legal duties. It has expelled the
demon of persecution from our land: but it has not weakened the arm
of public justice. Its equal and steady impartiality has soothed all the
contending sects into the most harmonious equality, but to none of
them has it yielded any of the rights of a well organized government. 2
Thus was posed an issue that continues to divide and trouble the
legal system: does the freedom of religious exercise guaranteed by the
constitutions of the states and United States require the government,
in the absence of a sufficiently compelling need, to grant exemptions
from legal duties that conflict with religious obligations? Or does this
freedom guarantee only that religious believers will be governed by
equal laws, without discrimination or preference?
The New York court in People v. Philips ruled that an exemption
was constitutionally required. 3 Although the government had a legit-
I This speech and all the other details of the case are taken from a report of the trial
published as W. SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA 8-9 (1813 and photo. reprint
1974). The decision of the court is excerpted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, r
CATH. LAw. '99, 199-209 (955).
2 W. SAMPSON, supra note I, at 5r (emphasis omitted and punctuation altered). The internal
quotations are from N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAws OF THE UNITED STATES
1328, 1338 (B. Poore 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
3 See W. SAMPSON, supra note I, at 112-14.
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imate need and the authority to compel testimony, that need did not
outweigh the interference with the relationship between priests and
penitents in the Roman Catholic Church. This resolution of the con-
flict between generally applicable law and religious conscience had
deep roots in the practices of the American states both before and
after independence. But it was not until the full flowering of the
Warren Court that the United States Supreme Court so interpreted
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. In the meantime, the
Court had upheld enforcement of anti-polygamy laws against Mor-
mons,4 of child labor laws against a minor who wished to distribute
religious tracts in the company of her aunt,5 of a public university's
suspension of students who refused on account of their religious con-
victions against war to participate in ROTC, 6 and of Sunday closing
laws against Orthodox Jews who observed the Sabbath on Saturday
rather than Sunday. 7
In Sherbert v. Verner,8 the first and leading case in the Supreme
Court's modern free exercise jurisprudence, the Court held that a
Seventh-Day Adventist need not agree to work on Saturday in order
to be eligible for unemployment compensation. Although a state has
a legitimate need and the authority to limit unemployment benefits to
those who make themselves available for work, it may not enforce
the limitation when it conflicts with sincere religious practices. The
state is "constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception - and
to provide benefits - for those whose unavailability is due to their
religious convictions," as Justice Harlan disapprovingly put the point
in dissent. 9 The Sherbert decision thus created the potential for chal-
lenges by religious groups and individual believers to a wide range of
laws that conflict with the tenets of their faiths, because such laws
impose penalties either for engaging in religiously motivated conduct
or for refusing to engage in religiously prohibited conduct. For ex-
ample, in the same year that the Court decided Sherbert, it remanded
for reconsideration in light of Sherbert the contempt conviction of a
religious objector who refused jury service. 10 A decade later, the
4 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding the criminal conviction of a
Mormon leader for the crime of polygamy under territorial law); see also Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (upholding the conviction of a "fundamentalist" Mormon polygamist
under a federal statute prohibiting the transportation of a woman across state lines for immoral
purposes); Davis v. Beason, i33 U.S. 333 (i89o) (upholding the requirement that voters take an
oath that they are not members of an organization that teaches polygamy); cf. The Late Corp.
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (189o) (upholding
a statute revoking the charter of the Mormon Church and confiscating its property).
5 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
6 See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
7 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (i961).
8 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 Id. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
10 See In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (per curiam), vacating and remanding In re Jenison
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Court exempted members of the Old Order Amish and the Conser-
vative Amish Mennonite churches from compulsory education of chil-
dren beyond the age of sixteen." Free exercise litigation since Sher-
bert has consisted almost entirely of requests for exemption rather
than for general invalidation of restrictive laws.12
The Court made no effort in Sherbert or subsequent cases to
support its holdings through evidence of the historical understanding
of "free exercise of religion" at the time of the framing and ratification
of the first amendment. This evident lack of historical support has
made the decisions vulnerable to attack. Critics have not hesitated
to call the decisions "a palpable and unprecedented misconstruction
of the Constitution," at variance with the Lockean liberal principles
of the Founding.13
While in retrospect the Court's inattention to original meaning may
seem characteristic of this period of constitutional jurisprudence, it
was anything but characteristic of the Court's treatment of the estab-
lishment clause. For example, in the School Prayer Cases decided in
the same Term as Sherbert, the author of the Sherbert opinion, Justice
Brennan, undertook a lengthy historical analysis of school prayer and
public education. He commented that "the line we must draw be-
tween the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords
with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding
Fathers.' 4 Interpretations of the establishment clause, then as well
as now, are replete with extensive analyses of the historical context
and meaning. Indeed, it has been said that "[n]o provision of the
Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment."' 5 Yet
neither Sherbert nor any other Supreme Court opinion - majority,
concurring, or dissenting - has ever grounded the interpretation of
the free exercise clause in its historical meaning.
Academic commentary has followed a similarly ahistorical ap-
proach. While scores of law review articles and a number of scholarly
Contempt Proceedings, 265 Minn. 96, 12o N.W.2d 515 (1963). On remand, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota reversed the conviktion. See In re Jenison Contempt Proceedings, 267 Minn. 136,
125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
11 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972).
12 The only clear exception among Supreme Court free exercise cases is McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978), which struck down a state law prohibiting ministers from serving as
delegates to a constitutional convention. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (ig8i) (striking
down under the free speech clause the exclusion of a student religious group from public
university facilities).
13 IV. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 38,
43-44 (1985).
14 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Is Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (i947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); accord
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-42 (i96i).
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books have been devoted to the historical background of the estab-
lishment clause, 16 little or no scholarly work has been devoted pri-
marily to the history of the concept of "free exercise of religion. 17
The history of the free exercise principle is usually seen as too meager,
or too inconclusive, to be of much help.' 8 The few serious efforts to
examine the history have concluded that the principle of constitution-
ally compelled free exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws
is historically unsupportable. 19
This Article analyzes the major philosophical, legal, and historical
sources that preceded the free exercise clause of the first amendment
to determine the probable understanding of those who drafted and
16 See, e.g., C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT (1964); G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982); L.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (I986); Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (I986); Smith, Getting Off on
the Wrong Foot and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions,
20 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 569 (1984); Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955 (1989) [hereinafter Smith, Separation and the
"Secular'].
17 The most comprehensive studies of the history of religious freedom in the United States
to the time of the Constitution have been S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA (1902); and T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2986). This Article makes liberal use of material
from Curry and Cobb. Other useful recent general historical studies include V. MILLER, THE
FIRST LIBERTY (1986); Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. i559 (1989); and Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986). None of these histories provides a clear doctrinal analysis
of the free exercise clause or focuses on free exercise exemptions.
The best historical examination of free exercise exemptions is a little-noticed report to the
Attorney General. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (1986) [hereinafter
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL]. The report relies on a much narrower range of sources
than are relied upon in this Article. Moreover, although it reaches conclusions on some issues
parallel to those reached here, the report reaches contrary conclusions on other, quite important
questions of interpretation. Other significant historical examinations of the exemptions issue
include W. BERNS, supra note I3; M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); and Marshall, The Case Against the Con-
stitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption (1989) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the
Harvard Law Library) (forthcoming in 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1989-x99o)). These
works reach conclusions at odds with those of this Article and will be discussed throughout at
appropriate points.
18 See, e.g., Choper, The Religious Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict,
41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 676 (i98o); Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for
the Free Exercise Clause, i981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 315; Marshall, supra note 17.
19 See W. BERNS, supra note i3; M. MALBIN, supra note 17; Marshall, supra note 17; see
also REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 17 (arguing that free exercise exemptions
are limited to prohibitory law).
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ratified it. The focus is on exemptions from generally applicable laws,
since this has posed the most important interpretive issue. The con-
clusions of this analysis are (i) that exemptions were seen as a con-
stitutionally permissible means for protecting religious freedom, (2)
that constitutionally compelled exemptions were within the contem-
plation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the
free exercise clause, and (3) that exemptions were consonant with the
popular American understanding of the interrelation between the
claims of a limited government and a sovereign God. While the
historical evidence may not be unequivocal (it seldom is), it does, on
balance, support Sherbert's interpretation of the free exercise clause. 20
For purposes of this Article, there is no need to presuppose agree-
ment about an "originalist" (or any other) theory of constitutional
interpretation. Even opponents of originalism generally agree that the
historical understanding is relevant, even if not dispositive. Much of
the criticism of the Sherbert doctrine is based on the supposed weak-
ness of its historical roots. 21 Thus, even if the original understanding
of the free exercise clause is not considered dispositive, a fresh look
at the historical record can correct misconceptions that have arisen
from the ahistorical manner in which free exercise exemptions have
been created and defended.
After a brief description of the state of modern free exercise doc-
trine in Part I, the Article proceeds chronologically. Part II canvasses
the preconstitutional history of free exercise of religion in the American
colonies and states by analyzing protections found in charters, consti-
tutions, and statutes. This Part also discusses the works of the main
philosophical, political, and religious figures of the time and examines
actual controversies over free exercise exemptions. Part In discusses
the framing of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, as well
as early interpretations of free exercise clauses in both federal and
state constitutions. Part IV, the conclusion, describes the relation
between religion and government that best reflects the original con-
ception of free exercise of religion.
While much of the analysis focuses on the specific doctrinal ques-
tion of free exercise exemptions, this discussion has implications for
the broader controversy involving the proper relationship between law
20 This does not mean that the principle was necessarily correctly applied to the facts of
Sherbert. For an analysis of whether there was a burden on free exercise in Sherbert, see
McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 40-41 (1989).
21 See, e.g., W. BERNS, supra note i3; M. MALBIN, supra note 17; Bork, The Supreme
Court and the Religion Clauses, in "TURNING THE RELIGION CLAUSES ON THEIR HEADS":
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONFERENCE OF THE CATHOLIC
LEAGUE FOR RELIGIOUS AND CrIL RIGHTS 83, 85-86 (1988).
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and religious obligation in a liberal republic.22 On many levels, the
legal recognition of religion as a counter-authority to law is anomalous.
Religious freedom claims present paradoxical combinations of duty
and liberty, neutrality and special accommodation. The characteristic
tendency of the modern legal system has been to assimilate the free-
dom of religion into the more familiar framework of Lockean liberal
individualism. This denies the singularity of religion in life and, more
particularly, in political life. Under this view the religion clauses of
the first amendment become an instrument of secularism to be inter-
preted in secular terms. 23 An understanding of the historical roots of
free exercise exemptions casts doubt on this interpretation. It suggests
instead a peculiarly American conception of the relation between re-
ligion and government - one that emphasizes the integrity and di-
versity of religious life rather than the secularism of the state.
A robust principle of liberty of conscience also conflicts with the
alternative, nonliberal understanding of the governmental role, known
as republicanism, under which the state has a responsibility to pro-
mote civic virtue among its citizens. The principle of free exercise of
religion effectively removes government from the development and
transmission of virtue at its most fundamental level - thus devolving
upon voluntary religious societies (including those of atheists or ag-
nostics) the central function thought by "republicans" to be vested in
the state. The free exercise principle therefore suggests that modern
attempts to understand the Founding as a clash between "liberal" and
"republican" elements are radically incomplete. It points instead to-
ward a social order that is neither strictly individualistic nor statist in
its understanding of the good.
I. FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE TODAY
The basic framework of the free exercise exemptions doctrine is
easily stated. If the plaintiff can show that a law or governmental
practice inhibits the exercise of his religious beliefs, 24 the burden shifts
to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice is necessary
to the accomplishment of some important (or "compelling") secular
objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that
22 The Article is mostly confined to issues of individual conscience. This is not to disparage
the importance of the institutional or corporate aspects of religious exercise - the independence
of religious bodies from government control. But the theoretical and historical background for
those issues is sufficiently distinct that to combine them would add too much both to pages and
to confusion.
23 See Smith, Separation and the "Secular", supra note x6, at 975-1x5.
24 For analysis of the requisite "burden" on free exercise, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin:
The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (x989); and
McConnell & Posner, cited above in note 20, at 38-45.
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objective. 25 If the plaintiff meets his burden and the government does
not, the plaintiff is entitled to exemption from the law or practice at
issue. In order to be protected, the claimant's beliefs must be "sin-
cere," but they need not necessarily be consistent, coherent, clearly
articulated, or congruent with those of the claimant's religious denom-
ination. 26 "Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause";27 secular beliefs, however sincere and conscientious,
do not suffice. 28
Some twenty-five years after Sherbert, the legitimacy of this doc-
trine has increasingly come under attack, and the survival of the
principle of free exercise exemptions is very much in doubt. Since
1972, the Court has rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption
to come before it,29 outside the narrow context of unemployment
benefits governed strictly by Sherbert.30 What once appeared to be a
jurisprudence highly sympathetic to religious claims now appears vir-
tually closed to them. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens
have openly declared their opposition to the doctrine. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has contended that when "a State has enacted a general
statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
25 For analysis of the "compelling governmental interest," see Gottlieb, Compelling Govern-
mental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L.
REv. 917 (x988); and McConnell & Posner, cited above in note 2o, at 45-54.
26 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., IO9 S. Ct. 1514, 157-18 (1989); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (i98I). For critical appraisals of the sincerity requirement,
see Noonan, How Sincere Do You Have To Be To Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713;
and Marshall, supra note 17, at 27-30.
27 Frazee, iog S. Ct. at 1517 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at 713); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (exempting Amish children beyond the age of
x6 from compulsory public school attendance on account of religious beliefs).
28 See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. I98I) (upholding a prison's
refusal to provide a prisoner with a special diet on the ground that his belief system was not a
religion); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting a free exercise claim
for exemption from a prohibition on marijuana use on the ground that the defendant did not
demonstrate that her beliefs supporting drug use were religious). The historical basis for this
limitation is discussed at pp. 1488-i5oo below.
29 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting the claim of Muslim
prisoners seeking a change in work schedule to accommodate Friday worship services); Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting the claim of an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer
forbidden to wear a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (requiring members of a religious organization opposed
to receiving cash wages to submit to minimum wage regulation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding a denial of religious school tax exempt status because of
the university's religiously based rule against interracial dating and marriage); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring members of a self-supporting religious group to contribute
to Social Security in violation of their religious tenets).
3o The narrow holding of Sherbert, as it applies to unemployment benefits, has been repeat-
edly reaffirmed, most recently in the unanimous Frazee decision. In Hobbie v. Unemployment
Compensation Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Thomas v. Review Board, 450
U.S. 707 (i981), then-Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter.
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secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not . . . require the State
to conform that statute to the dictates of religious conscience of any
group."'31 Justice Stevens has stated that there is "virtually no room
for a 'constitutionally required exemption' on religious grounds from
a valid . . . law that is entirely neutral in its general application. '32
Several leading scholars in the field have espoused a similar position. 33
The debate over free exercise exemptions hinges on two different
conceptions of the threat government poses to religious liberty. Under
the no-exemptions view, the free exercise clause exists solely to prevent
the government from singling out religious practice for peculiar dis-
ability. The evil to be prevented is, in Judge Bork's words, "laws
that directly and intentionally penalize religious observance. '34 The
remedy is to strike down the offending legislation and to treat religious
institutions and practices the same way that comparable nonreligious
institutions and practices are treated. Under the exemptions view, on
the other hand, the free exercise clause protects religious practices
against even the incidental or unintended effects of government action.
The evil includes not only active hostility, but also majoritarian pre-
suppositions, ignorance, and indifference. The remedy generally is to
leave the government policy in place, but to carve out an exemption
when the application of the policy impinges on religious practices
without adequate justification.
Under both conceptions, it is unconstitutional for the government
to inflict penalties on religious practices as such. For example, zoning
ordinances disallowing churches while allowing meeting halls and
other uses with comparable effects are unconstitutional, 35 as are "anti-
cult" legislation, 36 laws barring clergy from public office, 37 and char-
itable solicitation regulations crafted to disadvantage a particular re-
ligious sect.38 Under the no-exemptions view, however, religious be-
lievers and institutions cannot challenge facially neutral legislation, no
matter what effect it may have on their ability or freedom to practice
31 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
3 In addition to the sources cited in note 17 above, see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW (1962); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1978); and Tushnet, "Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 373.
34 Bork, supra note 21, at 84.
35 See Hollingsworth v. State, 37 Tenn. 518 (1858); cf. Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill.
257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939) (holding that a city may not zone out religious schools if it allows
public schools).
36 See Aronin, Cults, Deprogramming, and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Proposal, 17
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 163, 2o n.258 (2982).
37 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (2978).
38 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (disallowing solicitation regulations under the
establishment clause rather than the free exercise clause).
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their religious faith. Thus, a requirement that all witnesses must
testify to facts within their knowledge bearing on a criminal prose-
cution - the requirement at issue in Philips - if applied without
exception, could abrogate the confidentiality of the confessional. Sim-
ilarly, a general prohibition of alcohol consumption could make the
Christian sacrament of communion illegal, uniform regulation of meat
preparation could put kosher slaughterhouses out of business, and
prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status
could end the male celibate priesthood.
Both the exemption and no-exemption views can be expressed in
terms of "neutrality" toward religion, but the way in which the two
views define "neutrality" differs. 39 Under the no-exemption position,
a law or government practice is "neutral" if it makes no reference to
religion and has a secular justification unrelated to the suppression of
religion. Under the exemption position, a law or governmental prac-
tice is not "neutral" if it embodies the majority's view on a contested
question of religious significance to the minority, even if that question
is of no religious significance to the majority.40 For example, from
the majority's perspective, a requirement that those seeking unem-
ployment benefits be willing to work on Saturday seems secular and
neutral. Only from the perspective of a sabbatarian do Saturday work
environments have a religious dimension. Both the exemption and
no-exemption views thus insist on neutral, "secular" laws and govern-
mental practices, but the no-exemption view makes that judgment
exclusively according to the perspective of the government, while the
exemption view takes the perspective of the religious claimant, as well
as the countervailing interests of the government, into account.
Likewise, these two interpretations agree that laws and govern-
mental practices must be neutral among religions, but they differ about
how this is to be accomplished. Under the no-exemption position, the
best way to ensure equal treatment of all religions is to deny exemp-
tions to all. The proponents of exemption, by contrast, observe that
powerful and influential religions will usually receive adequate pro-
tection in the political arena.41 One rarely sees laws that force main-
39 See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DE
PAUL L. REv. (forthcoming 199o).
40 Here the term "majority" is used not in the technical sense of comprising over So% of the
population, but in the sense of prevailing in the political process, and the term "minority," in
the sense of losing in the political process. Obviously, "majorities" in the technical sense
sometimes lose, and "minorities" sometimes win.
41 See, e.g., Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305, 308-39_ (I919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. 21
(1933) (exempting sacramental wine from prohibition); Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 681(3) (1988) (exempting religious institutions); Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Aca-
demic Freedom Act (Armstrong Amendment), Pub. L. No. ioo-462, § 145, 102 Stat. 2269 (1988)
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stream Protestants to violate their consciences. Judicially enforceable
exemptions under the free exercise clause are therefore needed to
ensure that unpopular or unfamiliar faiths will receive the same con-
sideration afforded mainstream or generally respected religions by the
representative branches.
Opposition to free exercise exemptions arises from two jurispru-
dentially distinct positions. The first looks to the constitutionally
required separation of powers and is grounded in a philosophy of
judicial restraint. This objection holds that courts are not the proper
institutions to craft exemptions from generally applicable statutes that
have a secular purpose and lack an intent to suppress religious free-
dom. Any exemptions must be made by the legislature or by executive
officials acting within their delegated authority. The opinions of Chief
Justice Rehnquist exemplify this position on the modern Court. The
second objection, most forcefully articulated on the modern Court by
Justice Stevens, argues that whether made by courts or legislatures,
exemptions directed to religion alone are generally unwarranted be-
cause determining the "sincerity" of religious claimants is dangerously
intrusive, because granting exemptions for religious beliefs discrimi-
nates against secular beliefs, and because "special treatment" may give
the appearance of aid to and endorsement of religion. While these
two positions lead to virtually identical results in free exercise cases,
they lead to opposite results in many cases involving the establishment
clause, in which legislative exemptions and accommodations are at
issue. 42
As this Article went to press, a five-Justice majority abandoned
the free exercise exemptions doctrine except in cases involving a free
exercise claim "in conjunction with other constitutional protections." 43
The historical record casts doubt on this interpretation of the free
exercise clause.
(exempting Georgetown University from a Washington D.C. law prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual preference).
42 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, io9 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (striking down a statute
exempting religious magazines from sales tax) (Stevens, J., in the majority and Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down a statute
providing Sabbath observers the right not to work on their chosen Sabbath in the private
workplace) (Stevens, J., in the majority and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even Justice Stevens
sometimes votes to uphold a legislative accommodation specifically tailored to religion. See,
e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a statutory exemption for religious organizations from
the prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of religion).
43 Employment Div. v. Smith, No. 88-1213, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2990) (x99o U.S.
LEXIS 2021, *16).
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II. FREE EXERCISE BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION
Although the free exercise and establishment clauses were proposed
in 1789 and ratified in 1791, the American states had already expe-
rienced 150 years of a higher degree of religious diversity than had
existed anywhere else in the world. They had, moreover, seen the
results of religious conflict in England and of a variety of approaches
to church-state relations in the colonies, ranging from near-theocracy
to religious pluralism to state domination of the church. If the states
can serve as "laboratories of democracy,"44 the American colonies
surely served as laboratories for the exploration of different approaches
to religion and government. The free exercise clause cannot be under-
stood or appreciated without knowing what happened before.
A. Four Approaches to Church-State Relations in the Colonies
The English legacy was not a happy one. During the early settle-
ment of the colonies in the seventeenth century, England suffered
from chronic religious strife and intolerance. 45 The Church of Eng-
land was the established church of the realm, and both Roman Ca-
tholicism and extreme Protestantism (of which Puritanism was the
most prominent element) were suppressed. After the deposition of
Charles I in the English Civil War, the Protestant dissenters assumed
power, and Parliament took it upon itself to rewrite the prayer book
and confession of faith, dissolve the episcopal structure of the Church,
and confiscate the property of the bishoprics. Parliament ostensibly
guaranteed free exercise of religion to most Protestants but denied
religious freedom to "papists, the adherents of prelacy and the advo-
cates of 'blasphemous, licentious or profane' doctrines." 46 Baptist
leaders were imprisoned, and ministers who insisted on frequent use
of the prayer book were ejected from clerical office. 47
Upon restoration of the monarchy in 166o, Parliament reconsti-
tuted the Church of England. Suspected of conspiring with France
or Spain to the detriment of England's Protestant rulers, Catholics
continued to be targets for hostile legislation, as much for political as
for religious reasons. But Protestant dissenters' rights were limited as
well. The Test Act of 1672,48 for example, restricted public and
military office to Anglicans. The Act also required officeholders to
44 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4s For a discussion of religious strife in England during this period, see F. MAKOWER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 68-95 (1895
and photo. reprint 1972).
46 Id. at 86.
47 See id. at 85-86.
48 672, 25 Car. 2, ch. 2.
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swear an oath in court denying transubstantiation and acknowledging
the King's supremacy over the Church and to present proof that they
had taken communion within the preceding year in accordance with
the rites of the Church of England. 49 The Toleration Act of x68850
ended official persecution of Protestant dissenters but left the favored
position of Anglicans unchanged. The anti-Catholic elements of the
Test Act persisted throughout the eighteenth century.
The English religious policy did not automatically extend to the
colonies, where four different approaches to church-state relations
developed. The settlers of New England (outside of Rhode Island)
were predominantly English Calvinists called "Puritans" or "Congre-
gationalists." They moved to the wilderness of the New World in
order to establish a Christian commonwealth where, for the first time
in history, society would be directed by the revealed word of God.
Both civil and church governance were established in accordance with
their "congregational" understanding of church polity, under which
each town would constitute a congregation and would select its own
minister (within certain standards of education set by the General
Court) and would maintain a minister and church through compulsory
taxes. Authority in the system was decentralized and genuinely dem-
ocratic, but the results were foreordained. The local churches were
invariably of the Congregationalist persuasion. Nonetheless, ministers
in the system were accorded a high degree of autonomy from civil
control, and indeed frequently lectured colonial authorities on their
civic and spiritual derelictions. 51
Having carved their communities out of the rocky wilderness of a
distant land, the Puritans of New England saw no reason to allow
ungodly individuals to spoil their vision of a Christian commonwealth.
This vision allowed no room for religious pluralism or even for tol-
eration. "Polipiety [a variety of sects] is the greatest impiety in the
world," according to a well-known tract by Nathaniel Ward.5 2 The
great preacher John Cotton declared that "it was Toleration that made
the world anti-Christian. ''3 Cotton reasoned:
Fundamentals are so cleare, that a man cannot but be convinced in
Conscience of the Truth of them after two or three Admonitions: and
that therefore such a Person as still continues obstinate, is condemned
of himselfe: and if he then be punished, He is not punished for his
Conscience, but for sinning against his owne Conscience.54
49 See id.
so 1 W. & M., ch. I8.
SI For a general discussion of church-state relations in New England during this period, see
I W. McLOUGHLIN, NEw ENGLAND DISSENT: 1630-1833, at 3-110 (1971).
52 S. COBB, supra note 17, at 68 (quoting N. WARD, THE SIMPLE COBLER OF AGGAWAM
IN AMERICA (4th ed. 1647 and photo. reprint x9o5)).
53 Id.
54 J. COTTON, THE BLOUDY TENENT WASHED 9 (London 1647 & photo. reprint 1972).
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Massachusetts, the most rigorous of the New England Congregation-
alist establishments, actively persecuted dissenters. Baptists were ban-
ished from the colony by statute in i644, 55 and four Quakers, who
insisted on returning after being expelled, were hanged.5 6 Other dis-
senters were horsewhipped or jailed. By the 168o's, these violent
measures came to an end, although the established church and the
hostility to religious diversity continued in New England well into the
nineteenth century. 57
By contrast, in Virginia the Church of England was established
by order of the Crown and maintained, in large part, as an instrument
of social control by the governing authorities and the local gentry.
The government financed and tightly controlled the Church. Although
Virginia and New England both maintained religious establishments,
the two systems were in a more profound sense opposites. The New
England establishments arose from a grassroots movement born of the
conviction that religious truth should control all of society, while the
Virginia establishment was imposed from above and dedicated to
governmental control over religion.
For the first century of its existence, the Virginia establishment
required little overt coercion, for few dissenters ventured into the
colony. Even so, ministers sent to serve the small Puritan community
in Virginia were expelled, as was the Catholic Lord Baltimore.5 8 As
in Massachusetts, harsh measures, including banishment, were autho-
rized against Quakers, but there is little evidence that they were put
into effect.5 9 In the eighteenth century, waves of newcomers, first
Presbyterians but later Baptists and a few Quakers, entered the col-
ony. The authorities blocked the Presbyterians' ability to preach at
every turn, and the Baptists were "reviled" and "met with violence." 60
Baptists continued to be horsewhipped and jailed for their preaching
until the Revolution. In the eighteenth century, Virginia was the most
intolerant of the colonies. 61
Cotton's position had roots in both the Catholic and Reformed traditions and can be traced to
St. Augustine. See, e.g., Letter from Augustine to Boniface, The Correction of the Donatists
(A.D. 417), excerpted in J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 19 (1987)
(embracing the use of coercion against heretics and schismatics); see also D. RICHARDS, TOL-
ERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 87-88 (1986) (discussing St. Augustine's views regarding
schismatic Christians and heretics).
55 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 12-13.
56 See id. at 22.
57 See id. at 88.
58 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 82, 84-87.
S9 See id. at 89-go. But cf. id. at 9I (noting that some Quakers were arraigned and fined
under Governor Berkeley).
60 J. LEWIS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: FAMILY AND VALUES IN JEFFERSON'S VIRGINIA
49 (1987). For a discussion of Presbyterian difficulties, see T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 99; for
a discussion of Virginia's persecution of Baptists, see text accompanying note 152 below.
61 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 93, 111-14; T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 134-35; R. ISAAc,
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In time, the Virginia system spread to Maryland and throughout
the South, though with less violence toward dissenters. Georgia, the
last colony to be settled, represents an interesting variation. The
Trustees of the Georgia colony firmly supported the established
Church of England. With the assistance of the Anglican-based Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel, they financed and supervised min-
isters, built churches, and encouraged attendance and support for
religion. 62 Unlike the Virginians, the Georgia Trustees demonstrated
remarkable tolerance toward Protestant dissenters and even toward
Jews. (Savannah contained a substantial Jewish community, which
was allowed to worship in peace and participate in public affairs.)
Catholics, however, were detested and excluded from the colony.63
The third approach to religious liberty might be described as be-
nign neglect. In New York and New Jersey, a policy of de facto
religious toleration evolved, largely due to the extraordinary religious
diversity of the area. Although the four counties of metropolitan New
York had a formally established church, and although there were
periodic episodes when the royal governor attempted to enforce con-
formity to the Anglican Church, for the most part Protestants re-
mained free to live and worship in these colonies as they chose, and
Quakers and Jews were generally unmolested. 64
The fourth approach to religious freedom in seventeenth-century
America arose in those colonies that were established explicitly as
havens for religious dissenters. There were four such foundings, each
with a different religious cast. Maryland, the first haven for dissent-
ers, was founded by a Catholic proprietor, George Calvert (the first
Lord Baltimore), and his son, Cecil Calvert, to provide a place for
English Catholics to escape the persecution they suffered in the mother
country.65 After 1689, however, the proprietor was removed and the
Protestant majority in Maryland established the Church of England
and initiated a program of discrimination and intolerance toward
dissenters, particularly Roman Catholics. In the eighteenth century,
Maryland rivaled Virginia for the narrowness and intolerance of its
laws. Roger Williams, an extreme Protestant dissenter, founded
Rhode Island as a refuge for those who could not endure the Massa-
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 148-54, 162-63, 175-77, 192-94, 198-203 (2982); H.
MCILWAINE, THE STRUGGLE OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN
VIRGINIA (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Hist. and Pol. Sci., 12th Series, No. 4 April, 1894).
62 See R. STRICKLAND, RELIGION AND STATE IN GEORGIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
44-92 (1939).
63 See id. at 79-83.
64 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 301-62, 399-418; T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 62-73.
65 See W. RUSSELL, MARYLAND: THE LAND OF SANCTUARY (2d ed. i9O8); Lasson, Free
Exercise in the Free State: Maryland's Role in Religious Liberty and the First Amendment, 31
J. CHURCH & ST. 419 (I989).
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chusetts establishment. 66 William Penn founded Pennsylvania and
Delaware as sanctuaries for Quakers. 67 Although each of these colo-
nies was established for the benefit of a particular religious sect, all
extended freedom of religion to groups beyond their own. Finally,
Carolina was founded by a group of proprietors, with the assistance
of John Locke, who followed Enlightenment principles of toleration. 68
Early in the eighteenth century, North and South Carolina abandoned
these principles and instituted a rigid establishment of the Church of
England along lines parallel to Virginia's. 69 It was in these colonies
- Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Carolina
- that the free exercise of religion emerged as an articulated legal
principle.
The term "free exercise" first appeared in an American legal doc-
ument in 1648, when Lord Baltimore required his new Protestant
governor and councilors in Maryland to promise not to disturb Chris-
tians ("and in particular no Roman Catholic") in the "free exercise" of
their religion. 70 The proprietor had previously attempted to attract
settlers from Boston by a promise 'of "free liberty of religion," to which
offer Massachusetts Governor John Winthrop responded that none "of
our people. . . [had a] temptation that way."7 1 In 1649, the Maryland
Assembly passed a statute containing the first "free exercise" clause
on the continent: "noe person ... professing to beleive in Jesus Christ,
shall from henceforth bee any waies troubled .. .for . .. his or her
religion nor in the free exercise thereof ... nor any way [be] compelled
to the beliefe or exercise of any other Religion against his or her
consent. "72
Rhode Island's Charter of 166373 was the first to use the formu-
lation "liberty of conscience." The founder, Roger Williams, was a
man of extreme and idiosyncratic religious views who was banished
from Puritan Massachusetts. Williams wrote frequently, eloquently,
and vituperatively in defense of freedom of conscience. 74 With a few
glaring exceptions (Rhode Island barred Jews from citizenship, a pro-
vision that was not abandoned until 1842,75 and barred Catholics
66 See S. COBB, Supra note 17, at 422-23.
67 See id. at 440-41.
68 See id. at II5-g.
69 See id. at 124-26.
70 W. RUSSELL, supra note 65, at 130.
71 2 J. WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 163o-1649, at 149 (1825 and
photo. reprint i972).
72 Act Concerning Religion of 1649, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 49, 50
(P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
73 R.I. CHARTER of 1663, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, at 1595, 1596.
74 His most prominent work, written in i644, was R. WILLIAMS,THE BLOUDY TENENT OF
PERSECUTION, in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS I (S. Caldwell ed. 1963).
75 See M. BORDEN, JEWS, TuRKs, AND INFIDELS 13 (1984).
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from public office 76), the colony lived up to its royal Charter of 1663
as a "livelie experiment . . . with a full libertie in religious concerne-
ments. '77 In 1641, the legislature ordered that "none be accounted a
delinquent for doctrine, provided that it be not directly repugnant to
the government or laws established. 7 8 This tends to support historian
Thomas Curry's statement that "[t]he Rhode Island towns carefully
reiterated that liberty of conscience did not exempt one from the civil
law."79 Later, the royal Charter of I663 protected residents of the
colony from being "in any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or
called into question, for any differences in opinione in matters of
religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd
colony,"80 and stated that they may "freelye and fullye have and enjoye
his and theire owne judgments and consciences, in matters of religious
concernments . . . ; they behaving themselves peaceblie and quietlie
and not useing this libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor
to the civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others." 8' In compar-
ison with the earlier language, this provision implies that believers
were not required to obey all "laws established," but only those di-
rected to maintaining the "civill peace" and preventing licentiousness
and profaneness, or the injury of others.
It is tempting to assume that other American colonies observed
and eventually imitated the vision of Roger Williams and the Rhode
Island "experiment," for the depth and breadth of the Rhode Island
commitment to religious freedom were unparalleled until after the
American Revolution.8 2 The truth, however, is that Williams' writ-
ings were lost and forgotten until Massachusetts Baptist apologist and
historian Isaac Backus rediscovered them in 1773.83 In fact, far from
being a positive example, Rhode Island was the pariah among the
colonies, with a reputation for disorder and instability: "During and
after the colonial period, Rhode Island, 'the licentious Republic' and
76 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 90.
77 R.I. CHARTER of 1663, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, at 1595, 1596.
78 S. COBB, supra note 17, at 430.
79 T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 20.
80 R.I. CHARTER of 1663, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, at 1595, 1596.
81 Id., reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1597.
82 For scholarly works taking this approach, see M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE VIL-
DERNESS (1965); P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRA-
DITION (1953); W. MILLER, cited above in note I7; and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 14-3, at 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988).
83 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at gi; see also I W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 51, at 8
("[Ailmost no one in colonial New England ever praised his experiment, sought his advice,
quoted his books, or tried to imitate his practices.").
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'sinke hole of New England,' was an example to be shunned. " 84 It is
unlikely that the Rhode Island provisions had much direct influence
on subsequent developments of the free exercise principle.
The language of the Rhode Island Charter of 1663, however, had
a second and third life elsewhere in the colonies. In 1664, the pro-
prietors of Carolina issued an "Agreement" with prospective settlers,
using words almost identical to the Rhode Island charter of the pre-
vious year,8 5 and two of the Carolina proprietors also obtained the
grant of New Jersey, where they promulgated an almost identical
provision. 86 The language of the Rhode Island, Carolina, and New
Jersey provisions represented the most common form of protection for
religious freedom in the early colonies, although the provisions in other
colonies were less expansive. The language did not survive in North
Carolina, South Carolina, or New Jersey, as it was superseded by
later (and more limited) religious freedom provisions. But the sub-
stance of these early provisions later re-emerged as the most common
pattern in the constitutions adopted by the states after the Revolu-
tion.8 7
Three features of these early provisions warrant attention. First,
the free exercise provisions expressly overrode any "Law, Statute or
clause, usage or custom of this realm of England to the contrary. 88
Second, they extended to all "judgments and contiences in matters of
religion";8 9 they were not limited to opinion, speech and profession,
or acts of worship. Third, they limited the free exercise of religion
only as necessary for the prevention of "Lycentiousnesse" or the injury
or "outward disturbance of others," 90 rather than by reference to all
generally applicable laws. As discussed more fully below, these fea-
84 1 W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 5i, at 8. This illuminates the irony in the remark by
Benjamin Huntington, Representative from Connecticut, during the debate over the religion
clauses of the first amendment that "[b]y the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be
established by law; he could give a history of the effects of such a regulation; indeed the people
were now enjoying the blessed fruits of it." i ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug.
15, 1789). Huntington opposed the amendment.
Two printings exist of the first two volumes of the Annals of Congress. They contain different
pagination, running heads, and back titles. The printing with the running head "History of
Congress" conforms to the remaining volumes of the series, while the printing with the running
head "Gales & Seaton's history of debates in Congress" is unique. See CHECKLIST OF UNITED
STATES PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 1789-1909, at 1463 (3d ed. 1911). All page citations herein are to
the latter printing. Readers with the "History of Congress" printing can most easily find parallel
citations by referring to the date.
85 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at I17.
86 See id. at 400.
87 For a discussion of the later constitutions, see pp. 1456-57 & note 242 below.
88 S. COBB, supra note 17, at I17.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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tures are consistent with the idea of free exercise exemptions and
indicate the lengthy pedigree of modern exemptions under the free
exercise clause of the United States Constitution. 9'
Under the second Charter of Carolina, issued in 1665,92 the avail-
ability of free exercise exemptions was made yet more explicit. Rec-
ognizing that "it may happen that some of the people and inhabitants
of the said province cannot, in their private opinions, conform" to the
Church of England,93 the charter authorized the proprietors "to give
and grant unto such person and persons . . . such indulgences and
dispensations, in that behalf" as they "shall, in their discretion, think
fit and reasonable." 94 "Indulgences" and "dispensations" are technical
legal terms, referring to the King's asserted power to exempt citizens
from the enforcement of a law enacted by Parliament. Charles II and
James I used these powers frequently to exempt Roman Catholics
(and sometimes Protestant dissenters) from oppressive laws. 95 The
proprietors used this authority, among other things, to exempt Quak-
ers from the colony's oath requirements and to allow settlements made
up of non-Anglicans to choose their own ministers. 96
In 1669, the proprietors issued the Fundamental Constitutions, 97
though it was never fully put into effect. 98 The Fundamental Con-
stitutions is of particular interest because John Locke, as principal
adviser and assistant to Lord Ashley, the most active and influential
of the Carolina colony proprietors, helped to draft it. Indeed, the
published text was first printed from a copy in Locke's own hand-
writing and bears an obvious resemblance to Locke's theories of reli-
gious toleration.99 The Fundamental Constitutions established the
Church of England as "the only true and orthodox" church. 100 None-
theless, persons of "different opinions concerning matters of religion,"
other than atheists, were welcomed into the colony.' 10 In a remark-
91 See infra pp. 1461-64.
92 See CAROLINA CHARTER of 1665, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 1390.
93 Id., reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1397.
94 Id., reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1397.
95 See J. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 401-13
(1966); F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 302-06 (1968); 2 W.
STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 581-84 (3d ed. 1887 & photo, reprint
1987). The English Bill of Rights of 1689 curtailed the royal power of dispensation. See Bill
of Rights, 1689, i W. & M., ch. 2, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note
72, at I.
96 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 56.
97 See FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS of 669, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1397.
98 See H. BOURNE, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 243-44 (1876 and photo. reprint 1969).
99 See id. at 239 & n.i.
100 FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS of 1669, § 96, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1397, 14o6.
101 Id. § 97, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
14o6.
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able display of broadmindedness for its day, the document specifically
extended protection to "Jews, heathens, and other dissenters from the
purity of Christian religion," as well as to the "natives of that place."10 2
Even slaves were free to select "what church or profession any of
them shall think best, and, therefore, be as fully members as any
freeman. "1 0 3
While the Fundamental Constitutions provided exceptionally broad
freedom to choose among religions, there was no freedom of non-
religion or of individualistic, non-institutionalized belief. Atheists
were banned from the colony, and every person was required to be
enrolled as a member of one (and only one) church. "[A]ny seven or
more persons agreeing in any religion, shall constitute a church or
profession"'1 4 and could worship without molestation, provided they
adhered to three tenets:
Ist. "That there is a God."
11. "That God is publicly to be worshipped."
Im. "That it is lawful and the duty of every man, being thereunto
called by those that govern, to bear witness to truth; and that every
church or profession shall, in their terms of communion, set down the
external way whereby they witness a truth as in the presence of God
"105
Under this system, churches were required to register their member-
ship with the authorities, and any religious assemblies that did not
register would "not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings,
and be punished as other riots."10 6 This system suggested a respect
for the role of religion in supporting social stability, coupled with an
indifference to the choice of religion that is made and a fear of secret
religion and private faith. It had the strange effect of simultaneously
denying ultimate authority over religious matters to the state, the
church, and the individual. This corresponds to no popular concep-
tion of church-state relations and perhaps accounts for the system's
failure of implementation.
In actual practice, the most influential examples of religious plu-
ralism were the middle colonies, where no church was established
(except in the four counties of metropolitan New York) and the widest
102 Id. § 97, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1406-
07.
103 Id. § io7, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
1407.
104 Id. § 97, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Supra note 2, at 1406-
07.
105 Id. § ioo, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
1407.
106 Id. § ioS, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
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range of religious persuasions lived in relative harmony. William
Penn's colonies were particularly associated with religious freedom
and harmony because of Penn's widely read work, The Great Case of
Liberty of Conscience, published in 1670.107 Under his 1701 Charters
of Privileges,' 0 8 Pennsylvania and Delaware protected the religious
profession of all theists (but confined public office to Christians). This
example caught the eye of statesmen in other colonies, for Pennsyl-
vania's promise of toleration contributed to the highest level of im-
migration of any of the colonies, and with immigration, prosperity.
Madison later contrasted the religious repression of Virginia, which
turned away useful settlers, with "[t]he allurements presented by other
situations,' u0 9 probably referring to Pennsylvania.
B. Locke and Theories of Religious Toleration
These variations in the scope of free exercise in pre-revolutionary
America paralleled an intense and controversial theoretical debate on
the other side of the Atlantic regarding the proper relation between
religion and the state. Most of the great political thinkers of the
period - among them Hobbes, Bodin, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Bayle,
Voltaire, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Smith, and Burke - contributed
to the subject and in some manner, however indirect, influenced the
American solution to the problem.
This section concentrates on the thought of John Locke, both
because his discussion of the religion question was most extensive and
because his influence on the Americans and the first amendment was
most direct. Jefferson carefully read and made notes on Locke's The
Reasonableness of Christianity"0 and his Letters on Religious Toler-
ation.111 Major portions of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
107 See W. PENN, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in i A COLLECTION OF THE
WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 443 (London 1726 and photo. reprint 1974).
108 See DEL. CHARTER of 1701, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 270; PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES of 1701, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1536; see also S. COBB, supra note 17, at 440-53 (discussing
the religious histories of colonial Pennsylvania and Delaware); T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 72-
77, 159-62 (same); Gaustad, Colonial Religion and Liberty of Conscience, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 35 (M. Peterson & R. Vaughan eds. x988) [hereinafter VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM] (same).
109 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 188 (G. Hunt ed. i9oi) [hereinafter J. MADISON, Memorial
and Remonstrance]. Memorial and Remonstrance is also reprinted as an appendix to Justice
Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 28 app. at 63
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
110 J. LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY (I. Ramsey ed. 1958) (Ist ed. 1695).
I The Letters are reprinted in 6 J. LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE (London 1823
and 1963 photo. reprint) [hereinafter WORKS OF LOCKE]. Jefferson's notes appear in T. JEF-
FERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in i THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 544, 544-
48, 549-51 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON].
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Freedom" 12 derived from passages in Locke's first Letter Concerning
Toleration." 3 Jefferson's bill, in turn, was one of the major precursors
of the religion clauses of the first amendment. 1 4 Four of the five
states used language from Jefferson's bill in their proposals for a
religion amendment. 115 Moreover, James Madison served as floor
leader in the Virginia assembly in support of Jefferson's bill; only three
years later, he would serve as draftsman and floor leader in the House
of Representatives in support of the Bill of Rights. Locke's ideas also
entered the American debate (though more selectively) through the
writings of Massachusetts Baptist apologist Isaac Backus. 116 Locke's
ideas, then, are an indispensable part of the intellectual backdrop for
the framing of the free exercise clause. 1 7 The ways in which Amer-
ican advocates of religious freedom departed from Locke, however,
are as significant as the ways in which they followed him.
John Locke was one of the earliest, and certainly one of the most
influential, advocates of religious freedom on a theoretical ground.
Writing in the aftermath of religious turmoil in England and through-
out Europe, he viewed religious rivalry and intolerance as among the
most important of political problems. Religious intolerance was in-
consistent both with public peace and with good government. Locke's
resolution of the problem involved two elements: a modification of the
nature and claims of religion and an abandonment of the government's
role in upholding religious truth. His teachings on religion, most
prominently in The Reasonableness of Christianity, urged that Chris-
tianity be made more rational and tolerant but less engaged in ques-
tions of earthly significance. Thus, the dissension among Christian
112 Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 77.
113 See J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 WORKS OF LOCKE, supra note iii,
at I [hereinafter J. LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration]; Sandler, Lockean Ideas in Thomas
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 21 J. HIST. IDEAS OO (1960); see also W.
BERNS, supra note 13, at 18-24 (tracing the Lockean roots of Jefferson's insistence that principles
of consent and free opinion require religious freedom); M. MALBIN, supra note 17, at 29 (noting
and summarizing Jefferson's reliance upon the first Letter Concerning Toleration in drafting the
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom); Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom," 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983) (cataloging the similarities
between Locke's Letters and Jefferson's bill).
114 See Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hundred Years Later, in VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note io8, at I, io-ii. But cf. C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E.
ROBERTS, supra note 16 (explaining the varieties of religious establishment and toleration in the
colonies and illustrating the wide range of opinion and practice that lies behind the adoption of
the religion clauses); P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 48-50 (1964) (warning
against too heavy a reliance on the views of Madison and Jefferson for interpretation of the
first amendment).
115 See infra TAN 359-362.
116 See McLoughlin, Introduction, in I. BACKUS, ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM 1, 40-44 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968) [hereinafter CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM].
117 See D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at io5-o.
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denominations would be softened and would be less likely to create
political problems.
Although his little-known earlier works, Two Tracts on Govern-
ment," 8 advocated that government reduce religious turmoil by en-
forcing religious unity," 9 by 1689 Locke had concluded that such
attempts were the source of the problem: "It is not the diversity of
opinions, which cannot be avoided; but the refusal of toleration to
those that are of different opinions, which might have been granted,
that has produced all the bustles and wars, that have been in the
Christian world, upon account of religion." 120 Accordingly, Locke
became an advocate of a sweeping toleration toward religious dis-
senters, with the exceptions of Catholics (because of their allegiance
to a foreign prince), atheists (because they cannot be trusted to carry
out their promises and oaths), and those who refuse to support tol-
erance for others. 12 1 "Nobody . . . [has] any just title to invade the
civil rights and worldly goods of [another], upon pretence of religion,"
Locke stated. "Those that are of another opinion, would do well to
consider with themselves how pernicious a seed of discord and war,
how powerful a provocation to endless hatreds, rapines, and slaugh-
ters, they thereby furnish unto mankind."1 22
In Locke's view, religious strife stems from the tendency of both
religious and governmental leaders to overstep their bounds and in-
termeddle in the others' province: "I esteem it above all things nec-
essary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from
that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one
and the other."'1 23 The proper division between the realms of govern-
ment and religion comes down to this: "all the power of civil govern-
ment relates only to men's civil interests, is confined to the care of
the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to
come," 124 while "churches have [no] jurisdiction in worldly mat-
118 J. LOcKE, Two TRAcTs ON GOVERNMENT (P. Abrams ed. 1967). Not to be confused
with his Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698), these essays
were written by Locke in I66o, at the age of 3o, but he did not publish them. Both Tracts are
devoted to defending the power of the magistrate over religion.
119 Locke's Two Tracts on Government resembled Thomas Hobbes' teaching that civil gov-
ernment should have complete authority over religion, extending not just to conduct but to
religious profession and worship as well. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. III, ch. 43, at 355
(M. Oakeshott ed. 1957) (ist ed. i65I). Hobbes denied any right to exemption from civil law
on account of religious scruple, both because it would engender "confusion and civil war," id.,
and because true Christianity required only two "virtues" for salvation: "faith in Christ, and
obedience to Laws." Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
120 J. LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note I13, at 53.
121 See id. at 46-47.
122 Id. at 20.
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id. at 12-13.
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ters.11 25 Thus, Locke was concerned not only with limiting the powers
of government, but also with limiting the purview of religion. "The
end of a religious society," he wrote, "is the public worship of God,
and by means thereof the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline
ought therefore to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be
thereunto confined." 126
To be sure, Locke's ideal of separation was less than complete, for
he was willing to countenance governmental encouragement of the
state religion. "[T]he magistrate may make use of arguments," wrote
Locke, "and thereby draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and
procure their salvation .... But it is one thing to persuade, another
to command; one thing to press with arguments, another with pen-
alties.' 27 He also accepted government financial support of state
religion and never condemned the English system of supporting the
church with taxes; indeed, he served as secretary to the Lord Chan-
cellor for the presentation of benefices - that is, the dispensing of
religious patronage. 128 While Locke opposed what would be called
interference with free exercise, he thus approved of what would be
called an establishment under modern constitutional doctrine.
For the purposes of this Article, two aspects of Locke's teaching
are particularly significant: his advocacy of legislative supremacy with
respect to conflicts between public power and individual conscience
and his rejection of religious exemptions. Although Locke's prescrip-
tion for religious harmony depends upon the division between the
religious and the secular jurisdictions, he anticipated that some mat-
ters, such as "[m]oral actions," belong "to the jurisdiction both of the
.. .magistrate and conscience. 1 29 He recognized that this creates
"great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon the
other. '"130 As a practical matter, the possible overlap in jurisdiction
did not greatly concern Locke, for "if government be faithfully ad-
ministered, and the counsels of the magistrate be indeed directed to
12s Id. at ig.
126 Id. at 15-16. This understanding has its modern echo in the claim that religion is a
strictly "private" matter, which ought not be allowed to influence public decisions. An example
of this position, though not using precisely the words in text, is Justice Stevens' opinion in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1o9 S. Ct. 3040 (i989), in which he argues that
religiously based premises about the value of life form an illegitimate basis for legislation. See
id. at 3082-85 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a critique of this
position, see K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 12 (1988),
which concludes that it is appropriate for citizens and legislators to rely upon their religious
convictions when "shared premises of justice and criteria for determining truth cannot resolve
critical questions of fact"; and Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833, 1oll-
xio9 (1986).
127 J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at II.
128 See I P. KING, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 62 (London 1830).
129 J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at 41.
130 Id.
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the public good," it will "seldom happen" that the magistrate enjoins
"'any thing by his authority, that appears unlawful to the conscience
of a private person.""131 In theory, however, such clashes might occur;
Locke proposed that under these circumstances the individual should
disobey the law and accept punishment from the state. "[T]he private
judgment of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters,
for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law,
nor deserve a dispensation.' 32
Locke gave a modicum of rhetorical support to the individual,
exempting from this requirement of obedience those laws "not within
the verge of the magistrate's authority."1 33 But when the magistrate
believes that a law is within his authority, and the individual believes
the contrary, the magistrate prevails: "Who shall be judge between
them? I answer, God alone; for there is no judge upon earth between
the supreme magistrate and the people. . . . You will say then the
magistrate being the stronger will have his will, and carry his point.
Without doubt."1 34 In other words, the government's perception of
public need defines the boundaries of freedom of conscience. As
Professor Walter Berns puts the point: "according to liberalism - one
renders unto Caesar whatever Caesar demands and to God whatever
131 Id. at 43.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 44-45. This passage is similar to Locke's treatment of the wider theme of consti-
tutional limits on government in The Second Treatise of Government. There, he posited that
"the body of the people" are the "proper umpire" in cases of controversy over the powers of the
government. See J. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government § 242, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 118, at 307, 476-77. But there is no lawful institution for vindication
of the people's judgment. If the government does not honor the determination of the people on
a contested point, "the appeal then lies nowhere but to heaven." Id. By this Locke meant
revolution - a "state of war" between government and the people. The "supreme power"
reverts to the people, who then have authority to "continue the legislative in themselves, or
erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good." Id. § 243,
at 139. At a verbal level this "appeal to heaven" is the same remedy prescribed in A Letter
Concerning Toleration for a violation of religious freedom, but with an important difference.
In the case of religious freedom, Locke did not claim that the "body of the people" - or anyone
else on earth - can serve as judge between the believer and the government. Perhaps this is
because duties to God (unlike other constitutional limits) are not defined or governed by the
social contract. Perhaps it is also because, as Madison perceived, the "body of the people" are
as likely to violate the conscience of a religious minority as is the government. For this reason,
the "appeal to heaven" is unlikely to take the form of revolution unless the believers whose
rights are violated constitute a majority, or at least a powerful minority. In the context of
religious freedom, therefore, Locke pointed to the otherworldly consequences of the appeal to
heaven: "God, I say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the
last day according to his deserts . . . ." J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note
113, at 44. No political institution, nor even the remedy of revolution available under Locke's
political theories, can be expected to vindicate these rights if the magistrate chooses not to do
so. Locke's language thus subtly suggests that religious freedom is fundamentally more vulner-
able than other rights.
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Caesar permits." 135 When individual conscience conflicts with the
governmental policy, the government will always prevail and the
individual will always be forced to submit or suffer the punishment.
This understanding of religious toleration expressly precludes free
exercise exemptions. The rights of religious exercise, according to
Locke, are simply rights of nondiscrimination. "Whatsoever is lawful
in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the
church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their
ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any
sect of people for their religious uses." 136 Locke gave the example of
a sect that wishes to sacrifice a calf. "I deny that that ought to be
prohibited by a law," he said. 137 Since individuals can lawfully kill
a calf at home, and burn any part they see fit, they may do the same
thing in a religious meeting. 138 They are not entitled, however, to
dispensations or exceptions:
[T]hose things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in
their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things
ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred rites. Only the
magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his
authority, to the oppression of any church, under pretence of public
good. 139
Accordingly, if the "interest of the commonwealth required all slaugh-
ter of beasts should be forborn for some while," the ritual slaughter
of a calf for religious purposes may be forbidden as well.140
Locke's assertion of legislative supremacy and his opposition to
special religious exemptions from generally applicable laws are con-
sonant with arguments against free exercise exemptions. Unless there
is reason to believe that the understanding of the free exercise clause
held by the framers and ratifiers differed markedly from that of their
intellectual forebear, Locke, Sherbert is historically unsupportable. 14 1
As the next section demonstrates, however, the movement towards a
more expansive notion of religious liberty would gain momentum in
the wake of the American Revolution and shape the framing of both
state and federal constitutions.
135 W. BEaNS, supra note 13, at 44.
136 J. LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at 34.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 34-35.
140 Id. at 34.
141 The arguments against free exercise exemptions offered by Berns and Michael Malbin
are based almost exclusively on Locke and his Enlightenment counterparts in America. See W.
BERNS, supra note I3; M. MALBIN, supra note 17.
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C. Development of the Expansive Conception of Religious Freedom
x. Disestablishment in the States. - The American Revolution
immediately disrupted the relationship between religion and govern-
ment in those states with an Anglican establishment. The Church of
England was discredited during the Revolution by its connection to
the Crown and the loyalist sympathies of most of its clergy. Accord-
ingly, the Georgia Constitution of 1777, the South Carolina Consti-
tution of 1778, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, and the New
York Constitution of 1777 (with reference to the four metropolitan
counties that had an Anglican establishment) eliminated the special
preferences and state support that had been given to the Church of
England. South Carolina "established" the Protestant religion but
gave it no governmental support, while Georgia authorized the im-
position of a tax for the support of the taxpayer's "own profession."
New York and North Carolina joined the ranks of states (Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Rhode Island) with no establish-
ment. 1
4 2
Virginia and Maryland were slower to adjust. Virginia adopted a
free exercise provision in its Bill of Rights of 1776143 and exempted
dissenters from payment of tithes to the Anglican Church; shortly
thereafter, it temporarily suspended mandatory tithes for everyone.
The Church was formally disestablished in 1785, after a major popular
and legislative battle in which James Madison played the leading
role. 144 The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 authorized the
legislature to "lay a general and equal tax, for the support of the
Christian religion," 145 but during a protracted dispute in the Assembly
in the 178o's, supporters of an assessment were never able to pre-
vail. 146 Nonetheless, the Maryland legislature exercised continuing
control over church affairs. So subservient was the established
Church that in 1783 its clergy asked the legislature for permission to
make changes in the prayer book. 147 Accordingly, the Episcopal
142 See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 377, 383; N.Y. CONST of 1777, art. XXXV, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1328, 1338; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV,
reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1409, 1413-14; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIfl, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 1620, 1626-27.
143 See Va. Bill of Rights of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at i9o8.
144 See T. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at
155-64 (1977).
145 Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 817, 819.
146 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 154.
147 See id. at 154-55.
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Church of Maryland got the bitter of state meddling in church affairs
without the sweet of regular state financial support.
The Congregational establishments of Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont were more firmly entrenched and
emerged from the Revolution strengthened by their association with
the patriot cause. In reference to the Massachusetts Congregational-
ists, John Adams observed that "[w]e might as soon expect a change
in the solar system, as to expect that they would give up their estab-
lishment."1 48 And indeed, by 1789 only these states maintained actual
legal and financial support for the church. Outside of New England,
only Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia retained constitutional
provisions permitting some form of establishment, and in none of
these states did actual financial or other material support go into
effect.
By 1834, no state in the Union would have an established church,
and the tradition of separation between church and state would seem
an ingrained and vital part of our constitutional system. But as the
delegates gathered at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
in 1787 and at the meeting of the First Congress in New York in
1789, some form of establishment still held sway in most of New
England, and the resolution of disestablishment controversies else-
where could not be seen as assured.
2. The Evangelical Impetus Toward Religious Freedom. - The
movement for freedom of religion in the 178o's was part of a broad
reaction against the dominant but uninspired religious cultures rep-
resented by the Congregationalists of New England and the Anglicans
of the South. It is a mistake to read the religion clauses under the
now prevalent assumption that "the governing intellectual climate of
the late eighteenth century was that of deism (or natural law).' 49
America was in the wake of a great religious revival. Historian Henry
May has commented that the Enlightenment world view "excludes
many, probably most, people who lived in America in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries." 150 To determine the meaning of the religion
clauses, it is necessary to see them through the eyes of their propo-
nents, most of whom were members of the most fervent and evan-
gelical denominations in the nation.' 5 '
One historian's portrait of Madison's neighbors, the Virginia Bap-
tists, in the 176o's may help recreate the actual intellectual - more
148 1 W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 5I, at 560 (quoting Isaac Backus' account of his con-
frontation with the Massachusetts delegation).
149 Marshall, supra note 17, at 18; see also W. BERNS, supra note 13, at 1-2, 15-32 (same).
150 H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA at xiv (1976).
1S1 This point was first brought to the attention of legal scholars by M. HoWE, cited above
in note 82.
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precisely, spiritual - climate among the proponents of religious free-
dom:
Perhaps because they were at first largely lower class; perhaps because
their worship sometimes caused their members to cry, bark like dogs,
tremble, jerk, and fall to the ground; perhaps because they openly
disdained the established religion and gentry mores; and perhaps be-
cause, as one Virginian charged, "they cannot meet a man on the road
but they must ram a text of Scripture down his throat," the Baptists
were reviled. They were seen as troublesome, and they were met
with violence. 152
It must have been particularly irksome to the gentry that the Baptists
converted slaves in large numbers 5 3 and included them "as 'brothers'
and 'sisters' in their close communities."'51 4 Even the Presbyterians,
now pillars of mainstream Protestantism, were considered dangerously
"enthusiastic" (meaning fanatical) by the authorities. Itinerant Pres-
byterian preachers in Virginia were said to "screw up the People to
the greatest heights of religious Phrenzy, and then leave them in that
wild state. '155
The drive for religious freedom was part of this evangelistic move-
ment. It is anachronistic to assume, based on modern patterns, that
governmental aid to religion and suppression of heterodoxy were op-
posed by the more rationalistic and supported by the more intense
religious believers of that era. The most intense religious sects op-
posed establishment on the ground that it injured religion and sub-
jected it to the control of civil authorities. Guaranteed state support
was thought to stifle religious enthusiasm and initiative. As Madison
noted, the use of compulsory state taxes to support ministers would
produce "pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in
the laity. "156 Moreover, establishment served as an instrument for
state control over religion. This was particularly true in the states of
the Anglican establishment, including Virginia, where the governor,
legislature, and gentry exercised direct authority over the established
church and the power of licensing over preachers of dissenting denom-
inations.15 7 The establishment was localized and more democratic in
152 J. LEWIS, supra note 6o, at 49. A similar, though more sympathetic, portrayal is found
in R. IsAAC, cited above in note 6i, at 164-68.
153 See R. IsAAc, supra note 6r, at 165-66.
154 Id. at 171-72.
Iss Id. at I5o; see also D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL ExPERIENCE 135-
36 (1958) (providing an unflattering portrayal of the "Enthusiastick Preachers" of New Light
Presbyterianism).
156 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note io9, at 187. This argument is
elaborated by Adam Smith in A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 5, ch. I, pt. 3, art.
3, at 740-66 (E. Carman ed. 1937) (5th ed. 1789).
157 See, e.g., D. BOORSTIN, supra note 155, at 126-27, 129 (describing how, in the absence
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New England, but even there, the government set standards for li-
censing ministers and regulated ministerial tenure (hence ministerial
independence) and itinerancy.' 5 8
State financial support was inevitably linked to control. The Bap-
fists' declaration against the Virginia assessment proposal observed:
If, therefore, the State provide a Support for Preachers of the Gospel,
and they receive it in Consideration of their Services, they must
certainly when they Preach act as Officers of the State, and ought to
be Accountable thereto for their Conduct, not only as Members of
civil Society, but also as Preachers. The Consequence of this is, that
those whom the State employs in its Service, it has a Right to regulate
and dictate to; it may judge and determine who shall preach; when
and where they shall preach; and what they must preach. 159
The newer, more enthusiastic sects had the most to gain from
breaking the monopoly of the old established church. This would
allow new, often uneducated and itinerant preachers to conduct wor-
ship services and revival meetings and would make the financial
support of a preacher dependent on the enthusiasm he generated
among his adherents. The greatest support for disestablishment and
free exercise therefore came from evangelical Protestant denomina-
tions, especially Baptists and Quakers, but also Presbyterians, Lu-
therans, and others. 160 The decisive political event in the Virginia
disestablishment struggle was the decision of the Presbyterians to
of a bishop in Virginia, the Anglican church was governed in temporal matters by the House
of Burgesses and in other respects by the local gentry); S. COBB, supra note 17, at 97-98, 351-
53 (giving examples of restrictive licensing of ministers in Virginia and New York); id. at 107
(recounting instances of investiture and defrocking of ministers by Virginia's governor); id. at
126 (discussing governmental control over ministers under North Carolina law); id. at 393-94
(illustrating control by the proprietor over investiture in Maryland); T. CURRY, supra note 17,
at 99 (describing Virginia's prohibition of itinerant preaching); R. ISAAC, supra note 6r, at 148-
54 (recounting the struggle by Presbyterians in Virginia for permission to hold religious meetings);
R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 70, 83-87 (describing control by trustees over both the
Church of England and Presbyterian ministries in Georgia).
158 See, e.g., S. COBB, supra note 17, at 174, 202-03 (providing examples of the Massachu-
setts General Court's power to regulate doctrinal purity and the qualifications of preachers); id.
at 2 72-73 (recounting the adoption of laws against itinerant preaching in Connecticut); T. CURRY,
supra note 17, at 99, 1i8 (discussing Connecticut laws against itinerant preaching); id. at 171
(discussing a Massachusetts law requiring ministers to possess degrees).
159 Declaration of the Virginia Association of Baptists (Dec. 25, 1776), in I PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note Iii, at 66o, 66i (emphasis in original).
160 The small Jewish population of Philadelphia made its contribution to the struggle for
free exercise with petitions against religious tests for office in Pennsylvania and at the federal
level. See, e.g., Petition of the Philadelphia Synagogue to Council of Censors of Pennsylvania
(Dec. 23, 1783), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, Supra note 72, at 635; Letter
from Jonas Phillips to the President and Members of the Convention (Sept. 7, r787), reprinted
in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78, 78-79 (M. Farrand ed.
19ri and photo. reprint 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND RECORDS].
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desert the assessment cause and join the opposition. 161 Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, with its
mixed religious and secular arguments against the relatively liberal
form of establishment proposed for Virginia in 1785, garnered thou-
sands of supportive signatures. Over twice as many Virginians, how-
ever, subscribed to petitions arguing against the assessment in frankly
religious terms - stating, among other things, that the bill violated
"the Spirit of the Gospel.' t62
Religious rationalists, who are often credited with the leading
intellectual role in the movement for religious freedom, were far more
likely than the enthusiastic believers to side with the established
church (with notable exceptions such as Jefferson). 163 Ironically, it
was the Unitarian wing of the Standing Order, Jefferson's favored
theological position, that led the fight against disestablishment in Mas-
sachusetts, 164 while the "enthusiastic" Baptists sought to cast down
all vestiges of the establishment. The established religions - the
Congregational churches of New England and the Anglican churches
of the South - tended to be far more intellectual, uninspired, and
agreeable to rationalist sensibilities, in contrast to the disturbing en-
thusiasm of the upstart denominations.
The religious supporters of disestablishment and free exercise in
the various states also supported adoption of constitutional protections
at the federal level, for essentially the same reasons. They were joined
in the latter cause by a heterogeneous coalition called the Antifeder-
alists, who used the absence of a bill of rights as an argument against
ratification of the Constitution. This was little more than a marriage
161 As the established church of Scotland, the Presbyterians had no doctrinal tradition of
opposition to establishment. Their principal concern with the proposed assessment bill was that
its provision for support of the clergy would undermine the control of the elders over the
minister and the church. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 144, at 92-96, 137-139. Shortly after
the assessment controversy, the Presbyterians in the United States formally amended their
Confession of Faith to renounce their prior support for establishment. See PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (U.S.A.), "GOD ALONE IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE": POLICY STATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 7, 69-70 (1988) [hereinafter PRESBYTER-
IAN POLICY STATEMENT].
162 See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 144, at 148-5o; T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 143-44.
163 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 171 ("Religious rationalists in Massachusetts, such as
Samuel West, Charles Chauncey, and other ministers who benefited from the state-supported
religious system, remained its devoted upholders and insisted on its fairness."); see also D.
BOORSTIN, supra note 155
, 
at 132-39 (describing the undogmatic character of the Anglican
Church of Virginia); R. ISAAC, supra note 61, at 120-21 (same); id. at 153 (reporting a sermon
by an Anglican minister to the Virginia House of Burgesses that advocated "rational" religion
and denounced the New Light evangelical movement); R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 65
(describing a "typical eighteenth century Church of England man" in Georgia as "decrying
Calvinism, 'enthusiasm' and the doctrines of regeneration").
164 See McLoughlin, Editor's Introduction to I. BACKUS, Government and Liberty Described,
in CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 116, at 345, 346.
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of political convenience, for the advocates of religious freedom had
little in common with the political principles of most Antifederalists.
The Baptists of Virginia must have found it awkward to join forces
with Patrick Henry, Virginia's leading Antifederalist, who had so
recently championed the movement for religious assessments. Yet in
the ratification convention in Virginia it was Henry who took up the
issue of religious freedom and the absence of a Bill of Rights, 165 while
Madison, the erstwhile supporter of religious freedom, urged ratifi-
cation of the Constitution without amendment. 166
The political theory of the advocates of free exercise sharply con-
flicted with the "republican" ideology that prevailed among most An-
tifederalists (as well as many Federalists). 167 The central preoccupa-
tion of republican political theory was the necessity of public "virtue."
In its religious manifestation, this meant that government should sup-
port and encourage religion in order to promote public morality.168
The Massachusetts Constitution of 178o, for example, justified its
ministerial taxes on the ground that "the happiness of a people and
the good order and preservation of civil government essentially depend
on piety, religion, and morality."'1 69 The Virginia assessment proposal
was defended on the same ground. A petition by citizens of Isle of
Wight County, for example, stated: "being thoroughly convinced that
the prosperity and happiness of this country essentially depends on
the progress of religion, they . . . [pray] that an act may pass to
compel every one to contribute something, in proportion to his prop-
erty, to the support of religion.' u70 The most famous statement of
this sort was Washington's farewell address, in which he stated that
"[o]f all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports .... And let us with
caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained With-
out religion.' 71
165 See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 317-18 (J. Elliott 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (June
12, 1788).
166 See id. at 330.
167 For recent analyses of republican ideology, see M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-14 (1988); Michelman, The Supreme Court,
1g85 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self Government, ioo HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986); and Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539 (1988).
168 See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 426-29 (1969).
169 Mass. Declaration of Rights of 178o, art. II, in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 957.
170 Petition for General Assessment (Nov. 4, 1784), reprinted in C. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 125, 125 (19oo and photo.
reprint 1971).
171 Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in I DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 169, 173 (H. Commager 9th ed. 1973).
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These arguments ran directly contrary to the position of the evan-
gelical advocates of the religion clauses. To be sure, these advocates
did not deny that religion is necessary to civil society. Isaac Backus,
for example, affirmed that "religion is as necessary for the well-being
of human society as salt is to preserve from putrefaction or as light
is to direct our way and to guard against enemies, confusion, and
misery.'1 72 But they did deny that governmental support is necessary,
or even useful, to religion. 173 According to Elder John Leland, leader
of the Virginia Baptists, "[iut is error alone, that stands in need of
government to support it; truth can and will do better without...
it."1 74 Moreover, the evangelicals found this very mode of argument
objectionable, because it implied that religion was to be used as an
instrument of statecraft, thus implicitly subordinating religion to the
goal of "political prosperity." As Backus caustically observed of the
Massachusetts establishment, "a little while ago" the establishment
was "for religion," but now it is said to be "for the good of civil
society. "175
The paradox of the religious freedom debates of the late eighteenth
century is that one side employed essentially secular arguments based
on the needs of civil society for the support of religion, while the other
side employed essentially religious arguments based on the primacy of
duties to God over duties to the state in support of disestablishment
and free exercise. It was Baptist preacher John Leland who first
stated that "[t]he notion of a Christian commonwealth, should be
exploded forever."1 76
Although the secular strain of republicanism was less an object of
the evangelicals' polemics, it was no less inconsistent with their un-
derstanding of the proper role of the state. Civic republicanism sought
to inculcate public virtue through various devices, including sump-
tuary laws, education, and participatory politics. To the evangelical
advocates of religious freedom, this too was a vain extension of the
governmental sphere; virtue is either impossible or incoherent when
divorced from duty to God. Their position places the state in the
precarious posture of depending upon autonomous institutions to pre-
serve the moral conditions necessary to the survival of republican
government.
Thus, the evangelical position ultimately coalesced with the secular
liberal position, as against the dying tradition of civic republicanism.
172 1. BACKUS, Policy, as Well as Honesty, Forbids the Use of Secular Force in Religious
Affairs, in CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note i6, at 367, 371.
173 See supra pp. 1438-40.
174 J. LELAND, The Virginia Chronicle, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND 91, I18 (L. Greene ed. 1845) [hereinafter LELAND WRITINGS].
17S I. BACKUS, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty, in CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM, supra note 116, at 303, 324 (emphasis in original).
176 J. LELAND, supra note 174, at 107.
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This explains why the more fervent evangelicals, including the Bap-
fists, tended to become Jeffersonians, notwithstanding the deism of
Jefferson and the piety of his opponents. Religion, the evangelicals
believed, is vital to civic harmony. But voluntary religious societies
- not the state - are the best and only legitimate institutions for the
transmission of religious faith and, with it, virtue. The only support
that churches can legitimately expect from the government, apart from
equal participation in the benefits of civil society, is protection and
noninterference. 177
3. Advances Beyond Locke in the Popular Understanding of Re-
ligious Freedom. - The same evangelical forces converged in support
of protections for religious liberty through free exercise provisions in
state constitutions. It is no accident that Locke's vocabulary ("toler-
ation of religion") was rejected in favor of more sweeping terms -
not just the "exercise," but-the "free exercise" of religion, or "full and
equal rights of conscience." When George Mason proposed the term
"toleration" for the religious liberty clause of the Virginia Bill of
Rights, 178 Madison objected on the ground that the word "toleration"
implies an act of legislative grace, which in Locke's understanding it
was. Madison proposed, and the Virginia assembly adopted, the
broader phrase: "the full and free exercise of [religion]. " 179
Madison was far from alone in his rejection of the concept of
"toleration." Tench Coxe, a prominent essayist, stated that "[m]ere
toleration is a doctrine exploded by our general constitution." 80 He
said that the Americans had "substituted an unqualified admission and
assertion, that their own modes of worship and of faith equally belong
to all the worshippers of God, of whatever church, sect, or denomi-
nation. "181 George Washington, in his famous address to the Hebrew
177 See J. LELAND, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, in LELAND WRITINGS, Supra note
174, at 179, 184. Leland wrote:
Let every man speak freely without fear, maintain the principles that he believes, worship
according to his own faith, either one God, three Gods, no God, or twenty Gods; and
let government protect him in so doing, i.e., see that hemeets with no personal abuse,
or loss of property, for his religious opinions.
Id. The Presbyterian Church formally adopted a similar position at its first General Assembly
in 1788: "'We do not even wish to see any religious constitution aided by the civil power, further
than may be necessary for protection and security, at the same time be equal and common to
all others."' PRESBYTERIAN POLICY STATEMENT, supra note r61, at 7 (quoting the Presbyterian
Principles of Church Order).
178 See Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, I ANN. REP. AM. HIST. A. 163, 166
(igoi). Mason's proposal read in relevant part: "'that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration
in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained
by the magistrate, unless under color of religion any man disturb the peace, the happiness, or
safety of society."' Id.
179 Id.
180 Kurland, supra note 17, at 857 (quoting T. CoxE, A VIEw OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 103-04 (Philadelphia 1794)).
181 Id.
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Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, stated: "It is now no more
that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class
of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural
rights." 8 2 More pungently, Thomas Paine commented: "Toleration is
not the opposite of intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are
despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty
of conscience, and the other of granting it."'' s3 The United States,
several millions of dissenters and a century of pluralism ahead of
Locke's England, had advanced beyond mere toleration of religion.
There are two primary reasons to believe that the popular concep-
tion of free exercise on this side of the Atlantic was more expansive
than Locke's doctrine of religious toleration: the advent of judicial
review, and a difference in conception of the nature and role of
religion.
(a) Judicial Review. - One reason that Locke's doctrines may
have seemed so limited from an American perspective is that he did
not envision an authority within the law that was capable of limiting
the sovereign power of the "magistrate" (by which he meant the
government, the King, and Parliament). "[T]here is no judge upon
earth between the supreme magistrate and the people.' 8 4 While
Locke recognized the moral imperative to obey God instead of civil
rulers,' 85 his conception of political institutions did not include a
mediator who could transform this moral, prepolitical right into pos-
itive law. In the absence of such a mediator, individual conscience
could be compelled to yield to government in the event of a conflict.
For Locke, the field left to untrammeled conscience could only extend
to that in which the civil magistrate had no particular interest -
principally, to things pertaining to the world to come. Religious lib-
erty could only be defined negatively; any broader definition would
be pointless, since the magistrate would be judge of his own powers.
Locke's key assumption of legislative supremacy no longer holds
under a written constitution with judicial review. The revolutionary
American contribution to political theory was that the people them-
selves are sovereign and therefore possess inherent power to limit the
power of the magistrate, through a written constitution enforced by
judges independent of the legislature and executive. As Madison
would predict during deliberation over the Bill of Rights:
If [the provisions of the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the
constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
182 31 G. WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 93 n.65 (J. Fitzpatrick
ed. 1939).
183 T. PAINE, The Rights of Man, pt. x, in x THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE
243, 291 (P. Foner ed. 1945) (emphasis in original).
14 J. LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at 44.
1ss See id. at 43-45.
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in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the leg-
islative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every en-
croachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by
the declaration of rights.' 8 6
Once the courts are vested with the power to determine the proper
boundary between individual conscience and the magistrate's author-
ity, based on the words of a written charter derived from the people,
fuller protection for conscience becomes conceivable. An independent
judiciary could define religious liberty affirmatively, in terms of what
religious liberty requires, and not merely what the legislature con-
cedes. The modern "judicial restraint" position, that legislatures are
entitled to make free exercise exemptions but courts are not, is a relic
of Lockean legislative supremacy. Once the people empowered the
courts to enforce the boundary between individual rights and the
magistrate's power, they entrusted the courts with a responsibility that
prior to 1789 had been exercised only by the legislature.
(b) The Nature and Role of Religion. - Those most engaged in
the struggle for religious freedom guarantees in the United States also
departed from Locke's understanding of the role of religion and the
utility of religious liberty. While they put Locke's arguments to good
effect in legitimating their position, the free exercise apologists used
Locke opportunistically, ignoring implications of his argument that
were inconvenient to their case. To Locke, religious divisions and
discord presented a political problem; the solution was to keep the
peace by making religion irrelevant to the things of this world -
other than a reasonable, uncontroversial advocacy of good morals,
which would be fully consistent with the public good, publicly defined.
This was not the religious enthusiasts' idea of religion and not
their idea of religious liberty. To them, the church-state problem was
principally a religious problem: the state too frequently used its power
to prevent the practice and spread of the gospel. The Baptists lan-
guishing in the Culpepper jail and the Presbyterians fighting legislative
interference with their form of church governance were not fearful of
religion. They were fearful of government. To the evangelical spirit
of the minority Protestant sects in America, Locke's conception of the
separation between the secular and the religious would have seemed
absurd. Does not the will of God govern all of life? Is He not
sovereign over all? To the preachers who only recently had been
among the leading advocates of revolution against the King, Locke's
186 I ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789). The evidence is overwhelm-
ing that the framers and ratifiers understood and intended the courts to engage in constitutional
judicial review. For a brief summary, see D. CURaE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 69-70 (1985).
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claim that they should be "forbidden meddling with making or exe-
cuting laws in their preaching"' 87 must have seemed quaint, as well
as presumptuous. If Locke and Jefferson wished to promote a peace-
able, rational religion that minds its own business, is tolerant of
others, and does not meddle in affairs of state,' 88 their aspirations
were diametrically opposed to those whose political efforts produced
the first amendment.
These differing conceptions of the purposes of religious freedom
have clear implications for the question of free exercise exemptions.
From the religious perspective, the scope of free exercise cannot be
defined, in the first instance, by asking what matters the public is
rightly concerned about. Religion involves itself in many matters of
importance to the public. Free exercise must be defined, in the first
instance, by what matters God is concerned about, according to the
conscientious belief of the individual.
In this respect, Madison's argument in the Memorial and Remon-
strance echoed evangelical convictions about the roles of religion and
civil government. His position that duty to God precedes the claims
of civil society 189 strongly resembles the teachings of John Wither-
spoon, the nation's leading Presbyterian clergyman and President of
the College of New Jersey (Princeton) while Madison was a student.
In an address that Madison might have heard, Witherspoon observed:
Another reason why the servants of God are represented as trouble-
some is, because they will not, and dare not comply with the sinful
commandments of men. In matters merely civil, good men are the
most regular citizens and the most obedient subjects. But, as they
have a Master in heaven, no earthly power can constrain them to
deny his name or desert his cause. 190
The demands of civil society must be judged against the demands of
God. That is why the "servants of God" seem "troublesome" and why
a society that determines to respect the claims of conscience must
recognize exemptions from its laws.
187 J. LocyE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE 275 (V. von Leyden ed. 1954) (ca. x66o).
188 Compare Jefferson's praise for the Virginia Methodists with his criticism of the Presby-
terian clergy: "The Methodists are republican mostly, satisfied with their governmt. [,] medling
with nothing but the concerns of their own calling and opposing nothing"; the Presbyterian
clergy "are violent, ambitious of power, and intolerant in politics as in religion and want nothing
but license from the laws to kindle again the fires of their leader John Knox, and to give us a
2d blast from his trumpet." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (March 13,
1820), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 697, 697 (A. Koch &
IV. Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON].
189 See infra text accompanying notes 229-230.
190 J. WITHERSPOON, The Charge of Sedition and Faction Against Good Men, Especially
Faithful Ministers, Considered and Accounted for, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN
WITHERSPOON 415, 427 (Philadelphia 1802).
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While the argument for exemptions tended to be oblique and by
implication, opponents of free exercise automatically assumed that
liberty of conscience must entail exemptions, and thus claimed that
free exercise was tantamount to anarchy. Proponents of exemptions
could have responded by denying any claim to exemptions and con-
fining their opposition to discriminatory treatment. But this was not
their approach. Proponents did attempt to minimize the practical
consequences of the exemptions position by stoutly declaring their
fealty to almost all of the laws. But they cleverly used ambiguous
language to leave open the theoretical possibility that conscience would
prevail over wrongful legislation.
The question of exemptions arose for the first time in the dispu-
tation between John Cotton and Roger Williams in the 1640's and
1650's.191 Williams argued that the government has no authority to
enforce the so-called "First Table" (the first four commandments,
which deal with religious worship). 192 Cotton responded that this
undermined the government's authority to enforce the "Second Table"
(murder, theft, perjury, etc.), as well. 193 As Thomas Curry, author
of the of the leading history of church-state conflicts in preconstitu-
tional America, observes:
This rebuttal to Williams derived its strength from its solid foundation
in a very real problem, which Williams was unable to tackle and
which still has not been solved: how to distinguish between those
areas that belong only to religion or conscience and those that belong
to the law. In other words, to what extent does a claim to the free
exercise of religion exempt one from the laws of the land?194
If conscience must be respected, and if conscience can be defined in
no way other than by the individual believer, then doesn't liberty of
conscience give believers a license to violate laws vital to social order?
Williams never provided a direct response to this question. Wil-
liam Penn did. In The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, Penn
posed and answered a number of "objections" made by opponents of
religious freedom. To objection number three, "[b]ut at this Rate ye
may pretend to Cut our Throats, and do all Manner of Savage
Acts,"' 195 Penn responded:
Though the Objection be frequent, yet it is as foully ridiculous[.] We
are pleading only for such a Liberty of Conscience, as preserves the
Nation in Peace, Trade, and Commerce; and would not exempt any
191 The exchange is summarized in T. CURRY, cited above in note 17, at 18.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 Id.
19S IV. PENN, supra note 107, at 457.
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Man, or Party of Men, from not keeping those excellent Laws, that
tend to Sober, Just, and Industrious Living.196
This endorsement of certain "excellent laws" falls conspicuously
short of a denial of exemption from any laws. Penn went on to deny
that the Quakers had violated any laws, properly so called, even
though "[i]f the enacting any Thing can make it lawful," it was true
that the Quakers had violated the "law" against unlawful assem-
blies. 197 His position was that "law" in the true sense was confined
to limited purposes, which could not conflict with Quaker practices.
He argued that "the Words Lawful or Unlawful" must "bear their
Signification from the Nature of the Things they stand for" rather
than from mere enactment into statutes. 198
A century later, John Leland, the leader of the Baptists in Virginia
during the assessment controversy and the enactment of the first
amendment, addressed the same question. Like Penn, he condemned
in the strongest language the notion that liberty of conscience would
justify crimes such as murder or tax evasion:
Should a man refuse to pay his tribute for the support of government,
or any wise disturb the peace and good order of the civil police, he
should be punished according to his crime, let his religion be what it
will; but when a man is a peacable subject of state, he should be
protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his
own conscience.1 99
But also like Penn, Leland made clear that this did not mean that
believers could be required to obey all laws. "It is often the case," he
wrote, "that laws are made which prevent the liberty of conscience;
and because men cannot stretch their consciences like a nose of wax,
these non-conformists are punished as vagrants that disturb the
peace. "200 Unfortunately, Leland supplied no clear basis for distin-
guishing between the cases. "Let any man read the laws," he said,
"and see who were the aggressors." 20 ' Instead, he seems to have
assumed that the distinction would be readily apparent. When a
believer's "practice is opposed to good law, he is to be punished,"'20 2
but when the law has invaded the province of conscience, punishment
would be an aggression.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 458.
198 Id.
199J. LELAND, The Yankee Spy, in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 174, at 213, 228.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.; see also I. BAcKUs, supra note 175, at 317 ("We view it to be our incumbent duty
to render unto Caesar the things that are his but also that it is of as much importance not to
render unto him anything that belongs only to God, who is to be obeyed rather than any man.").
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Locke's position of no exemptions would have been an easier one
to maintain, especially for the Baptists, whose religious practices did
not conflict with any generally applicable secular laws. But the Bap-
fists and other proponents of religious freedom in America did not
adopt Locke's position, presumably because they insisted on defining
liberty of conscience as adherence to the demands of God. This, then,
is the key difference between the Lockean view and the popular
American view: the former takes the perspective of government and
the latter the perspective of the believer. It remains to be seen which
of these perspectives dominated the legal arrangements for religious
liberty in the years leading up to 1789.
4. The Views of the Framers. - The growing popular support for
broad religious freedom within the newly formed American states
helped to shape the views of the framers of the Constitution and the
free exercise clause. Of particular interest are the contrasting positions
of Jefferson and Madison regarding the religion issue, not only because
they played the key roles in formulating the free exercise clauses of
Virginia and the federal Constitution, but also because their differ-
ences illuminate the American evolution away from the narrower
conception of religious liberty championed by Locke.
Like Locke, Jefferson favored a mild, tolerant, and rationalistic
brand of religion. 20 3 Professor Sanford Kessler points out that "Jef-
ferson's debt to Locke in theological matters was so great that in some
instances he accepted Locke's interpretation of the gospels over what
he believed to be the doctrines of Jesus himself. '20 4 As Locke advo-
cated a watered-down and de-politicized Christianity in his Reason-
ableness of Christianity, so Jefferson took the more radical step of
composing his own version of the gospels, excluding everything at
variance with his understanding of science and natural morality. 20 5
Jefferson far surpassed Locke in his hostility to orthodox Christianity.
Jefferson called Athanasius and Calvin - the pillars of Catholic and
Reformed theology - "impious dogmatists" and "mere usurpers of the
Christian name, teaching a counter-religion made up of the deliria of
crazy imaginations. '20 6 He denied the divinity of Christ and the
203 See Kessler, Jefferson's Rational Religion, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY: ESSAYS ON
THE FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN POLITICS 58 (S. Pearson ed. 1983); Kessler, supra
note 113; Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme Court's
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 57, 58-64 (1976).
204 Kessler, supra note 113, at 247-48 (footnotes omitted).
205 See T. JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND MORALS OF JESUS OF NAZARETH (Philadelphia 18o4
and photo. reprint 19o4). For example, Jefferson deleted from his narrative all of the miracles
of Jesus reported in the New Testament.
206 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822), in 12 THE
WoRxs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 241, 242 (P. Ford ed. I905) [hereinafter WORKS OF JEFFERSON]
(emphasis in original); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (April 11, 1823),
in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 188, at 705-06 (calling Calvin "an atheist,
... or rather his religion was daemonism").
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authority of scripture, 20 7 condemned the Protestant doctrine that for-
giveness of sins is achieved through repentance as opposed to good
works, 208 and ridiculed Presbyterians, among others, for "fanaticism"
in matters of religion. 20 9 He was equally contemptuous of Judaism,
whose theology he called "degrading and injurious" and whose ethics
he called "repulsive. '"210
Jefferson advocated religious freedom, in large part, as a means
of combatting religious enthusiasm and advancing the day when all
would become adherents of Unitarianism, his idea of a rational and
sensible religion:
I rejoice that in this blessed country of free inquiry and belief, which
has surrendered its creed and conscience to neither kings nor priests,
the genuine doctrine of one only God is reviving, and I trust that
there is not a young man now living in the United States who will
not die an Unitarian.2 1'
This Lockean-Jeffersonian preference for rational over traditional re-
ligion continues to characterize one strain, perhaps the dominant
strain, of American liberalism.2 12
In many respects, Jefferson advocated a fuller freedom of religion
than Locke. Whereas Locke favored a single established church,
Jefferson opposed any form of state-established church, even the broad
multiple establishment proposed for Virginia. Unlike Locke, Jefferson
207 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. io, 1787), in SELECTED WRITINGS
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 188, at 429, 431-33; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short
(Aug. 4, I820), in s5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257, 261-62 (A. Lipscomb ed.
1903) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON].
208 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (April 13, 1820), in 15 WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 243, 244.
209 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: WRITINGS 1463, 1464 (M. Peterson ed. 1984). Jefferson once wrote to John Adams:
"If, by religion, we are to understand Sectarian dogmas, in which no two of them agree, then
your exclamation on that hypothesis is just, 'that this would be the best of all possible worlds,
if there were no religion in it.'" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 5, 1817),
in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 512, 512 (L. Cappon ed. 1959) (emphasis in original).
210 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (April 21, 18o3), in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 188, at 566, 569 (enclosing Jefferson's Syllabus of an
Estimate of the Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, Compared with Those of Others); see also
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 12, 1813), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS, supra note 2o9, at 383, 383-84 (commenting on the "wretched depravity of sentiment
and manners" which prevailed among the Jews, and which Jesus undertook to reform).
211 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822), supra note
2o6, at 243 (emphasis in original). To similar effect, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Smith (Dec. 8, 1822), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, cited above in note 188, at 703;
cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (April ii, 1823), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS, supra note 209, at 591, 593-94 (rejecting the doctrine of a Holy Spirit separate from
God).
212 See, e.g., J. DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934).
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would extend toleration to atheists and Catholics, though he appeared
to agree that toleration should be denied those who would not tolerate
others. 213 Unlike Locke, Jefferson would deny all power to the gov-
ernment to provide financial support for religious teaching, arguing
that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and
tyrannical." 214  Finally, Jefferson departed from Locke's views by
denying the authority of governmental officials to promote or encour-
age religion, even through persuasion. 215
Jefferson's understanding of the scope and rationale of free exercise
rights, however, was more limited even than Locke's. Like Locke,
he based his advocacy of freedom of religion on the judgment that
religion, properly confined, can do no harm: "The legitimate powers
of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.
But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty
gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg."216
On this rationale, Jefferson espoused a strict distinction between be-
lief, which should be protected from governmental control, and con-
duct, which should not. As he wrote in his famous "wall of separa-
tion" letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, "the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions .... [M]an . . .
has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." 217 It was in
reliance on Jefferson that the Supreme Court later held that there can
be no free exercise right to exemption from a generally applicable law
when such laws are directed at actions and not opinions.218
Jefferson's advocacy of a belief-action distinction placed him at
least a century behind the argument for full freedom of religious
exercise in America. William Penn wrote in 1670 that "by Liberty of
Conscience, we understand not only a meer Liberty of the Mind, in
believing or disbelieving . . . but the exercise of ourselves in a visible
way of worship."219 Historian Thomas Curry recounts the 1651 flog-
ging of Obediah Holmes, a Baptist, for holding a religious meeting in
Lynn, Massachusetts: "To the familiar argument that he was sentenced
not for conscience but for practice, Clark replied that there could be
213 See T. JEFFERSON, supra note iii, at 55o n.2.
214 Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 77, 77.
215 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, i8o8), in ii
WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 2o6, at 7 (explaining his refusal to issue a presidential
proclamation of a day of fasting and prayer).
216 T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (W. Peden ed. 1955) (1st ed.
1787).
217 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan.
1, 1820), in 16 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 207, at 281, 281-82.
214 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (i878).
W.9 . PqNN, supra note 107, at 447 (emphasis in original).
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no such thing as freedom of conscience without freedom to act. '220
It is unlikely that many Americans would have disputed that position
by 1789. St. George Tucker, no radical, wrote in 1803 that "[1]iberty
of conscience in matters of religion consists in the absolute and un-
restrained exercise of our religious opinions, and duties, in that mode
which our own reason and conviction dictate. '221 Thus, while Jeffer-
son was one of the most advanced advocates of disestablishment, his
position on free exercise was extraordinarily restrictive for his day.222
Although often linked with Jefferson's "Enlightenment-deist-ration-
alist" stance toward religious freedom, 223 Madison's views on the
religion-state question should be distinguished from those of his fellow
Virginian, and hence from Locke. 224 To begin with, Madison pos-
sessed a far more sympathetic attitude toward religion than did Jef-
ferson. 225 While Madison's religious convictions as an adult are un-
known, as a young man he attended a Presbyterian college in New
Jersey (Princeton) instead of pursuing the more natural course of study
at the Anglican college, William and Mary, in his own state. Madi-
son's correspondence with his close friend, William Bradford, suggests
that the more evangelical Presbyterian teachings took hold, at least
for a time; he urged Bradford to become a "fervent Advocate[ in the
cause of Christ. ''226 None of Madison's writings displayed the disdain
Jefferson expressed for the more intense manifestations of religious
spirit. Indeed, the sight of "5 or 6 well meaning men" - Baptist
preachers imprisoned in Culpepper, Virginia "for publishing their re-
ligious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox" - sparked
his concern for religious freedom. The usually soft-spoken Madison
described such persecution as a "diabolical Hell conceived principle,"
220 T. CURRY, supra note 17, at i5.
221 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 96, 97 (emphasis added).
222 For this reason, Michael Malbin's argument against free exercise exemptions must be
rejected. After noting that Jefferson opposed free exercise exemptions, Malbin contends that
"whatever protection the free exercise clause might have meant to give to religion, it was not
likely to have been greater than the protection Jefferson thought religion should be given." M.
MALBIN, supra note 17, at 36.
223 See D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 111-21, 147-48; Pepper, supra note 18, at 34. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly linked Jefferson and Madison as if their thought were identical.
See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (x963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 465 (196I) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 40 (1947)
(Rutledge, J. dissenting); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1878).
224 See Pepper, supra note 18, at 320-21. For a discussion of differences between Madison
and Jefferson in other areas, see A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABO-
RATION 43-46 (I95O).
225 See Ketcham, James Madison and Religion: A New Hypothesis, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY i75 (R. Alley ed. 1985).
22, Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Sept. 25, 1773), in i THE PAPERS OF
JA.MES MADISON 95, 96 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds. 1977) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
[Vol. lO314o91452
ORIGINS OF FREE EXERCISE
and stated that it "vexes me the most of any thing whatsoever. '227
He recounted that he had "squabbled and scolded abused and ridi-
culed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose that I am without common
patience." 228 This formative experience exemplifies the marked dif-
ference between Madison and Jefferson in their attitudes towards
religious liberty. In all Jefferson's writings about liberty of conscience,
he never once showed concern for those who wish to practice an
active faith; to Jefferson, unlike Madison, liberty of conscience meant
largely freedom from sectarian religion, rather than freedom to prac-
tice religion in whatever form one chooses.
Consistent with this more affirmative stance toward religion, Mad-
ison advocated a jurisdictional division between religion and govern-
ment based on the demands of religion rather than solely on the
interests of society. In his Memorial and Remonstrance, he wrote:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise
it as these may dictate .... It is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be accept-
able to him. 2 2 9
Moreover, Madison claimed that this duty to the Creator is "precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society," and "therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society."230
This striking passage illuminates the radical foundations of Mad-
ison's writings on religious liberty. While it does not prove that
Madison supported free exercise exemptions, it suggests an approach
toward religious liberty consonant with them. If the scope of religious
liberty is defined by religious duty (man must render to God "such
homage ... as he believes to be acceptable to him"), and if the claims
of civil society are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it
would seem to follow that the dictates of religious faith must take
precedence over the laws of the state, even if they are secular and
generally applicable. This is the central point on which Madison
differs from Locke, Jefferson, and other Enlightenment advocates of
religious freedom. 231
227 Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in I MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 226, at 104, io6.
228 Id.
229 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note log, at 183, 184.
230 Id. at 184-85.
231 Walter Berns, an astute scholar of Locke and the liberal Enlightenment, argues against
free exercise exemptions on Lockean grounds: "Congress does not have to grant an exemption
to someone who follows the command of God rather than the command of the law because the
Congress established by the Constitution denies ... that God issues any such commands." W.
BERNS, supra note 13, at 48 (emphasis in original). "Liberalism," Professor Berns goes on to
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Additional evidence supports the conclusion that Madison believed
freedom of religion to include exemption from generally applicable
laws in some circumstances. As discussed more fully below, 23 2 Mad-
ison supported a formulation of the Virginia Bill of Rights that allowed
generous scope for free exercise exemptions and proposed an express
religious exemption from military conscription for inclusion in the Bill
of Rights. 233 These positions tend to confirm the "pro-exemptions"
reading of the Memorial and Remonstrance.
Another passage in the Memorial and Remonstrance arguably con-
tradicts such a reading. Virginia's proposed assessment bill made
special provision for "Quakers and Menonists," who could use the
funds appropriated from their members "in a manner which they shall
think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship,"
rather than being required, like other denominations, to use the money
exclusively "for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel of their denomi-
nation, or the providing places of divine worship." 234 In response to
this special provision, Madison commented:
As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens;
so it violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar ex-
emptions. Are the Quakers and Menonists the only sects who think
a compulsive support of their religions unnecessary and unwarantable?
Can their piety alone be intrusted with the care of public worship?
Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others, with extraor-
dinary privileges, by which proselytes may be enticed from all oth-
ers?235
This passage provides some support for the no-exemptions view,
since it describes the "peculiar exemptions" in the bill as "extraordinary
privileges" that violate the principle of religious equality. However,
the meaning of the passage is ambiguous and must be weighed against
evidence that Madison departed from the Lockean objection to ex-
emptions. Instead of indicating a general objection to exemptions, the
passage can be read as objecting only to the fact that the bill singled
out two sects by name, giving them a preference over others that
might have similar scruples. Alternatively, the quoted passage may
say, "began in the effort to subordinate religious opinion to the law." Id. at 5o. Professor Berns
has no doubt correctly summarized Locke's position - and Jefferson's as well - but this
position is at odds with Madison's. According to Madison, it is precisely because God does
issue commands (though there will be disagreement over what they are) that the state must
respect religious liberty, as a subordinate must respect the commands of a superior power.
232 See infra pp. 1462-63.
233 See infra text accompanying note 466.
234 Va. House of Delegates, A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion (December 24, 1784), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 app. at
72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
235 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note IO9, at 186.
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mean no more than that one reason to reject establishments is that
they generate a need for otherwise unnecessary exemptions. The pas-
sage therefore does not tell us whether Madison would oppose exemp-
tions from legitimate secular legislation that create unavoidable con-
flicts with conscience.
No other political figure played so large a role in the enactment
of the religion clauses as Jefferson and Madison.2 36 To a large extent,
Jefferson reflected the rationalist premises of Locke, and it is these
premises that the modern courts and commentators have relied upon
in arguing for a no-exemption interpretation of the free exercise clause.
The evidence indicates, however, that Madison, with his more gen-
erous vision of religious liberty, more faithfully reflected the popular
understanding of the free exercise provision that was to emerge both
in state constitutions and the Bill of Rights.
D. Legal Protections After Independence
The Revolution inspired a wave of constitution-writing in the new
states. Eleven of the thirteen states (plus Vermont) adopted new
constitutions between 1776 and 1780. Of those eleven, six (plus Ver-
mont) included an explicit bill of rights; three more states adopted a
bill of rights between 1781 and 1790. With the exception of Con-
necticut, every state, with or without an establishment, had a consti-
tutional provision protecting religious freedom by 1789, although two
states confined their protections to Christians and five other states
confined their protections to theists.237 There was no discernible dif-
ference between the free exercise provisions adopted by the states with
an establishment and those without. The free exercise clauses of
Massachusetts and New Hampshire were almost identical to those of
236 Fisher Ames of Massachusetts drafted the last version of the amendment to pass the
House; his version was quite similar to the amendment that was ultimately ratified. His views,
therefore, could be relevant. But Ames, who wrote numerous letters and essays on various
issues of public importance, never made any reference in them to free exercise or to religious
freedom. See F. AMES, WORKS OF FISHER AMES (S. Ames ed. 1854). His biographer does not
even mention his authorship of the free exercise clause. See W. BERNHARD, FISHER AMES:
FEDERALIST AND STATESMAN: 1758-1808 (1965). Nor do his opinions regarding religion seem
noteworthy. He was a member of the majority denomination in his state, the Congregational
Church, and left late in life to join the Episcopal Church, apparently because of political
differences with the pastor. See W. BERNHARD, supra, at 330-31. Evidently, his role in drafting
the free exercise clause was one of political peacemaker, rather than exponent of a particular
vision of religious freedom.
237 Maryland and Delaware explicitly limited their free exercise protections to Christians,
although a related provision of the Delaware Declaration of Rights contains language that is
not so confined. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsyl-
vania limited their free exercise protections to believers in God. New York, Georgia, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina extended their protections to all religions. Virginia's Bill of Rights
is ambiguous; it contains a theistic definition of religion but also contains language that may be
broader in application. See infra pp. 1456-57 & note 242.
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New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Freedom of religion was
universally said to be an unalienable right; the status of other rights
commonly found in state bills of rights, such as property or trial by
jury, was more disputed and often considered derivative of civil so-
ciety.238
These state constitutions provide the most direct evidence of the
original understanding, for it is reasonable to infer that those who
drafted and adopted the first amendment assumed the term "free
exercise of religion" meant what it had meant in their states. The
wording of the state provisions thus casts light on the meaning of the
first amendment.
New York's 1777 Constitution was typical:
[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be al-
lowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty
of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this State. 239
Likewise, New Hampshire's provision stated:
Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or
estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience, . . .provided he doth not disturb
the public peace, or disturb others, in their religious worship. 240
238 The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 declared: "Among the natural rights, some are
in their very nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of
this kind are the RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE." N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. IV, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 128o, 1280-81. The Pennsylvania
Constitution of 2790 listed both liberty of conscience and the rights of property and reputation
as among the "inherent and indefeasible rights." PA. CONST. of 179o, art. IX, §§ 1, 3, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 2548, 2554; see also i ANNALS OF
CONG. 454 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (speech by James Madison, June 8, 1789) ("Trial by jury cannot
be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact which regulates
the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one
of the pre-existent rights of nature."); Madison, Property, National Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792,
reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note io9, at ioi, 101-03 (treating
property as a right "dependent on positive law"). See generally M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION 195-228 (1978) (discussing the distinction between unalienable
and alienable rights, placing "the right to worship" in the former category, and recounting
Jefferson's view that "property," an example from the latter category, should not be enumerated
in the Declaration of Independence).
239 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, supra note 2, at 1328, 1338.
240 N.H. CONST. of 2784, pt. 1, art. V, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 1280, 1281.
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As a final example, Georgia's religious liberty clause read: "All persons
whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be
not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State."'241 Other state
provisions were similar. 242 In addition to these state provisions, article
241 GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 377, 383.
242 Together with the provisions quoted in the text, the following is a complete collection of
state free exercise provisions at the time of the adoption of the first amendment.
The Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of 1776 provided:
2. That all Men have a natural and unalienable Right to worship Almighty God
according to the Dictates of their own Consciences and Understandings; that no Man
ought or of Right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship or maintain any
Ministry contrary to or against his own free Will and Consent, and that no Authority
can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any Power whatever that shall in any Case
interfere with, or in any Manner controul the Right of Conscience in the Free Exercise
of Religious Worship.
3. That all Persons professing the Christian Religion ought forever to enjoy equal
Rights and Privileges in this State, unless, under Colour of Religion, any Man disturb
the Peace, the Happiness or Safety of Society.
Del. Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of 1776, §§ 2, 3, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 70.
The Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided:
That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most
acceptable to him; all persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person ought by any law to be molested
in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order,
peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in
their natural, civil, or religious rights ....
Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, supra note 2, at 817, 819.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly and at stated seasons,
to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe. And no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for wor-
shipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the
public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship.
MASS. CONST. of 178o, art. 11, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, at 956, 957.
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided: "That no person shall ever, within this
Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor, under any pretence whatever, be compelled
to attend any place of worship, contrary to his own faith and judgment . . . ." N.J. CONST.
of 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
1310, 1313.
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided: "That all men have a natural and
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences."
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 1409, 1410.
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And that no man ought or
of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place
of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and
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I of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted contemporaneously
with the drafting of the Constitution and re-enacted by the First
Congress, provided: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable
and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode
of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory."243
While differing in their particulars, these constitutional provisions
followed the model set by the early Rhode Island, Carolina, and New
Jersey charters, both in the scope of the liberty and in its limitations.
Each of these elements warrants attention.
r. Scope of the Liberty. - Each of the state constitutions first
defined the scope of the free exercise right in terms of the conscience
consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or
abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar
mode of religious worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed
by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul,
the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, stupra note
2, at 1540, 1541.
The Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations of 1663 provided:
[Noe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise molested,
punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinione in matters of
religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd colony; but that all and
everye person and persons may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes hereafter, freelye
and fullye have and enjoye his and theire owne judgments and consciences, in matters
of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lande hereafter mentioned; they be-
having themselves peaceblie and quietlie, and not useing this libertie to lycentiousnesse
and profanenesse, nor to the civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others; any lawe,
statute, or clause, therein contayned, or to bee contayned, usage or custome of this
realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding.
R.I. CHARTER of 1663, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at
1595, 1596-97.
The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 provided:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimi-
nation or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind:
Provided, That the liberty of conscience thereby declared shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of
this State.
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § i, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at x628, x632-33 (emphasis in original). The South Carolina Constitution of 1778
contained a much more limited religious freedom clause, similar to the Fundamental Constitu-
tions of i669. See S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1620, 1626-27. References in text are to the 179o constitution
unless otherwise specified.
The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 provided:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore
all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love,
and charity towards each other.
Va. Bill of Rights of 1776, § i6, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 19o8, 19o9.
243 Northwest Territorial Ordinance of r787, art. I, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 429, 431.
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of the individual believer and the actions that flow from that con-
science. None of the provisions confined the protection to beliefs and
opinions, as did Jefferson, nor to expression of beliefs and opinions,
as some recent scholars have suggested. 244 Indeed, the language ap-
pears to have been drafted precisely to refute those interpretations.
Maryland, for example, prohibited punishment of any person "on
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious
practice. '245 Opinion, expression of opinion, and practice were all
expressly protected. The key word "exercise," found in six of the
constitutions, was defined in dictionaries of the day to mean "ac-
tion. '24 6 Two of the other constitutions used terms as broad or
broader - Maryland referred to religious "practice," Rhode Island to
matters of "religious concernment. '2 47
Nor did these constitutions follow Locke in defining the scope of
free exercise negatively, as a sphere of otherworldly concern that does
not affect the public interest. The free exercise provisions defined the
free exercise right affirmatively, based on the scope of duties to God
perceived by the believer. The New Hampshire formulation defined
the believer's right by "the dictates of his own conscience, and 'rea-
son";24 8 it extended to all "matters of religious concernment," according
to Rhode Island. These could, and often would, include matters of
concern to the public. This is consistent with the proposition, reflected
in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, that the right of free ex-
ercise precedes and is superior to the social contract.24 9
Although the free exercise right plainly extends to some forms of
conduct, the scope of protected conduct in these clauses is less clear.
The provisions fall into two categories. Four states - Virginia, Geor-
gia, Maryland, and Rhode Island - protected all actions stemming
from religious conviction, subject to certain limitations. 250 The Vir-
ginia Bill of Rights, the model for three of the state proposals for the
first amendment and presumably the greatest influence on Madison,
is especially clear on this point. It provides that "all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience" and defines "religion" as "the duty which we owe to our
244 See Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 545 (I983)i
245 Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 817, 819 (emphasis added).
246 See infra text accompanying notes 407-409.
247 See Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, Supra note 2, at 817, 819; R.I. CHARTER of z663, in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 1595, I596.
248 N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. V, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 128o, 1281 (emphasis added).
249 See supra text accompanying notes 229-230.
250 See supra text accompanying note 241 & note 242.
,99o] 1459
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Creator, and the manner of discharging it."'25 1 In the biblical tradi-
tion, "duties" to God included actions, perhaps all of life, and not just
speech and opinion. So according to Virginia, the right of free exercise
extended to all of a believer's duties to God and included a choice of
means as well as ends.
By contrast, eight states - New York, New Hampshire, Dela-
ware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina - plus the Northwest Ordinance, confined their pro-
tection of conduct to acts of "worship." The word "worship" usually
signifies the rituals or ceremonial acts of religion, such as the admin-
istration of sacraments or the singing of hymns, and thus would
indicate a more restrictive scope for the free exercise provisions. 252
The limitation to "worship" was not carried over into the federal
free exercise clause, which in this respect most closely resembles the
Georgia provision. 25 3 No direct evidence suggests whether the adop-
tion of the broader formulation was deliberate, but this seems consis-
tent with the general theological currents of Protestant America, which
were "low church" and anti-ritualistic. One of the main elements of
the Great Awakening was the insistence that duties to God extend
beyond the four walls of the church and the partaking of the sacra-
ments. From the evangelical Protestant perspective, "worship" would
not have been sharply distinguished from "the duty we owe to our
Creator. '25 4 The ready availability of narrow models in the recently
enacted Northwest Ordinance and the constitution of final drafter
Fisher Ames' home state of Massachusetts makes it likely that the
choice of broader language was deliberate. The federal free exercise
251 Va. Bill of Rights of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 1908, 19o9. The definition of "religion" resembles the one provided by James
Buchanan in 1757: "Piety, godliness, the worship of God, and the practice of any duty in
obedience to his commands." J. BUCHANAN, LINGUAE BRITANNICAE VERA PRONUNCIATIO (R.
Alston ed. 1967) (London 1757). Under this definition, the exercise of "religion" would include
both "worship" and "the practice of any duty" to God.
252 Samuel Johnson's A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia 18o5) defines
the verb "worship" as "[t]o adore; to honour or venerate with religious rites." Id. Other
dictionaries of the day are less specific in the connection to religious ritual. See J. BUCHANAN,
supra note 251 (defining "worship" as "[t]o adore or praise the Almighty"); N. WEBSTER, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 301 (New Haven 1807) (defining "worship" as "to
adore, perform adoration"). The latter two definitions make no direct reference to religious
ceremonials. Modern definitions, like Johnson's, are more specific. Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary defines "worship" as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being
or supernatural power; also: an act, process, or instance of expressing such veneration by
performing or taking part in religious exercises or ritual." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2637 (P. Gove ed. 1986) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
253 See supra text accompanying note 241.
254 R. MEHL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROTESTANTISM 107-08 (J. Farley trans. 1970) (explaining
that "worship" is understood as "[a]ll that one calls 'the Christian life,' with all its ethical
components").
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clause seems in every respect to have followed the most expansive
models among the states.
Indeed, even in the states that apparently limited free exercise to
acts of "worship," it is not clear that the limitation had any actual
effect. In none of the state free exercise cases in the early years of
the Republic did the lawyers argue or the courts hold that religiously
motivated conduct was unprotected because it was not "worship."
Since the scope and nature of religious duty was itself a contested
issue among religions, it seems unlikely that the state provisions in-
tended to interject a judicial discrimination among forms of religious
practice, and especially unlikely that this interjection would favor
ritual over pious conduct. Interestingly, Pennsylvania (a state whose
substantial Quaker population had an interest in exemptions) revised
its constitutional protection for liberty of conscience in 179o, removing
the language that had limited it to acts of worship.2 5 5 Kentucky
borrowed this broader language for its first constitution in 1792.256
This may suggest a movement toward broader protections, simulta-
neous with the ratification of the first amendment.
In any event, it would be difficult on this evidence to conclude
that the framers of the free exercise clause intended it to be confined
to acts of "worship." That would require the assumption that Fisher
Ames and the First Congress accidentally failed to use familiar lan-
guage that would have precisely expressed their meaning and adopted
instead new language that went beyond their intentions. Either the
broader meaning was intended, or no thought was given to the matter
at all.
2. Limits on the Liberty. - The second common element in state
free exercise provisions is that the provisions limit the right by par-
ticular, defined state interests. Nine of the states limited the free
exercise right to actions that were "peaceable" or that would not
disturb the "peace" or "safety" of the state. 2 57 Four of these also
expressly disallowed acts of licentiousness or immorality; 25 8 two for-
255 The 1776 Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania states
that "no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall
in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise
of religious worship." A Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania
of 1776, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, s*pra note 2, at 1541, 1541. The
1790 Pennsylvania Constitution states that "no human authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience." PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3, reprinted
i 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Supra note 2, at 1548, 1554.
256 See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 2, at 647, 654.
257 The nine states are New York, New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See supra p. 1456 & note
242.
258 The four states are New York, Maryland, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See supra
text accompanying note 239 & note 242.
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bade acts that would interfere with the religious practices of others;259
one forbade the "civil injury or outward disturbance of others";260 one
added acts contrary to "good order";261 and one disallowed acts con-
trary to the "happiness," as well as the peace and safety, of society. 262
These provisos are the most revealing and important feature of
the state constitutions. They further confirm that the free exercise
right was not understood to be confined to beliefs. Beliefs without
more do not have the capacity to disturb the public peace and safety.
As Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, drafted by Jef-
ferson, stated, "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order. '263 If the basic right did not
extend to "overt acts," the provisos would be unnecessary.
Moreover, the state provisions make sense only if free exercise
envisions religiously compelled exemptions from at least some gener-
ally applicable laws. Since even according to the Lockean no-exemp-
tions view, religious persons cannot be prohibited from engaging in
otherwise legal activities, the provisos would only have effect if reli-
giously motivated conduct violated the general laws in some way.
The "peace and safety" clauses identify a narrower subcategory of the
general laws; the free exercise provisions would exempt religiously
motivated conduct from these laws up to the point that such conduct
breached public peace or safety.
The language of these provisos cannot be dismissed as boilerplate,
synonymous with "an assertion of interest on the part of the public."
The debates surrounding the drafting of these provisos suggest that
they served as independent criteria for evaluating assertions of legis-
lative power. The debate over the free exercise provision of the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 most clearly demonstrates the under-
standing of the states that passed these provisos. George Mason, chief
architect of the religious liberty clause of the Declaration, proposed
"that all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and un-
restrained by the magistrate, unless under color of religion any man
disturb the peace, the happiness, or safety of society."264 Madison
objected to the proposal on two grounds. First, he criticized the use
of the word "toleration" for reasons already discussed. 265 He offered
259 The two states are New Hampshire and Massachusetts. See supra text accompanying
note 240 & note 242.
260 The state is Rhode Island. See supra note 242.
261 The state is Maryland. See id.
262 The state is Delaware. See id.
263 Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted in 5 TiE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 77.
264 S. COBB, supra note 17, at 491.
265 See id. at 492.
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a substitute that read, that "all men are equally entitled to the full and
free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience."2 66
This change was accepted, with minor alteration. Second, Madison
criticized the breadth of Mason's proposed state interest limitation.
Madison proposed instead that free exercise be protected "unless under
color of religion the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of
the State are manifestly endangered. '267 This is obviously a much
narrower state interest exception than Mason's. While "peace" and
"safety" refer to the fundamental peacekeeping functions of govern-
ment, "happiness" is a term as compendious as all of public policy.268
The "peace, happiness, or safety of society" is therefore a standard
that would encompass virtually all legitimate forms of legislation. The
"preservation of equal liberty" and "manifest endangerment of the
existence of the State," on the other hand, is a standard that only the
most critical acts of government can satisfy.
The Virginia legislature ultimately passed a religious liberty guar-
antee that did not spell out the nature of the state interest that could
outweigh a free exercise claim. Apparently, the legislature could not
decide between the Mason and Madison formulations and compro-
mised through silence. It is fair to assume, however, that the state's
interest must fall somewhere between "the peace, the happiness, or
safety of society" - Mason's broad formulation - and "manifest
danger" to the "preservation of equal liberty, and existence of the
State" - Madison's more limited formulation. If so, Virginia was
typical of its sister states. While none adopted a proviso as restrictive
as Madison's, only one (Delaware) adopted a proviso as broad as
Mason's. Almost all opted for the terms "peace" or "safety," presum-
ably on the ground that "happiness" was too broad. In any event,
the dispute between Madison and Mason would not have mattered if
the proviso were of no legal significance, and the proviso would have
been of no legal significance if the "full and free exercise of religion"
did not include the right of exemption from generally applicable laws
that conflict with religious conscience.
266 Id.
267 Id. In a private letter many years later, Madison endorsed a different formulation under
which religion is immune from governmental authority "in every case where it does not trespass
on private rights or the public peace." Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July
io, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note iog, at 98, 1oo.
268 Samuel Johnson's two-volume A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London
1755), chooses two of five exemplars of the use of the word "happiness" from political sources.
It quotes Richard Hooker to the effect that: "Happiness is that estate whereby we attain, so far
as possibly may be attained, the full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired,
and containeth in it after an eminent sort, the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of
all our perfection." Id. It also quotes John Locke: "The various and contrary choices that men
make in the world, argue that the same thing is not good to every man alike: this variety of
pursuits shews, that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing." Id. (emphasis
in original).
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The wording of the state constitutions also provides some guidance
regarding when the government's interest is sufficiently strong to ov-
erride an admitted free exercise claim. The modern Supreme Court
has stated only that the government's interest must be "compelling,"
"of the highest order," "overriding," or "unusually important. '269
These formulations are unnecessarily open-ended, leading to grudging
and inconsistent results. The historical sources suggest that the gov-
ernment's interest can be more precisely delimited in a few specific
areas, although other cases will remain difficult to resolve.270
The most common feature of the state provisions was the govern-
ment's right to protect public peace and safety. As Madison expressed
it late in life, the free exercise right should prevail "in every case
where it does not trespass on private rights or the public peace. '271
This indicates that a believer has no license to invade the private
rights of others or to disturb public peace and order, no matter how
conscientious the belief or how trivial the private right on the other
side. There is no free exercise right to kidnap another person for the
purposes of proselytizing, or to trespass on private property -
whether it be an abortion clinic or a defense contracting plant - to
protest immoral activity. Conduct on public property must be peace-
able and orderly, so that the rights of others are not disturbed.
Where the rights of others are not involved, however, the free
exercise right prevails. The state constitutional provisions give no
warrant to paternalistic legislation touching on religious concerns.
They protect the "public" peace and safety but respect the right of the
believer to weigh spiritual costs without governmental interference.
Thus, some modern free exercise controversies, such as the refusal by
Jehovah's Witnesses to receive blood transfusions 272 or the enforce-
ment of minimum wage laws in a religious community, 273 should be
easy to resolve and require no subjective judicial judgments about the
importance of public policy. Moreover, the early free exercise clauses
seem to allow churches and other religious institutions to define their
own doctfine, membership, organization, and internal requirements
269 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 529-30 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (sum-
marizing free exercise tests from earlier cases).
270 For another discussion of governmental interest in light of the early state constitutions,
see REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, cited above in note 17, at 61-68.
271 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July io, x822), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note iog, at 98, xoo.
272 But see In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d ooo (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576,
279 A.2d 670 (971).
273 But see Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (x985). The
author of this Article was the principal author of the Secretary's brief in that case but believes
the position was wrong.
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without state interference. As Jefferson wrote to the Reverend Samuel
Miller, "the government of the United States [is] interdicted by the
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doc-
trines, discipline, or exercises. '274 That their internal practices may
seem unjust or repugnant to the majority should be of no moment. 275
Only a handful of states allowed laws against "licentiousness" or im-
morality to override free exercise claims, and those provisions may
well have referred to public displays of immoral behavior.
Obvious connections exist between the scope of the free exercise
right defined by these provisions and the wider liberal political theory
of which they are an expression. The central conception of liberalism,
as summarized in the Declaration of Independence, is that government
is instituted by the people in order to secure their rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. Governmental powers are limited to
those needed to secure these legitimate ends. In contrast to both
ancient and modern non-liberal regimes, government is not charged
with promotion of the good life for its citizens. Except as needed for
mutual protection and a limited class of common interests, government
must leave the definition of the good life to private institutions, of
which family and church are the most conspicuous. Even in the
absence of a free exercise clause, liberal theory would find the assertion
of governmental power over religion illegitimate, except to the extent
necessary for the protection of others.
To eighteenth-century evangelicals, this issue was posed in theo-
logical terms but the answer was much the same. God instituted
government for the punishment of wrongdoing, 276 which they inter-
preted to mean injury to others. 277 While the evangelicals could not
accede to the Lockean proposition that the reach of governmental
authority is defined by the judgments of civil authorities, they found
the liberal theory of government a way to reconcile their insistence
on the primacy of conscience with their equal insistence on the divinely
ordained authority of government. Thus, when describing the legiti-
274 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, i8o8), in II WORKS
OF JEFFERSON, supra note 206, at 7, 7.
275 But cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (finding no violation of
the free exercise clause when the IRS refused to grant charitable status to a religious school due
to its proscription of interracial dating).
276 "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God:
the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the
ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." Romans 13:1-2.
277 See, e.g., J. LELAND, supra note 174, at ui8 ("The legitimate powers of government
extend only to punish men for working ill to their neighbors . . . "); I. BACKUS, supra note
175, at 313-14 (interpreting Romans I3:i-io as "clearly show[ing] that the crimes which fall
within magistrates' jurisdiction to punish are only such as work ill to our neighbors," while
"church government respects our behavior toward God as well as man").
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mate reach of government, the evangelical writers sounded little dif-
ferent from the American followers of Locke.278
The "peace and safety" limitations of the state constitutions are
therefore neither simple restatements of unbridled governmental su-
premacy in a clash with religious precepts, nor mere expedient excep-
tions to what would otherwise be unlimited rights of religiously mo-
tivated conduct. Both the affirmative free exercise protections and
the peace and safety limitations follow logically from the liberal and
evangelical theories of government, which reached similar conclusions
from different premises about the origin and scope of legitimate gov-
ernment.
E. Actual Free Exercise Controversies
An examination of actual free exercise controversies in the precon-
stitutional period bears out these conclusions. To be sure, the issue
of exemptions did not often arise. 279 The American colonies were
peopled almost entirely by adherents of various strains of Protestant
Christianity. 28 0 The Protestant moral code and mode of worship was,
for the most part, harmonious with the mores of the larger society.
Even denominations like the Quakers, whose theology and religious
practice differed sharply from the others, entertained similar beliefs
about public decorum. 281 Moreover, the governments of that era were
far less intrusive than the governments of today. Thus, the occasions
when religious conscience came into conflict with generally applicable
secular legislation were few.
Nonetheless, the issue of exemptions did arise, primarily centered
around three issues: oath requirements, military conscription, and
religious assessments. The resolution of these conflicts suggests that
exemptions were seen as a natural and legitimate response to the
tension between law and religious convictions.
278 For example, compare the passages quoted in note 277 above with Jefferson's statement
that "[t]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others."
T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 216, at 259.
279 Professor Marshall relies heavily on this point in his attack on free exercise exemptions.
See Marshall, supra note 17, at I9-2o. But of course, few instances are not the same as no
instances.
280 For a discussion of the number of churches of each denomination at the end of the
colonial period, see I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 273 & n.5o
(i95o). The largest groups, in order, were Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and
Anglicans. Out of 3,005 congregations, only 50 were Roman Catholic. See id. There were
fewer than 2,000 Jews, concentrated in five cities - New York, Philadelphia, Newport, Charles-
ton, and Savannah. See M. BORDEN, supra note 75, at 6.
281 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 81. In the early days of the American colonies, the
Quakers' behavior had been more unconventional. See W. RUSSELL, supra note 65, at 3 n.1
(describing offensive Quaker practices, including interrupting others' worship services and going
naked in public in protest against cruelty and sinfulness).
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I i. Oaths. - By far the most common source of friction was the
issue of oaths. The oath requirement was the principal means of
ensuring honest testimony and of solemnizing obligations. At a time
when perjury prosecutions were unusual, extratemporal sanctions for
telling falsehoods or reneging on commitments were thought indis-
pensable to civil society. Quakers and certain other Protestant sects,
however, conscientiously refused to take oaths, 28 2 producing more
serious consequences than it might at first seem. A regime requiring
oaths prior to court testimony effectively precluded these groups from
using the court system to protect themselves and left them vulnerable
to their adversaries, "who could sue them for property and never
doubt the result."28 3 There are three possible responses. First, the
government could eliminate the oath-taking requirement for everyone,
making oath-taking purely voluntary. Second, the government could
continue to insist on the oath requirement, making it impossible for
dissenters to give evidence in court or participate in any civic activity
involving an oath. Third, the government could continue the oath
requirement for the majority, allowing those with religious scruples to
comply by an alternative procedure. According to the no-exemption
view, only the first two possibilities are available. But the first pos-
sibility is disruptive of the entire judicial system and the second is
unnecessarily harsh to the dissenters.
The third alternative - to create a religious exception to the oath
requirement - was in fact adopted in most of the colonies. As early
as the seventeenth century the proprietors of the Carolina colony
permitted Quakers to enter pledges in a book in lieu of swearing an
oath. Similarly, New York passed a law in 169i permitting Quakers
to testify by affirmation in civil cases, 28 4 and in 1734 passed a law
permitting Quakers to qualify for the vote by affirmation instead of
oath.285 Jews in Georgia received dispensation to omit the words "on
the faith of a Christian" from the naturalization oath required in
1740.286 In 1743, Massachusetts, one of the states with a strong
established church tradition, substituted an affirmation requirement
for "'Quakers [who] profess to be in their consciences scrupulous of
282 Their refusal to take oaths was based on Matthew 5:33-37:
Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear
thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you, swear not at
all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool:
neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by
thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your commu-
nication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.
Id.
283 R. BRUGGER,' MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 30 (1988).
284 See T. CuRRY, supra note 17, at 64.
28S ee id. at 71.
286 See R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 29.
,99o] 1467
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
taking oaths.' 287 By 1789, virtually all of the states had enacted oath
exemptions. 288
2. Military Conscription. - The exemption issue also arose in
connection with military conscription. Exemption from conscription
provides a particularly telling example due to the entirely secular
nature of conscription, its importance to preservation of the state in
times of war, and the high costs the granting of exemptions imposes
on others. Several denominations in colonial America, most promi-
nently the Quakers and Mennonites, refused on religious grounds to
bear arms. As early as 167o-8o, Quakers in several states asserted
that liberty of conscience exempted them from bearing arms. Rhode
Island, 289 North Carolina, 290 and Maryland 291 granted the exemp-
tions; New York refused. 292 It is presumably not coincidental that
Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Maryland had explicit free exercise
or liberty of conscience clauses in the seventeenth century, while New
York did not.
In Georgia, the Moravians claimed a right to be exempt from
military service during the troubles with Spanish Florida, and when
they were denied, the entire Moravian community departed Georgia
between 1737 and 174o and moved to Pennsylvania. 293 Pennsylvania,
where Quakers were most numerous and influential, went without a
militia until 1755, when one was organized on a voluntary basis. 294
The issue arose in New York again in I734, and again the Quakers
were denied exemption from penalties imposed for refusal to train for
military service. 295 The colony finally relented in 1755, provided the
objector would pay a commutation fee or send a substitute. 296 Mas-
sachusetts and Virginia soon adopted similar policies. 297 New Hamp-
shire exempted Quakers from conscription in I75 9.298 Later, the Con-
tinental Congress was to grant exemptions in these words:
287 T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 90 (citing i MASSACHUSETTS ACTS AND RESOLVES 305; and
2 id. at 494-95).
288 See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 17, at 1631-32.
289 See Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409, 412-13 (1952). Roger Williams opposed militia exemptions. See
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 17, at x624, 630.
290 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 56.
291 S. COBB, supra note 17, at 380 & n.2.
292 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 63.
293 See R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 76-78.
294 See Russell, supra note 289, at 413.
295 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 356.
296 See Act of Feb. X9, 1755, reprinted in U.S. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 2 BACK-
GROUNDS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE: MILITARY OBLIGATION pt. 9, at 186, 203-04 (A. Vollmer
ed. 1947) [hereinafter SELECTIVE SERVICE].
297 See Act of Nov. 31, 1757, reprinted in SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note 296, pt. 6, at
595, 195-97 (Massachusetts); Act of Nov. 1776, reprinted in SELECTIVE SERVICE, supra note
296, pt. 14, at 249, 249-53 (Virginia).
298 An Act for the More Speedy Levying One Thousand or at Least Eight Hundred Men
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As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear
arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences,
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this
time of universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in
the several colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed
Country, which they can consistently with their religious principles.299
The language as well as the substance of this policy is particularly
significant, since it recognizes the superior claim of religious "con-
science" over civil obligation, even at a time of "universal calamity,"
and leaves the appropriate accommodation to the judgment of the
religious objectors.
3. Religious Assessments. - A third example of a religious excep-
tion recognized under the preconstitutional free exercise provisions is
found only in states with established churches. Such states often
required the citizens to make payments for the support of ministers
either of the established church or of their own denomination. Not
uncommonly, however, these states accommodated the objection of
members of sects conscientiously opposed to compelled tithes. For
example, from i727 on, Massachusetts and Connecticut exempted
Baptists and Quakers from ministerial taxes. This exception was
expressly, if grudgingly, made in recognition of the "alleged scruple of
conscience" of these sects. 30 0 From 1692 on, New Hampshire ex-
empted anyone who could prove in a contested proceeding that he
was "conscientiously" of "a different persuasion," attended services of
his own faith regularly ("constantly," in the words of the statute), and
made financial contributions toward its support. 30 1 New Hampshire
also exempted Quakers who served as constables from the duty of
collecting the assessments from others. 30 2 Virginia exempted Huguen-
ots in 17oo, German Lutherans in 173o, and all dissenters from the
Anglican Church in 1776.303
Inclusive of Officers to be Employd in His Majestys Service in the Current Year, 32 Geo. 2.
Orig. Acts, vol. 4, P. 55; recorded Acts, vol. 2, p. 412; N.H. Province Laws 296, 198 (enacted
Mar. 9, 1759).
299 See Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, 1774-1789, at 187, r89 (IV. Ford ed. 2905 & photo, reprint 1968).
300 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 89-go (quoting i MASSACHUSETTS ACTS AND RESOLvES
305; 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 299, at 494-95).
Cobb's account is slightly different from Curry's. See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 234-35. Cobb
reports that in 1727, Massachusetts passed a law similar to one already existing in Connecticut,
allowing Episcopalians to pay tithes to their own churches (instead of to the prevailing Congre-
gational churches) and that Massachusetts extended this treatment to Quakers and Baptists in
1728. Massachusetts exempted Quakers from any religious assessment whatsoever in 1731, and
"Anabaptists" in 1734. See id.
301 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 298-99.
302 See An Act to Exempt Those People Called Quakers From Gathering the Rates for the
Ministers of Other Perswations Within the Province of New Hampshire, 4 Geo. 2. Orig. Acts,
vol. 2, p. 5o; recorded Acts, vol. i, p. 329; N.H. Province Laws 530 (enacted May 1o, 1731).
303 See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 98, 492.
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Exemptions were a far from perfect solution to the assessment
problem. Having obtained inclusion in the certificate system, the
Baptists of Massachusetts eventually concluded that the system would
not work. In 1773, the association of Baptist churches voted to urge
their members to refuse to provide the certificates required for legal
exemption. 30 4 Through civil disobedience, the Baptists resolved to
pressure the legislature to abolish mandatory tithes altogether.
The Baptists' objections arose from both practice and principle.
Administration of the certificate system was in the hands of local
officials and local courts, who gave vent to the general hostility against
the Baptists. Certificates were sometimes ignored 30 5 and more often
rejected on technicalities. 30 6 In addition, popular opposition (amount-
ing in some instances to violence) made the certificate system un-
workable. 30 7 It became evident that exemptions would not be admin-
istered evenhandedly. Moreover, the Baptists objected to the
requirement of certifying which "members" (itself a theologically
loaded term) were "conscientiously" of the Baptist persuasion, a judg-
ment they believed could only be made by God. 30 8 These objections
foreshadow two critiques of modern free exercise exemptions: that
their administration is implicitly biased in favor of familiar reli-
gions, 309 and that the "sincerity" requirement is an inappropriate gov-
ernmental inquiry.310 But in the case of religious assessments, these
problems could be resolved by abolishing the system of ministerial
taxes - a solution not always available for secular interferences with
conscience.
It might be objected that the example of exemptions from religious
assessments is inapt, because the generally applicable law is itself
religious, not secular, and would be unconstitutional under the estab-
lishment clause today. This is a valid point, even though the assess-
ment laws were most frequently defended in terms of the secular need
to promote morality.3 1' The decisive question, however, is whether
the people at the time of adoption of the first amendment would likely
have considered exemptions, whether legislative or judicial, an appro-
priate remedy when law and conscience conflict. Those states with
304 See i W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note i, at 550-54.
303 See id. at 548.
306 See id. at 549 (describing a certificate deemed invalid because it was signed by two
persons plus the Elder, rather than three); id. at 549-50 (discussing a certificate rejected because
it did not state that the persons listed "belonged to" the church); id. at 547-48 (discussing a
certificate rejected because "it did not state that the persons listed were 'conscientiously' of the
Baptist persuasion").
307 See id. at 55o (describing instances of mob action).
308 See I. BACKUS, supra note 175, at 333.
309 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 33, at 381-83. The greater the variance between religious
practices and the prevailing social norm, the greater will be the difficulty of accommodation.
310 See, e.g., Noonan, supa note 26, at 718-2o.
311 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 139-41.
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established churches had free exercise provisions which were almost
identical to the provisions in states without establishment; and the
establishment states understood the principle of free exercise to entail
exemption from religious assessments, solely for the benefit of those
with religious scruples. If exemptions were a recognized form of free
exercise protection in establishment states, they likely would also have
been recognized in the others (although the occasions for exemptions
would be less frequent). The fact that exemptions were also made
available from military conscription laws (plainly secular) and from
oath requirements (largely secular), as well as from other secular laws,
supports the broader principle.
4. Other Religious Exemptions. - Other colonies and states re-
sponded to particular conflicts between religious convictions and gen-
erally applicable laws by exempting those faced with the conflict. The
Trustees of Georgia, for example, allowed certain groups of Protestant
refugees from the European Continent virtual rights of self-govern-
ment, a form of wholesale exemption that enabled these dissenters
from the Church of England to organize themselves in accordance
with their own faith. 312 A group from Salzburg formed the town of
Ebenezer, described by one historian as "a state within a state, a sort
of theocracy under the direction of their ministers with daily confer-
ences of the entire congregation in which God's guidance was invoked
at the beginning and end." 313 In 1764, the colonial legislature of
Rhode Island passed a statute waiving the laws governing marriage
ceremonies for "any persons possessing [professing] the Jewish religion
who may be joined in marriage, according to their own usages and
rites."314 In 1798, the state legislature exempted Jewish residents from
the operation of state incest law, "within the degrees of affinity or
consanguinity allowed by their religion. '315 This was important be-
cause Jewish law was understood to encourage the marriage between
uncle and niece, a relationship illegal under Rhode Island law.
Similarly, both North Carolina 316 and Maryland 317 exempted
Quakers from the requirement of removing their hats in court, which
312 See R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 21-22, 71-76, 87. These groups were required to
obey the colonial laws regarding military service, "property, place and good government," but
were otherwise free to govern themselves. Id. at 72.
313 Id.
314 Hartogensis, Rhode Island and Consanguineous Jewish Marriages, 20 PUBLICATION AM.
JEvISH HIST. Soc'Y 137, 144 (1911).
31s An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce, 1798 R.I. Pub. Laws § 7; see also Hartogensis,
supra note 314, at 139-40 (discussing the Rhode Island law as an early example of religious
exemptions in family law); Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism
and Religious Authority, 26 J. FA.x. L. 741, 744 n.6 (1988) (same).
316 See An Act to prescribe the affirmation of allegiance and fidelity to this state to be taken
by the people called quakers, and for granting them certain indulgences therein mentioned, 1784
N.C. Laws ch. 2o9, at 488.
317 See R. BRUGGER, supra note 283, at 29-30.
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they considered a form of obeisance to secular authority forbidden by
their religion. This exemption may seem trivial today,318 but it was
an issue of historical and emotional importance to the Quakers of that
day. One of the most notorious courtroom cases of religious intoler-
ance in England involved William Penn's refusal to remove his hat
when he appeared in court to face an indictment for speaking to an
unlawful assembly. Penn came to court bareheaded, but knowing his
religious scruple, the judge ordered a court official to place a hat on
his head. Penn then refused to remove the hat in respect to the court.
Although acquitted on the charge on which he was tried, Penn was
held in contempt and imprisoned for refusing to doff his hat. 319 This
case became a cause c~lebre in America, and the North Carolina and
Maryland exemptions were no doubt passed as a result.320
The history of oath requirements, military conscription, religious
assessments, and other sources of conflict between religious convictions
and general legislation demonstrates that religion-specific exemptions
were familiar and accepted means of accommodating these conflicts.
Rather than make oaths, military service, and tithes voluntary for
everyone, which would undercut important public programs and ob-
jectives, and rather than coerce the consciences of otherwise loyal and
law-abiding citizens who were bound by religious duty not to comply,
the colonies and states wrote special exemptions into their laws. Lest
the exemptions be extended too broadly, they confined the exemptions
to denominations or categories known or proven to be "conscien-
tiously" opposed. This aspect of the historical practice parallels in its
purposes the requirement of "sincerity" under current law,32' although
318 Interestingly, the right to wear a hat has featured prominently in modern free exercise
litigation. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 5o3 (I986) (denying an Orthodox Jewish
officer the right to wear a yarmulke with his military uniform); Cooper v. Eugene School Dist.,
301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (I986) (upholding a revocation of tenure and teaching certificate
when a Sikh teacher violated the dress statute by wearing a turban while teaching), appeal
dismissed, 480 U.S. 942 (I987) (Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
319 An excellent summary of the case may be found in I. BRANT, TH8 BILL OF RIGHTS 62-
67 (1965).
320 It is interesting that this subject came up for oblique discussion in the First Congress,
during the debate over the Bill of Rights. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts had ridiculed
the Select Committee's list of freedoms to be protected, saying that "they might have declared
that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he
pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but he would ask the gentleman whether he
thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of rights." i ANNALS OF CONG. 759-
6o (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. I5, 1789). John Page of Virginia responded:
The gentleman from Massachusetts . . . objects to the clause, because the right is of so
trivial a nature. He supposes it no more essential than whether a man has a right to
wear his hat or not; but let me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and
a man has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority;
people have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful occasions.
Id. at 760. This was an evident reference to Penn's case. See I. BRANT, supra note 319, at
53-55-
321 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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the tendency to recognize only those beliefs that are a formal part of
the religious dogma of the claimant's denomination has been
superseded by a more individualistic view of religious conscience.
322
An obvious objection to all these examples would be that they
were initiated by the legislature. While these examples may refute
the absolute no-exemption position, they are not inconsistent with the
"judicial restraint" position. If, however, as seems to be the case, the
exemptions were granted because legislatures believed the free exercise
principle required them, it is reasonable to suppose that framers of
constitutional free exercise provisions understood that similar appli-
cations of the principle would be made by the courts, once courts
were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the mandates of
free exercise.
III. THE FEDERAL FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. The Constitution of 1787
The original Constitution drafted by the Convention in 1787 and
ratified by the states in 1788 contained no provision protecting the
general freedom of religion. It was not, however, entirely silent about
religion. Two provisions of the Constitution reflect a spirit and pur-
pose similar to that of the free exercise clause: the prohibition on
religious tests for office in article VI, 323 and the allowance of affir-
mations in lieu of oaths in articles I, II, and VI.324 Both provisions
322 See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., iog S. Ct. 15x4 (I989).
323 Article VI provides: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. This provision was
first proposed by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina as a freestanding amendment, see 2 1787:
DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1487 (W. Benton ed. 1986) [hereinafter DRAFTING THE
CONSTITUTION], and io days later, as an amendment to the article on the oath of office, see
id. at 1488. Debate was brief. Roger Sherman of Connecticut "thought it unnecessary, the
prevailing liberality being a sufficient security against such tests," but Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania and Pinckney's second cousin, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, supported
the motion, which passed unanimously. See id. at 1488-89; 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note
16o, at 457, 46o-6I (Journal, Aug. 30, 1787); id. at 461, 468 (Madison's notes, Aug. 30, 1787).
Later, during the ratification debates, the provision generated some opposition from those who
believed that atheists, "heathens," non-Christians, "Papists," or "Mahometans" should be ex-
cluded from office. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 165, at m9 (noting Col. Jones'
opposition to the provision during the Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at I99 (noting Caldwell's
argument against the provision during the North Carolina convention); id. at 215 (noting W.
Lancaster's opposition during the North Carolina convention). On the importance of this
provision, see C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, cited above in note 16, at 92-Iso; and
Bradley, The No Religions Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine
That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674 (1987).
324 Article I requires that the Senate "shall be on Oath or Affirmation" when sitting for the
trial of impeachments. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. As originally proposed by Gouverneur
Morris and as reported by the Committee on Style, this provision required an oath. See r
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were designed to prevent restrictions hostile to particular religions and
thus to make the government of the United States more religiously
inclutsive. Neither provision, however, used the device of a religion-
specific exemption.
The framers' decision to ban religious tests was a dramatic depar-
ture from the prevailing practice in the states, eleven of which then
banned non-Christians and at least four of which banned non-Prot-
estants from office. 325 While innovative in practice, however, the
provision was unexceptional in theory. From the outset, the preven-
tion of persecution, penalties, or incapacities on account of religion
has served as a common ground among all the various interpretations
of religious liberty. Religious tests for office are classic examples of
laws that single out particular religious beliefs for peculiar disability,
and they would be unconstitutional under any intelligible construction
of the religion clauses. 326 As Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, later
Chief Justice of the United States, wrote during the ratification cam-
paign:
[T]he sole purpose and effect of [the ban on religious tests for office]
is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the important right of
religious liberty . . . . In our country every man has a right to
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his own con-
science. If he be a good and peaceable citizen, he is liable to no
penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments; or in
other words, he is not subject to persecution. 327
DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, suprt note 323, at 640, 641. The words "or affirmation" were
added on September 14, 1787, by unanimous vote of the Convention. See id. at 641.
Article II provides:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take the following
Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, c]. 8. The allowance of an affirmation in lieu of an oath was part of
the original provision as drafted by the Committee of Detail. See 2 DRAFTING THE CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 323, at 1488.
Article VI provides: "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. As originally
proposed by the Committee of Detail, this provision required an oath. This appears to have
been an oversight; the words "or affirmation" were added, apparently on the floor of the
Convention, without separate vote. See 2 DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 323, at
1488.
325 See Bradley, supra note 323, at 681-83. By this time, Virginia had eliminated religious
tests. New York allowed Jews but banned Catholics; Maryland banned Jews but allowed
Catholics. See M. BORDEN, supra note 75, at 13-14.
326 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (I96I) (striking down Maryland's religious test
under the first amendment). But cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (189o) (upholding an anti-
Mormon oath requirement for voting).
327 Ellsworth, A Landholder VII, in r4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 448, 449 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1983) (originally published
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The significance of the "oath or affirmation" provisions is more
subtle. Oaths of office were serious matters, so serious that the Pres-
ident's oath of office is spelled out in the otherwise spare text of article
II. Moreover, the I787 Constitution requires that state as well as
federal officers be "bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution" - one of the few provisions of the Constitution directed
at state officers. Yet the framers of the Constitution realized that
several small religious sects, including the influential Quakers, refused
to swear oaths, on authority of Matthew 5:33-37. Lest members of
these sects be excluded from office, it was necessary to provide alter-
natives.
As has already been noted, this problem had arisen in most of the
states in connection with the oaths required of witnesses in court, as
well as with oaths of office. 32 8 The usual solution was to create an
exemption only for those with the religious objection and to require
all others to take the oath. The framers of the federal Constitution,
however, did not follow this model; they allowed any person, whether
"conscientiously scrupulous" or not, to promise by affirmation instead
of oath. Perhaps this was an act of verbal economy. Perhaps it
reflected a principled objection to exemptions limited to those of par-
ticular beliefs. In any event, the framers solved the oath problem
without the need for a free exercise exemption.
The new Constitution made no other provision for religious dif-
ferences. Indeed, it appears the subject did not come up, though
Luther Martin (not always the most reliable of sources) stated that he
was "positive" that "[a]n honorable member from South Carolina"
made an "attempt to have a stipulation in favour of liberty of con-
science, but in vain. '32 9 The prevailing view among the Federalists,
the supporters of the new Constitution, was that additional guarantees
of individual liberty were unnecessary. Explicit guarantees might even
be counterproductive, since the express mention of some liberties
might be taken to disparage the existence of other rights, which were
in the Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787). Oddly, Ellsworth supported a strict religious test
for office in his own state. See M. BORDEN, supra note 75, at 18.
328 See supra pp. 1467-68.
329 Martin, Reply to The Landholder (Mar. 19, 1788), reprinted in 3 FARRAND RECORDS,
supra note 16o, at 286, 290. Martin was probably recalling Charles Pinckney's several efforts
to ban religious tests for office. A less likely possibility is that Martin recalled Pinckney's original
draft of a constitution, which may have provided: "The Legislature of the United States shall
pass no Law on the subject of Religion." The Pinckney Plan, reprinted in 3 FARRAND RECORDS,
supra note 16o, at 595, 599. This draft (if it existed) was never debated, and the Committee
of Detail included no such provision in the drafts it presented to the Convention. See 3 FARRAND
RECORDS, supra note 16o, at 595. According to Farrand, "it is established beyond all doubt"
that the draft containing this language was not at all similar to the original Pinckney plan. See
id. at 6o3; Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of 1787, 1 ANN. REP.
AM. HiST. A. 89, 111-32 (1902).
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adequately secured through the careful enumeration and delimitation
of federal powers. 330
Other participants in the debate were less trustful of the novel and
distant federal government. Patrick Henry complained that a too-
powerful federal government could override religious freedoms that
had been hard won at the state level. 331 "Philadelphiensis," a Penn-
sylvania pamphleteer, objected to the transfer of control over military
service to the federal government for fear that the Quakers would
lose the exemptions from compulsory service they had won at the
state level: "Their influence in the state of Pennsylvania is fully suf-
ficient to save them from suffering very materially on this account;
but in the great vortex of the whole continent it can have no
weight. '332 The leader of the Virginia Baptists, John Leland, opposed
ratification on the ground that religious freedom was "not sufficiently
secured."333 "[11f Oppression dose not ensue," he wrote, "it will be
owing to the Mildness of administration & not to any Constitutional
defence." 334 In the Rhode Island town meetings of 1788-89, citizens
spoke out against the lack of protection for liberty of conscience "and
other fundamental liberties," and the state refused to ratify the Con-
stitution until after the Bill of Rights had been proposed. 335 Others,
perhaps more numerous, supported ratification but demanded amend-
ments incorporating a bill of rights. These advocates were sufficiently
persuasive (or sufficiently numerous) to extract the promise of a Bill
of Rights as the price for ratification of the rest of the Constitution.
Perhaps the most significant political battleground for future de-
velopment of a strong protection for religious freedom was in the
foothills of Virginia, where the young James Madison, recently re-
turned from the Constitutional Convention, was seeking a seat in the
first House of Representatives. Like other proponents of the Consti-
330 See, e.g., i ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (statement of James Madison,
June 8, 1789); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 51o (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. Ig6x).
331 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note I65, at 317-18 (June 12, 1788).
332 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 3.9.12, at 107 (H. Storing ed. 1981). A similar
argument was made by another pamphleteer nicknamed "An Old Whig." See id. § 3.3.29, at
36.
333 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
528 (U.S. Dep't of State ed. 19o5) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION].
The Virginia Baptist Association voted unanimously to oppose ratification, a fact that several
men quickly communicated to Madison, with the request that he take steps to mollify them.
See R. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE BAPTISTS IN VIRGINIA 99
(Richmond I8io); Letter from James Madison, Sr., to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1788), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note xog, at io5 n.I; Letter from Joseph Spencer to James
Madison (Feb. 28, 1788), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra, at 525.
334 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra note 333, at 528.
335 See C. ANTIEAU, A. DowNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note i6, at 152-53; F. BATES,
RHODE ISLAND AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION 165-76 (1898).
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tution of 1787, Madison initially lacked enthusiasm for adding a Bill
of Rights, though he came to recognize the need for one to assuage
the demands of the Antifederalist opposition. In a letter to Washing-
ton, he called "several of" Virginia's proposed amendments "highly
objectionable. '336 But when he initiated his candidacy for Congress,
he discovered that his Baptist constituents were prepared to throw
their support to his opponent, James Monroe. On advice of his po-
litical adviser, George Nicholas, 337 Madison contacted Baptist leaders
and proclaimed his support for "the most satisfactory provisions for
all essential rights, particularly the rights of Conscience in the fullest
latitude. '338 He then championed a constitutional provision for reli-
gious liberty as a campaign issue. 339 The Baptist leaders responded
by giving him their electoral support, which contributed to his narrow
margin of victory. A letter to Madison contains an interesting eye-
witness account of a gathering at the Blue Run Baptist Church, at
which the minister, the Reverend George Eve, "took a very Spirited
and decided Part in your favour" and "Spoke Long" on the subject of
Madison's contributions to religious freedom. 340
There were two strands to the Federalist argument against a free
exercise amendment. First, under the Constitution, the new federal
government was not given any powers to pass laws affecting religion.
As Madison told the Virginia ratifying convention, "There is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with reli-
gion. Its least interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpa-
tion."'341 Proponents of a free exercise amendment understandably
336 See Letter from James Madison to George Washington (June 27, 1788), in ixI MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 182; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct.
17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note iog, at 271 (stating that Madison
had never viewed the Bill of Rights "in an important light).
337 See Letter from George Nicholas to James Madison (Jan. 2, 1789), in ii MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 406.
338 Letter from James Madison to the Rev. George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in ix MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 404, 405; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas M.
Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), in xx MADISON PAPERS, supra note 226, at 415, 416.
339 See Letter from James Madison published in the Fredricksburg (Va.) Herald (Jan. 29,
1789), in ir MADISON PAPERS, supra note 226, at 428 (promising to sponsor a constitutional
amendment); Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Jan. 14, 1789), in xi MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 417 (describing his speeches and newspaper campaign to dispel a
report that he opposed constitutional amendments); see also Letter from David Jameson, Jr., to
James Madison, in ri MADISON PAPERS, supra note 226, at 419 (Jan. 14, 1789) (thanking
Madison for making an address in Culpepper County on the issue of amendments).
340 Letter from Benjamin Johnson to James Madison (Jan. 19, 1789), in ix MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 226, at 423, 424.
341 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 165, at 330 (June i2, 1788). James Iredell made a
similar argument in the North Carolina ratifying convention. See 4 id. at 194 (July 30, 1788).
Roger Sherman of Connecticut continued to make the argument in the First Congress in
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rejected this argument. The federal government would exercise ple-
nary regulatory authority in the territories, 342 the District of Colum-
bia,343 and the military.344 Its powers of taxation, 345 spending, 346
immigration and naturalization, 347 copyright, 348 international trade,349
bankruptcy,350 and relations with Indian tribes351 and foreign
governments352 could, with little imagination, be expected to affect
the exercise of religion. The potential of the necessary and proper
clause might be viewed - and was viewed, according to Madison -
as the most threatening of all. 3 53 Thus, a federal government bent
opposition to enactment of the religion clauses. See i ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (J. Gales ed.
1834) (statement of Roger Sherman, Aug. I5, 1789).
342 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the petitioner's conviction
under territorial legislation outlawing the Mormon practice of polygamy).
343 See H. Rep., Returned Bill 2i (Feb. 23, I8iI), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
TUTION, supra note 72, at 99 (recording President Madison's veto of "An Act incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia," on the
ground that Congress' authority over the District of Columbia should not be used to define the
functions and governance of a church).
344 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding an Air Force uniform
regulation prohibiting the wearing of a yarmulke).
345 See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 1o9 S. Ct. 2136 (1989) (rejecting a claim that disallow-
ance of claimed charitable contributions violated the religion clauses).
346 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that federal taxpayers who alleged that
the appropriation of federal funds to religious schools violated the establishment and free exercise
clauses had standing to sue).
347 See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (holding that the Nationality Act did
not require Seventh-day Adventist aliens to swear to bear arms in defense of the country);
United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. i989) (sustaining the conviction of defendants
engaged in a sanctuary movement who challenged enforcement of immigration laws as violative
of their free exercise rights).
348 See United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Directors, 829 F.2d 1152
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that congressional extension of the Christian Science Church's copyright
on all Christian Science scripture unconstitutionally contravened the first amendment rights of
a dissident group that wished to publish a variant).
349 See ig U.S.C. § 1202, sch. 8, pt. 4, T 850 (1988) (exempting certain religious artifacts
from import duties).
350 See In re Reynolds, 83 Bankr. 684 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (regulating the religious contributions
of a debtor in bankruptcy).
3s1 See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 5o (igo8) (maintaining that prohibiting the exercise
of Indian treaty power to appropriate tribal and trust funds for sectarian education would deny
an Indian's free exercise of religion).
352 See Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3 d
Cir.) (upholding denial of standing to a group raising an establishment clause challenge to the
appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
353 See I ANNALS OF, CONG. 758 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (speech by James Madison, Aug. 15,
1789). Madison observed:
[S]ome of the State Conventions ... seemed to entertain an opinion that under the clause
of the constitution, which gave power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper
to carry into execution the constitution, and the laws made under it, enabled them to
make laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a
national religion.
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on religious oppression could accomplish such oppression under pre-
text of one of the enumerated powers. Moreover, the argument that
the lack of enumerated power could serve as a sufficient assurance of
religious liberty offered no comfort to those who understood free
exercise of religion to entail exemption from otherwise legitimate gen-
eral legislation. Such legislation is by definition within the enumerated
powers of the federal government.
The second strand of the Federalist argument was more persua-
sive. The Federalists argued that the structure of government, com-
bined with the multiplicity of religious sects, would provide an effec-
tive guarantee against religious oppression. Madison's defense of the
Constitution in the Virginia convention typified this position:
Religion is not guarded; there is no bill of rights declaring that religion
should be secure .... Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost
freedom of religion. This freedom arises from that multiplicity of sects
which pervades America, and which is the best and only security for
religious liberty in any society; for where there is such a variety of
sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and
persecute the rest.35
4
This argument exactly parallels Madison's famous defense of the Con-
stitutional structure in Federalist No. 51. There he says that the
"security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.
It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects." 355 The best cure for factional
oppression is a large republic with many conflicting factions and a
representative government with checks and balances. 356
354 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 165, at 330 (June i2, 1788).
355 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also id. No.
io, at 79 (J. Madison) (citing "[a] zeal for different opinions concerning religion" as his first
example of a "faction").
356 Madison's theory of religious faction was no doubt a product of his experiences during
the assessment controversy in Virginia, where the two largest denominations - Anglican and
Presbyterian - were played off against one another. It also had roots in European thought.
Madison was fond of quoting Voltaire that "'[i]f one religion only were allowed in England,
... the government would possibly become arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would
cut each other's throats; but, as there are such a multitude, they all live happy and in peace.'"
W. RivEs, 2 HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 220 n.i (1866) (quoting F.
VOLTAIRE, LETTRES SUR LES ANGLAIS). Similarly, Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations,
observed:
The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome
only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a
large society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting by
concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be alto-
gether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into
as many thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb
the public tranquillity.
A. SMITH, supra note I56, bk. 5, ch. i, pt. 3, art. 3, at 745.
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If the principal danger to religious liberty was the deliberate
oppression of religious minorities by the majority, then the Madisonian
vision offered a more powerful answer to those demanding a free
exercise clause. In a nation of many different religious groups, each
jealous of the others, it would be difficult if not impossible for any
group to impose its beliefs on the others. Yet Madison's argument
did not carry the day. Perhaps the reason is that his argument did
not satisfy the concerns of those, like the Quakers addressed by "Phi-
ladelphiensis," who feared not deliberate oppression, but the unin-
tended effects of legislation passed without regard to the religious
scruples of small minorities. The multiplicity of sects provides no
protection against ignorance or indifference. Indeed, the position of
religious minorities might be made much worse. Because settlements
of minorities tend to be concentrated in particular regions, most sects
had greater influence at the state level than in "the great vortex of
the whole continent."357 The same extended Union that protected
minority faiths against oppression would make them more vulnerable
to thoughtless general legislation.
Federalist assurances thus failed to assuage the concerns of Amer-
ica's religious sects, including many of Madison's own constituents.
Only a bill of rights would do.
B. Framing and Ratifying the Free Exercise Clause
i. Debates in the First Congress. - Madison admitted that the
lack of a provision protecting the rights of conscience had "alarmed
many respectable Citizens," and he pledged to work for "the most
satisfactory provisions for all essential rights, particularly the rights
of Conscience in the fullest latitude, the freedom of the press, trials
by jury, security against general warrants &c." 358 Lawmakers in other
states responded to the same popular pressure. Seven states drafted
proposals for amendments, and five of them (plus the minority report
in Pennsylvania) urged protection for religious freedom. New York,
for example, ratified the Constitution but proposed a bill of rights
including the following provision: "That the people have an equal,
natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their
religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . . ,,359 Virginia
proposed a similar provision, using the phrase "free exercise of reli-
357 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 332, § 3.9.12, at 1o7.
358 Letter from James Madison to the Rev. George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in II MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 404, 404-05. Madison subsequently published this promise in the
Fredericksburg Herald. See Letter from James Madison published in the Fredericksburg (Va.)
Herald (Jan. 29, 1789), in xI MADISON PAPERS, supra note 226, at 428.
359 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note x65, at 327 (July 26, 1788).
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gion";360 Rhode Island 361 and North Carolina 362 made proposals vir-
tually identical to Virginia's.
Only New Hampshire, of the states that proposed a federal bill of
rights, used a markedly different formulation: "Congress shall make
no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience. '363
The wording of this proposal tends to support the exemptions view,
since the second clause would have little, if any, application unless
secular, generally applicable laws (laws not "touching religion") could
violate the rights of conscience. This proposal was considered on the
floor of the House of Representatives, briefly adopted, and then re-
jected in favor of a formulation similar to today's free exercise
clause. 364
The recorded debates in the House over these proposals cast little
light on the meaning of the free exercise clause. Indeed, the main
controversy during these debates centered on establishment. The key
changes in free exercise language ("free exercise of religion" in place
of "equal rights of conscience," and "prohibiting" in place of "in-
fring[ing]") took place after the recorded debate. Thus, we must rely
primarily on the successive drafts of the clause during its passage
through the First Congress.
Madison undertook an initial draft of the Bill of Rights, to be
proposed to the House of Representatives. His draft free exercise
clause did not follow the language of the state proposals. Rather, he
suggested the following formulation: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, [n]or shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, nor on any pretext, infringed. '365 Three
aspects of the Madison proposal are suggestive. First, the formulation
"full and equal rights of conscience" implies that the liberty has both
a substantive and an equality component: the rights must be both
"full" and "equal." Hence, the liberty of conscience is entitled not
only to equal protection, but also to some absolute measure of pro-
tection apart from mere governmental neutrality.
360 The Virginia proposal read:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore
all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience ....
3 id. at 659 (June 27, 1788). The Virginia proposal was taken almost verbatim from the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776. See supra text accompanying note 251.
361 See i ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 165, at 334 (May 29, 179o).
362 See 4 id. at 244 (Aug. 1, 1788).
363 1 id. at 326 (June 21, 1788).
364 See i ANNALS OF CONG. 757-59 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 2789), 796 (Aug. 20,
1789).
365 Id. at 451 (proposal of James Madison, June 8, 1789).
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Second, the formulation that the rights in question shall not "in
any manner nor on any pretext" be infringed suggests protection from
infringements in any form, even those not expressly directed at reli-
gious practice. This proposal recognized that infringements on rights
of conscience could result from Congress' exercise of its enumerated
powers even when the legislation made no direct reference to religion.
For the most part these infringements would be indirect - secular
laws that invaded religious freedom as applied, rather than acts di-
rected toward religious practice or belief as such.
Third, Madison favored the formulation "rights of conscience" over
the formulation "free exercise of religion," which was found both in
his own state's laws and in three of the five state proposals. This
choice of language was ultimately reversed after deliberation by the
House and the Senate; its meaning is considered below.3 66
Rather than debating Madison's proposal, the Select Committee
proposed a much shorter version: "no religion shall be established by
law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." 367 The
Committee deleted Madison's reference to "Civil Rights," probably
because it was redundant, and shortened his "full and equal rights of
conscience" to "equal rights of conscience." If this change was more
than stylistic, which seems doubtful, it might suggest a move toward
a no-exemptions view of free exercise, since it emphasizes equal treat-
ment rather than full substantive protection.
The Select Committee language ran into trouble in the House,
largely because of concerns that its establishment provision might
interfere with the ability of the states to support religion - an issue
especially important to those states with established churches. After
a brief flirtation with the New Hampshire language, previously dis-
cussed, 368 the House adopted a formulation proposed by Fisher Ames
of Massachusetts: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion,
or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience." 369 This version omitted the modifiers "full" and "equal"
from the phrase "rights of conscience." This suggests that the deletion
of "full" by the Committee was no more than stylistic and that the
word "equal" was deleted so as not to create a negative inference.
More strikingly, the Ames version introduced a new term into the
debate: "free exercise of religion." "Free exercise" had been part of
most of the state proposals but had not appeared in the Madison,
Select Committee, or New Hampshire proposals previously debated
in the House, all of which had used the alternative formulation "rights
of conscience." In many contexts, the phrases "rights of conscience"
366 See infra pp. 1488-15oo.
367 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (J. Gales ed. x834) (Aug. 1s, 1789).
368 See supra text accompanying notes 363-364.
369 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (proposal of Fisher Ames, Aug. 20, 1789).
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and "free exercise of religion" seem to have been used interchangeably.
But here, Ames, a notoriously careful draftsman and meticulous law-
yer, thought it necessary to use both terms. The significance of this
change will be considered below.370
The House of Representatives approved the amendment as pro-
posed by Ames without recorded debate or discussion. Both the
House and the Senate journals record that the House passed and sent
to the Senate a proposed amendment slightly different from the Ames
proposal: "Congress shall make no law establishing Religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed."'371 The difference between these two versions is a shift in
verbs from "prevent" to "prohibit" and a shift in grammatical form
from infinitives to gerunds. Whether these changes result from an
unrecorded amendment or from mistranscription in either the Annals
or the final copy of the engrossed bill is unknown. 372
Whatever the precise chain of events, the language considered by
the Senate and ultimately employed in the first amendment was "pro-
hibiting the free exercise [of religion]." This wording has proven
significant to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the free exercise
clause and is discussed in detail below. 3 73
In the Senate, the debate was not recorded, but various versions
of the religion clauses were adopted and rejected in succession. The
versions adopted, in order, were as follows:
(i) "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or
society in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed."374
(2) "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." 375
370 See infra pp. 1488-1500.
371 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 136 (L. De Pauw ed. 1972) (Senate Journal); 3 id. at i59 (House Journal) [here-
inafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
372 See Laycock, supra note 16, at 879 n.27. The Annals is not entirely reliable. See id. at
885. For a glaring example, see I ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (J. Cales ed. 1834) (Sept. 24, 1789)
(transcribing the final version of the free exercise clause adopted by both Houses as ". . . or
prohibiting a free exercise thereof" (emphasis added)). Madison wrote that the reporter's notes,
later printed in the Annals, showed "'the strongest evidences of mutilation & perversion, and of
the illiteracy of the Editor.'" Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18
WM. & MARY Q. 519, 532-33 (3d ser. i96i) (quoting PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON XI, No. 58,
Lib. Congress). See generally Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1986) (arguing that most records of the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution may be seriously unreliable).
373 See infra pp. 1486-88.
374 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 371, at 151 (Senate Journal).
375 Id.
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(3) "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion ... ",376
Note that each of these versions used either the phrase "rights of
conscience" or the phrase "free exercise of religion." No version used
the phrases in conjunction, as had the Ames proposal.
The third version passed the Senate and was transmitted to the
House, which rejected it, presumably because of its narrow provision
on establishment. A Conference Committee, on which Madison
served, proposed the version of the religion clauses that was ultimately
ratified. 3 77 The free exercise clause itself was unchanged from the
final Senate bill.
One final point about the debate in the First Congress deserves
mention. In addition to the provision already discussed, which ap-
plied only to the federal government, Madison proposed an amend-
ment that would have been applicable to the states. It read: "[N]o
State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of
speech or of the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases." 3 78 Madison said that he conceived this to be "the most valu-
able amendment in the whole list. If there were any reason to restrain
the Government of the United States from infringing upon these es-
sential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured
against the State Governments. '3 79 Significantly, Madison did not
propose that the establishment clause be made applicable to the states;
this reflects the prevailing view at the time that states should be
permitted to set their own course with respect to establishment, but
that liberty of conscience was an unalienable right. With minor edi-
torial change, the House adopted Madison's proposal. 38 0 Later the
Senate rejected the proposal, presumably in deference to states'
rights. 38 ' This left the provisions of the Bill of Rights solely as
limitations against the federal government, 38 2 as they were to remain
376 Id. at i66 (Senate Journal).
377 See 3 id. at 228 (House Journal).
378 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (J. Gales x834) (Aug. 17, 1789).
379 Id.
380 See id. at 784.
381 No less a Federalist than James Iredell had commented in his state's ratifying convention:
It has been asked . . . why a guaranty of religious freedom was not included. . . . Had
Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular species of it, they
would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have nothing to do with.
Each state, so far as the [republican form of government clause] does not interfere, must
be left to the operation of its own principles.
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 65, at 194-95 (July 30, 1788) (emphasis in original).
382 See Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588, 609 (1845) ("The Constitution
makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties;
this is left to the State constitutions and laws.").
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until the Supreme Court held that they had been selectively "incor-
porated" pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.383
Any interpretation of the religion clauses as applying to the states
is thus somewhat anachronistic. Because the free exercise clause at
the federal level was itself modeled on free exercise provisions in the
various state constitutions, however, no structural distortions arise
from assuming that, for modern purposes (after "incorporation"), the
free exercise clause means the same thing for states that it has always
meant for the federal government. 384
2. Ratification. - The ratification debates in the state legislatures
were unilluminating. Most states ratified the proposed amendments
quickly, with little debate or controversy. Three states - Georgia,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut - failed to ratify, but the refusal
seems to have been unrelated to questions of religious freedom. Only
in Virginia is there record of opposition to the religion clauses as
proposed by Congress. In Virginia, the Senate delayed ratification of
the first amendment, partly on' the ground that it "does not prohibit
the rights of conscience from being violated or infringed. '385 The
reasons for this are difficult to fathom, since neither Virginia's own
Bill of Rights nor the amendment on religious freedom the state
proposed to the Congress contained a separate "rights of conscience"
clause, and in the only legal document in which the "rights of con-
science" and the "exercise of religion" were differentiated - the Geor-
gia Charter of 1732386 - free exercise was broader than the rights of
conscience. 387 Historian Leonard Levy attributes the delay to Anti-
federalist political maneuvering rather than to serious substantive op-
position to the language of the first amendment. 388 After two years,
the first amendment was ratified without additional comment.
3. Two Issues of Interpretation. - As has been noted,389 two key
modifications in the language that ultimately became the free exercise
clause were made after the close of recorded debate. In the House,
the verb "prohibit" was substituted for the broader term "infringe."
38 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the free exercise clause
to the states for the first time through the fourteenth amendment).
384 Incorporation of the establishment clause presents far more serious interpretive difficulties,
since there existed no national consensus on the question of governmental aid to religion, other
than to leave the question to the states; in addition, the ramifications of establishment are
different for small than for large units of government.
38S C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note I6, at 145 (quoting JOURNAL OF
THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA FOR 2789, at 51 (available at Virginia State Library, Richmond)).
386 See GA. CHARTER of 1732, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 2, at 369.
387 See infra pp. 1489-9o.
388 See L. LEVY, supra note i6, at 86-89.
389 See supra p. 1481.
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In the Senate, the term "free exercise of religion" was adopted and
the term "rights of conscience" was deleted. Both changes could have
important implications for the meaning of the free exercise clause.
But since there was no recorded debate or discussion of these later
versions, we can only rely on context, contemporary diction, and other
indirect evidence of meaning.
(a) The Meaning of "Prohibiting." - The prior drafts considered
by the House used the verbs "infringing" or "preventing" to describe
the forbidden effect on the rights of conscience. Moreover, in parallel
clauses of the first amendment, the framers used the verb "abridging"
to protect the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. The Su-
preme Court later relied on this choice of words to support a restrictive
reading of the free exercise clause. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association,390 the Court reasoned: "The crucial
word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit"'; therefore, the free exercise
clause does not require the government "to bring forward a compelling
justification" for actions "which may make it more difficult to practice
certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs." 391 This textual argu-
ment is further developed in the Department of Justice study of the
origins of the free exercise clause: "'[P]rohibiting' and 'abridging' are
denotatively and connotatively distinct. 'Prohibiting' means to forbid
or prevent, while 'abridging' means to reduce or limit. Thus, 'pro-
hibiting' connotes a finality, certitude, or damning not present in
'abridging,' which connotes limitations falling short of the finality of
prohibition or prevention. '392 On the strength of this textual evidence
alone, the report concludes that laws that discourage or inhibit reli-
gious exercise by denying government benefits (even those enacted in
"purposeful discrimination" against a religion) do not violate the free
exercise clause. 393 Only laws that make a religious practice unlawful
or impossible are forbidden.
While contemporaneous definitions of "prohibit" indicate that it
was a stronger and narrower term than "abridge" or "infringe," the
distinction is probably overdrawn in the context of the free exercise
debate in 1789. Among the synonyms for "prohibit" listed in Samuel
Johnson's 1755 edition is "to hinder, '394 which seems weaker and
broader than "abridge" or "infringe." Since the verb form used for
the establishment clause ("respecting") was different from the verb
form used for the free speech clause ("abridging"), it seems more likely
390 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
391 Id. at 451.
392 REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note r7, at 17 (citing various dictionaries,
including a 1755 edition of Samuel Johnson's and an 1828 edition of Noah Webster's).
393 See id. at 47 n.84.
394 2 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 268.
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that the drafters found it less awkward or more euphonious to use
yet a third verb form ("prohibiting") for the free exercise clause. 395
No one in the debate, in or out of Congress, expressed the view that
infringements that are not final, certain, or "damning"396 should be
allowed. Madison had promised to support "the most satisfactory
provisions for all essential rights, particularly the rights of Conscience
in the fullest latitude, '397 and Daniel Carroll, a Roman Catholic from
Maryland, had stated that the "rights of conscience . . . will little
bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand" and that "many sects
have concurred in opinion that they are not well secured under the
present constitution. '398 If the final version had been understood to
allow infringements short of outright prohibition, one of these gentle-
men would surely have spoken up. But both seemed satisfied with
the bill's language, as did their constituents. A Baptist leader wrote
Madison to tell him "that the amendments had entirely satisfied the
disaffected of his Sect."399
Ten years after the House debate, Madison commented on the
difference in verbs in the three portions of the first amendment (laws
respecting Establishment, laws prohibiting free exercise, and laws
abridging the freedom of speech, press, or assembly). The argument
had been made (by no less a figure than John Marshall) that Congress
had greater power over the press than over the establishment of
religion, because the term "abridging" was less encompassing than the
term "respecting. '40 0 Madison, in response, stated that "the liberty of
conscience and the freedom of the press were equally and completely
395 The word choice may therefore reflect what is called "elegant variation," disapproved of
by modern authorities. See H. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 130-33
(1927).
396 See REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra 17, at 17.
397 Letter from James Madison to the Rev. George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in ii MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 226, at 404, 405.
398 I ANNALS OF CONG. 757-58 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
399 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note iog, at 429.
400 See Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 136, 138. Marshall's argument,
in full, was as follows:
In a solemn instrument, as is a constitution, words are well weighed and considered
before they are adopted. A remarkable diversity of expression is not used, unless it be
designed to manifest a difference of intention. Congress is prohibited from making any
law RESPECTING a religious establishment, but not from making any law RESPECT-
ING the press. When the power of Congress relative to the press is to be limited, the
word RESPECTING is dropt, and Congress is only restrained from the passing any law
ABRIDGING its liberty. This difference of expression with respect to religion and the
press, manifests a difference of intention with respect to the power of the national
legislature over those subjects, both in the person who drew, and in those who adopted
this amendment.
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exempted from all authority whatever of the United States."40 1 He
went on to argue:
[If Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, provided they do
not abridge it, because it is said only "they shall not abridge it," and
is not said "they shall make no law respecting it," the analogy of
reasoning is conclusive that Congress may regulate and even abridge
the free exercise of religion, provided they do not prohibit it; because
it is said only "they shall not prohibit it," and is not said "they shall
make no law respecting, or no law abridging it."'402
Madison found this interpretation of the free exercise clause so absurd
that to state it was to refute it. Despite its plausibility as a textual
matter, the narrow interpretation of "prohibiting" should therefore be
rejected, and the term should be read as meaning approximately the
same as "infringing" or "abridging."
(b) The Substitution of "Free Exercise of Religion" for the "Rights
of Conscience." - As noted above, 40 3 the states requesting consti-
tutional protection for religious freedom, with one exception, employed
the language free "exercise" of "religion," borrowing from the Virginia
Bill of Rights. Madison, for reasons that remain mysterious, did not
follow this lead in his draft, using instead the term "rights of con-
science," a term also used by the Select Committee and New Hamp-
shire drafts debated on the floor of the House of Representatives. The
term "free exercise of religion" reappeared after the close of recorded
debate, in the Ames version, which protected both "free exercise of
religion" and the "rights of conscience," and which passed the House.
The Senate first voted to protect "rights of conscience" and then settled
upon protecting the "free exercise of religion" alone, a formulation
that ultimately carried the day. It is possible that these changes in
language were without substantive meaning, for in many of the de-
bates in the preconstitutional period, the concepts of "liberty of con-
science" and "free exercise of religion" were used interchangeably.
There are, nonetheless, three principal differences between the terms
that may have significance for interpretation.
The least ambiguous difference is that the term "free exercise"
makes clear that the clause protects religiously motivated conduct as
well as belief. This point merits emphasis, because in 1879 the Su-
preme Court, relying on Jefferson, explicitly rejected this reading. 40 4
Only in 194o did the Court begin to include religiously motivated
conduct within the ambit of the free exercise clause, and even then,
401 Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 18, z8oo), reprinted in 5 THE FOUND-
ERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 141, 146 (emphasis in original).
402 Id.
403 See supra pp. 1481-82.
404 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
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only to a limited degree. 40 5 The belief-action distinction is often used
to suggest that protection for religiously motivated conduct is far
weaker than that accorded to free speech or other, seemingly "abso-
lute" freedoms. 40 6
The choice of the words "free exercise of religion" in lieu of "rights
of conscience" is therefore of utmost importance. As defined by dic-
tionaries at the time of the framing, the word "exercise" strongly
connoted action. The American edition of Samuel Johnson's Diction-
ary of the English Language, published in Philadelphia in 1805, used
the following terms to define "exercise": "Labour of the body," "Use;
actual application of any thing," "Task; that which one is appointed
to perform," and "Act of divine worship, whether public or private. 40 7
Noah Webster's American dictionary defined "exercise" as "employ-
ment. '408 James Buchanan's 1757 dictionary defined "exercise" as "[tlo
use or practice." 40 9 "Conscience" was more likely to have been under-
stood as opinion or belief. Johnson equated "conscience" with the
terms "knowledge," "Real sentiment; veracity; private thoughts,"
"Scruple; difficulty," and "reason; reasonableness. °4 10 Webster defined
it as "natural knowledge, or the faculty that decides on the right or
wrong of actions." 411 Buchanan defined it as the "testimony of one's
own mind. ' 412
The Georgia Charter of 1732 is the only legal document of the
period to make a distinction between the two phrases. It provided
"that there shall be a liberty of conscience allowed in the worship of
God, to all persons inhabiting, or which shall inhabit or be resident
within our said province, and that all such persons, except papists,
shall have a free exercise of religion. '413 Since Roman Catholics were
405 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
406 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978) (plurality opinion); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-07 (ig6i); Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 139, 763
P.2d 852, 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. i, i8 (1988) (holding that the prosecution for manslaughter of a
mother who refused any medical treatment except prayer for her son was not prohibited by the
free exercise clause); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity, 46
Cal. 3d 1092, 1112, 762 P.2d 46, 56, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 132 (1988) (holding that the free
exercise clause does not bar an action for fraud against a religious organization when that action
implicates conduct, not belief); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 727-27, 481 N.E.2d 116o,
I167 (2985) (holding that the free exercise clause would not prevent the consideration of tort
claims arising out of the termination of a Christian Science Monitor employee who refused to
seek healing through the church for her sexual preference).
407 S. JOHNSON, supra note 252.
408 N. WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New Haven
18o6).
409 J. BUCHANAN, supra note 251.
410 S. JOHNSON, supra note 252.
411 N. WEBSTER, supra note 252.
412 J. BUCHANAN, supra note 25I.
413 GA. CHARTER of 1732, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
2, at 369, 375.
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guaranteed liberty of conscience but not the free exercise of religion,
this suggests that the former was understood to be narrower than the
latter.414 The most plausible reading of the provision is that it per-
mitted Catholics to believe what they wished (and possibly to worship
as they liked, though that is more doubtful), but did not permit them
to put their faith into action. Such a policy would be consistent with
the fears of the papacy that existed at the time.
By using the term "free exercise," the first amendment extended
the broader freedom of action to all believers. As noted, the freedom
of religion was almost universally understood (with Jefferson being
the prominent exception) to include conduct as well as belief.415 Ac-
cordingly, free exercise is more likely than mere liberty of conscience
to generate conflicts with, and claims for exemption from, general
laws and social mores.
A second important difference between the terms "conscience" and
"religion" is that "conscience" emphasizes individual judgment, 416
while "religion" also encompasses the corporate or institutional aspects
of religious belief. In the great battle cry of the Protestant Reforma-
tion - "God alone is Lord of the conscience"417 - the individual
conscience was used in contradistinction to the teaching of the insti-
tutional church. "Religion," by contrast, connotes a community of
believers. The most widely accepted derivation of the word "religion"
is from the Latin "religare" - to bind.418 Religion binds believers
together; conscience refers to the inner faculty of judgment. Thus,
the "free exercise of religion" suggests that the government may not
interfere with the activities of religious bodies, even when the inter-
ference has no direct relation to a claim of conscience. 4 19 This inter-
414 It is not apparent what "liberty of conscience" included as applied to Catholics, or if the
charter provision was enforced at all. During this period, Catholics were excluded from the
colony, and those who entered were not permitted to receive land grants, inherit property, or
hold public office. See R. STRICKLAND, supra note 62, at 8o-8x. Later, when governance of
the colony was transfered from the Trustees to the Crown, the instructions to the royal governor
denied even the liberty of conscience to Catholics and omitted any reference to "free exercise."
See id. at 120.
415 For a discussion of the belief-action distinction prior to the framing, see pp. 1451-52
above.
416 See supra p. 1489 (quoting contemporaneous dictionary definitions of "conscience').
417 This statement was formally adopted as part of their creed by the Calvinists of Great
Britain in 1647. See The Westminster Confession of Faith, in 3 THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM
6oo (P. Schaft 4 th ed. i919). It presumably derived from John Calvin's Reply to Cardinal
Sadolet, published in 1539, which stated: "There is nothing of Christ, then, in him who does
not hold the elementary principle, that it is God alone who enlightens our minds to perceive
his truth, who by his Spirit seals it on our hearts, and by his sure attestation to it confirms our
conscience." J. CALVIN, Reply to Letter by Cardinal Sadolet to the Senate and People of
Geneva, in JOHN CALVIN: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS 81, 1o5 (J. Dillenberger ed. 1971).
418 See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1628 (2d ed. 1987).
419 An example would be the application of a nondiscrimination law to the employment of
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pretation is also consistent with the distinction drawn in the Georgia
Charter, since the private devotions of individual Catholics would be
of less concern to the state than the operations of an institutional
Church with supposed connections to foreign powers.
The third, and most controversial, difference between the "free
exercise of religion" and the "rights of conscience" is that the latter
might seem to extend to claims of conscience based on something
other than religion - to belief systems based on science, history,
economics, political ideology, or secular moral philosophy. By deleting
references to "conscience," the final version of the first amendment
singles out religion for special treatment. And so the Supreme Court
has held: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not
be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . . if it is
based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief."420
This distinction between religion and other belief systems has come
under substantial attack in academic circles. 421 Religion is understood
a minister. See, e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. i985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). Under the view of free exercise
espoused in the text, such a law would be an unconstitutional interference in a religious function
even if the religious group in question had no doctrinal tenet requiring or allowing discrimination.
420 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). This position was unanimously reaf-
firmed in Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., iog S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989); see also
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, iog S. Ct. 89 o , 9oi n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.)
(noting that exemptions conferred exclusively on religious groups or individuals on account of
their religious convictions do not violate the establishment clause if they are "designed to alleviate
government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct
protected by the Free Exercise Clause"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[I]n one important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of
religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience may give
rise to constitutional rights that other strongly held beliefs do not." (emphasis in original)) .
The draft cases of the Vietnam War era marked the only instance in the Court's history that
it extended religious exemptions to persons with essentially secular claims of conscience. See
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (970). Four members of the Court in Welsh rested their
decision on (not very persuasive) statutory construction grounds. One member of the Court -
Justice Harlan - joined the majority on the ground that a distinction between religious and
secular claims of conscience would be unconstitutional. See id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Although the Supreme Court has consistently confined the constitutional protections of the
free exercise clause to religion, it sometimes takes the opposite position with regard to accom-
modations not required under the free exercise clause. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 71, (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding a statute unconstitutional
because it "singles out Sabbath observers for special ...protection without according similar'
accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees") and
Caldor, 472 U.S. at 71o n. 9 (same) with Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (I987) ("Where ...government
acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see
no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.").
421 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 200-01 (977); M. KONVITZ, RE-
LIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 73-IO6 (2968); D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 136-46;
Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 325, 325-27 (2984).
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to be a product of individual choice, and protected as such. It is said
to be arbitrary (and even unconstitutional) to differentiate between
belief systems, all of which are the product of individual judgment,
on the ground that some are "religious" and some are not.
David A.J. Richards has presented the most sustained and
thoughtful exposition of this position. 422 Professor Richards' concep-
tion of free exercise is rooted in liberal individualism. He views
religious freedom as an aspect of the "equal respect" that must be
shown "for the capacity to exercise our twin moral powers of ration-
ality and reasonableness." 423 It is ultimately based on "respect for the
person as an independent source of value. '424 A definition of "con-
science" sufficiently broad to encompass all that "neutrality requires"
would "include[] everything and anything, including purely scientific
beliefs about the causal structure of the world integrated into some
larger rational and reasonable conception of one's ends." 425 If the
science of the origin and structure of the universe is included, so
presumably must be the soft sciences of economics, politics, history,
psychology, and the like. Richards thus contends that "the motivation
for universal toleration must encompass all belief systems, religious
and nonreligious, expressive of our moral powers of rationality and
reasonableness. ,4 2 6
Under this view, religious claims have no higher status than non-
religious claims - and maybe even lower status, to the extent that
modern moral philosophy elevates "rationality and reasonableness"
over the characteristic religious claims of revelation, tradition, and
spirit-filled inspiration. And if the distinction between religious and
nonreligious conscience is arbitrary, then it amounts to an indefensible
preference - an establishment of religion - to accommodate religious
and not nonreligious claims of comparable magnitude.
The question is therefore whether the principle of free exercise, as
enacted by the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment, was a
specific instantiation of a wider liberty of conscience encompassing
individual moral judgments rooted in nonreligious as well as religious
sources, or whether religious conscience is different in some funda-
mental respect from other forms of individual judgment, in which
case the free exercise clause would provide no warrant for protecting
a broader class of claims. 427 The question is all the more significant
422 See D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 136-46.
423 Id. at 136.
424 Id. at 142.
425 Id. at 141-42.
426 Id. at 138.
427 Professor Richards agrees that this issue must be resolved by reference to the "history
and practice of religion clause jurisprudence," id. at 141, but he devotes no attention to the
actual history of the free exercise clause bearing on the specific point (nor to its "practice'). See
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for the practical reason that if the exercise of religion extends to
"everything and anything, '428 the interference with ordinary opera-
tions of government would be so extreme that the free exercise clause
would fall of its own weight. To protect everything is to protect
nothing.
The historical materials uniformly equate "religion" with belief in
God or in gods, 429 though this can be extended without distortion to
transcendent extrapersonal authorities not envisioned in traditionally
theistic terms. 430 By contrast, Noah Webster's Dictionary of the En-
glish Language, the first comprehensive American dictionary (pub-
lished in 1807), defined "conscience" as: "natural knowledge, or the
faculty that decides on the right or wrong of actions in regard to one's
self. '431 Similarly, James' Buchanan's 1757 dictionary, Linguae Bri-
tannicae Vera Pronunciatio, defined "conscience" as "[t]he testimony
of one's own mind. '432 And Samuel Johnson's great Dictionary of the
English Language gave as the first definition: "The knowledge or
faculty by which we judge of the goodness or wickedness of our-
selves. '433 In none of these definitions was there specific reference to
religion, although about half of the literary examples Johnson gave in
the four volume edition had a religious context.434
On the other hand, outside of dictionaries, the vast preponderance
of references to "liberty of conscience" in America were either expressly
or impliedly limited to religious conscience. 435 A few examples suffice
to make the point; dozens of others would do as well. St. George
id. Significantly, Richards uses a vocabulary that was deliberately rejected by the framers. He
talks of "toleration," although the framers condemned the concept of toleration. See supra pp.
1443-49. And he speaks of "conscience," when the framers considered drafts employing the
term and chose to use the term "religion" instead.
428 D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 141.
429 See Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 (1983). For example, the Virginia Bill of Rights defined "religion" as "the
duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it." Virginia Bill of Rights
of 1776, § i6, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 19o8,
1909.
430 Madison, for example, deliberately chose terms other than "God" to refer to the object
of religious homage, including "Creator," "Governor of the Universe," and "Universal Sovereign."
J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note iog, at 184-85. This suggests an attempt
at a definition more compendious than the familiar Judeo-Christian God, but it retains the
distinction between transcendent authority and personal judgment. See Freeman supra note
429, at 1521-23; Ingber, supra note 429, at 251. The literature on the meaning of "religion"
under the first amendment is vast. See id. at 233 n.3.
431 N. WEBSTER, supra note 252.
432 J. BUCHANAN, supra note 251.
433 S. JOHNSON, supra note 252.
434 See id.
435 See i A. STOKES, supra note 28o, at 16-17; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 17, at 1599
n. 174.
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Tucker's 1803 commentary on American constitutional law divided
"[tihe right of personal opinion" into two subcategories: "liberty of
conscience in all matters relative to religion" and "liberty of speech
and of discussion in all speculative matters, whether religious, philo-
sophical, or political. '"436 Madison himself used the terms "free exer-
cise of religion" and "liberty of conscience" interchangeably when
explaining the meaning of the first amendment. 437 The laws of at
least ten of the states expressly linked "liberty of conscience" to reli-
gion. The Massachusetts Charter of 169i provided that "a liberty of
Conscience [be] allowed in the Worshipp of God to all Christians
(Except Papists),"438 and the Connecticut legislature passed a similar
measure in 1784, entitled "An Act for securing the Rights of Con-
science in Matters of Religion, to Christians of every Denomina-
tion.''439 The Carolina proprietors' Agreement with proposed settlers
granted "liberty of conscience in all religious and spiritual things. '"440
Maryland's Toleration Act of 1649 declared "the enforcing of the
conscience in matters of Religion . . . to be of dangerous conse-
quence. "441
Religious and popular writings also linked conscience and religion.
Elisha Williams, sometime president of Yale, wrote a pamphlet in
1744 called The essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants. A sea-
sonable Plea for the Liberty of Conscience, and The Right of private
Judgment in Matters of Religion without any Control from Human
Authority.442 Virginia Baptist leader John Leland's pamphlet, The
Rights of Conscience Inalienable, focused on attacking religious estab-
lishments and state-supported religion. 443 There was no recorded
controversy in preconstitutional America in which the right of "con-
science" was invoked on behalf of beliefs of a political, social, philo-
sophical, economic, or secular moral origin.
In any event, the final version of the amendment adopted by
Congress and ratified by the states omitted any reference to "rights of
conscience" and protected the "free exercise of religion" instead. There
436 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 72, at 96-97.
437 See e.g., Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 18, 18oo), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION supra note 72, at 141.
438 MASS. BAY CHARTER of 169i, reprinted in i FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
supra note 2, at 942, 950.
439 T. CURRY, supra note 17, at i8o (quoting ACTS AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECT-
ICUT 21-22).
440 S. COBB, supra note 17, at 116.
441 Id. at 376; see also id. at 293-94 (New Hampshire): id. at 303-04, 308, 323-54 (New
York); id. at 401-02 (New Jersey); id. at 419 (Georgia): id. at 431 (Rhode Island).
442 See T. CURRY, supra note 17, at 97-98 & n.59 (citing E. WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (Boston 1744)).
443 See J. LELAND, supra note 174, at 179-92.
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are two possible explanations for this. The reference to conscience
could have been dropped because it was redundant, or it could have
been dropped because the framers chose to confine the protections of
the free exercise clause to religion.-
The "redundancy" explanation can be supported by the absence of
any recorded speech or discussion of differences between the terms. 444
The drafters alternated between the two formulations without appar-
ent pattern, 445 and participants in the debate later referred to the free
exercise clause as a "liberty of conscience" provision without apparent
awareness of the difference in denotation.
Still, the theory that the phrase "free exercise of religion" was
deliberately used in order to exclude nonreligious conscience seems
more likely, since the different drafts called attention to the question.
If no distinction was intended, it would have been more natural to
stick with a single formulation and to concentrate on the wording of
the contested establishment clause. This theory also derives support
from Samuel Huntington's comment that he hoped "the amendment
would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience,
and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those
who professed no religion at all."44 6
It derives further support from the debate over a proposed consti-
tutional exception for those "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms.'447
Representative Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania opposed the clause,
stating:
There are many sects I know, who are religiously scrupulous in this
respect; I do not mean to deprive them of any indulgence the law
affords; my design is to guard against those who are of no religion.
It has been urged that religion is on the decline; if so, the argument
is more strong in my favor, for when the time comes that religion
shall be discarded, the generality of persons will have recourse to these
pretexts to get excused from bearing arms. 4 48
444 The sole exception is the objection posed by the Virginia State Senate to the first
amendment, discussed above at text accompanying note 385, which can be read as distinguishing
between the terms.
445 The Senate adopted three different versions of the religion clauses in turn, which included
three different formulations of the establishment provision, each of which was coupled with
either a "free exercise of religion" clause or a "rights of conscience" clause. See supra pp. r483-
84. There is no apparent pattern that might connect the free exercise/liberty of conscience
terminology with the establishment formulations. The term "free exercise" seems to be associated
with both the broadest and the narrowest conceptions of disestablishment, and "rights of
conscience" associated with the intermediate establishment provision. It is difficult to harmonize
this with an understanding of religious liberty.
446 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
447 See infra pp. 15oo-o3.
448 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 20, 1789).
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Why the proposed language ("religiously scrupulous") was not ade-
quate for Scott's purposes is hard to say, but his underlying view of
the proper scope of free exercise exemptions is clear: they should be
reserved for cases of conflict with actual religious beliefs. Elbridge
Gerry expressed a similar view.449
In any event, it does not matter which explanation - redundancy
or intentionality - is correct, for under either explanation, nonreli-
gious "conscience" is not included within the free exercise clause. If
"the rights of conscience" were dropped because they were redundant,
"conscience" must have been used in its narrow, religious, sense. If
the omission was a substantive change, then the framers deliberately
confined the clause to religious claims. Neither explanation supports
the view that free exercise exemptions must be extended to secular
moral conflicts.
The textual insistence on the special status of "religion" is, more-
over, rooted in the prevailing understandings, both religious and philo-
sophical, of the difference between religious faith and other forms of
human judgment. Not until the second third of the nineteenth century
did the notion that the opinions of individuals have precedence over
the decisions of civil society gain currency in American thought. In
1789, most would have agreed with Locke that "the private judgment
of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters, for the
public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve
a dispensation. '45 0
Religious convictions were of a different order. Conflicts arising
from religious convictions were conceived not as a clash between the
judgment of the individual and of the state, but as a conflict between
earthly and spiritual sovereigns. The believer was not seen as the
instigator of the conflict; the believer was simply caught between the
inconsistent demands of two rightful authorities, through no fault of
his own. This understanding was grounded in the Protestant doctrine
of "two kingdoms," taught by both Calvin and Luther,451 and had
still older roots in Augustinian thought. 45 2
449 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 17, 1789) (reporting that Gerry
"wished the words to be altered so as to be confined to persons belonging to a religious sect
scrupulous of bearing arms").
450 j. LocKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at 43. Locke wrote:
[E]very man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politic under one Government,
puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society to submit to the determi-
nation of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original Compact . ..
would signifie nothing, and be no Compact ....
J. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 134, § 97, at 376 (emphasis in
original).
451 See 2 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1485 (J. McNeill ed. 196o);
M. LUTHER, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in 45 LUTHER'S WORKS
81, 89-129 (W. Brandt ed. 1962).
452 See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 376-77 (M. Dods ed. i95o). For a brief
discussion of "two kingdoms" doctrine and its relation to religious liberty, see Adams & Em-
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Not only were the spiritual and earthly authorities envisioned as
independent, but in the nature of things the spiritual authorities had
a superior claim. "[O]bedience is due in the first place to God, and
afterwards to the laws," according to Locke. 45 3 The American con-
ception of religious liberty was accordingly defended in those terms.
The key passage in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance reads as
follows:
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he
must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And
if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Asso-
ciation, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the general
authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any
particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the
Universal Sovereign. 454
Far from being based on the "respect for the person as an independent
source of value, '455 the free exercise of religion is set apart from mere
exercise of human judgment by the fact that the "source of value" is
prior and superior to both the individual and the civil society. The
freedom of religion is unalienable because it is a duty to God and not
a privilege of the individual. The free exercise clause accords a spe-
cial, protected status to religious conscience not because religious judg-
ments are better, truer, or more likely to be moral than nonreligious
judgments, but because the obligations entailed by religion transcend
the individual and are outside the individual's control.
It is important to remember that the framers and ratifiers of the
first amendment found it conceivable that a God - that is, a universal
and transcendent authority beyond human judgment - might exist.
If God might exist, then it is not arbitrary to hold that His will is
superior to the judgments of individuals or of civil society. Much of
the criticism of a special deference to sincere religious convictions
arises from the assumption that such convictions are necessarily mere
subcategories of personal moral judgments. 45 6 This amounts to a de-
nial of the possibility of a God (or at least of a God whose will is
made manifest to humans). But while this skeptical position is tenable
merich, cited above in note 17, at 1623-24; see also Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence
of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65 (2987) (contrasting the Jewish jurisprudence of
obligation with the liberal jurisprudence of rights); Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of
Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REv. 779, 798-801 (1986) (drawing an analogy between religion
and insanity to assert that "religious claimants [are] different from other people, and therefore
deserving of special constitutional protection"); Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (i98o) (advocating a
"model of competing authorities" to replace current exemption doctrine).
4S3 J. LoCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 113, at 43.
454 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note iog, at 185.
455 D. RicHARDs, supra note 54, at 142.
456 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 421, at 200-01.
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as a theoretical or philosophical proposition, it is a peculiar belief to
project upon the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment, for
whom belief in the existence of God was natural and nearly universal.
It is an anachronism, therefore, to view the free exercise clause as a
product of modern secular individualism. From the perspective of the
advocates of religious freedom in 1789, the protection of private judg-
ment (secular "conscience") fundamentally differs from the protection
of free exercise of religion.
The religious distinction between the City of God and the City of
Man had its counterpart in secular Enlightenment thought. Religious
belief, as Locke argued in his Third Letter for Toleration, "is not
capable of demonstration"; it is not, therefore, "capable to produce
knowledge, how well grounded and great soever the assurance of faith
may be wherewith it is received; but faith it is still, and not knowl-
edge; persuasion, and not certainty."457 Natural law and morality, on
the other hand, are subjects for rational inquiry and knowledge. That
is the epistemological premise of Locke's scientific investigations into
psychology and politics.
The "magistrates of the world" thus have no authority to coerce
individuals on account of religious opinion, for in this sphere they can
have no basis for action other than "their own belief, their own
persuasion,"458 which is as likely to support the false as the true
religion. As Madison observed, "that the Civil Magistrate is a com-
petent Judge of Religious truth . . . is an arrogant pretension. '459 By
contrast, the very purpose of civil society is to grant the magistrate
authority to coerce all members of society to comply with the rational
principles that order human affairs. 460 When individuals err (however
conscientiously) in their judgments about earthly things - politics,
economics, natural morals - the magistrate is, and must be, empow-
ered to correct them. It is no usurpation of authority for the govern-
ment to use its power in these cases. Only when the individual's
judgment is grounded in beliefs outside the ken of government is the
government required to defer.
A distinction between religious and secular conscience is, therefore,
consistent both with the religious and the Enlightenment perspective
on free exercise. From the religious point of view, the difference
457 J. LocKE, A Third Letter for Toleration, in 6 WORKS OF LocKE, supra note xII, at 139,
144 [hereinafter J. LocK, Third Letter for Toleration]; cf. T. HOBBES, supra note 119, at 242
(contrasting the "principles of nature," which our "experience has found true," with matters that
depend on the "supernatural revelations of the will of God"). This casts doubt on Professor
Richards' assumption that religious judgment is an exercise of Kantian practical reason. See
D. RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 136.
458 J. LOCKE, Third Letter for Toleration, supra note 457, at 143.
459 j. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1o9, at 187.
460 See J. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 134, §§ 87-89, at 366-
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between religious and secular forms of conscience is that the former
represent an obligation to an authority higher than the individual,
while the latter are manifestations of mere individual will or judg-
ment. From the Enlightenment point of view, the difference is that
the government has no basis for evaluating the truth of religious
claims, while it inevitably must evaluate claims based on rational
inquiry and knowledge. The religious view emphasizes the impor-
tance of the individual; the Enlightenment, the incapacity of the
government. Madison combined these points in his Memorial and
Remonstrance.461 Both perspectives lead to the same conclusion: it is
sensible to restrict the power of government to influence or coerce
religious conscience, even when government has the power to influence
or coerce judgments based on science, history, political ideology, eco-
nomics, moral philosophy, or other secular sources.
This raises the question whether the free exercise clause protects
atheists or other unbelievers. As previously noted, Locke excluded
atheists from his proposed system of religious toleration, while Jeffer-
son departed from Locke in this respect. 462 Six of the state consti-
tutions as of 1789 confined free exercise protections to theists, two
(Virginia and Delaware) were ambiguous, and four extended protec-
tion to all religious beliefs without limitation. Since the free exercise
clause of the federal Constitution contained no limitation, it is most
plausible to assume that, in this as in other respects, it was imitating
the more expansive of the state provisions. But this begs the question
of what free exercise protection might mean for a person who does
not recognize any form of transcendent, extrapersonal authority - to
a person who does not "exercise" a "religion."
For the most part, the prohibition on an establishment of religion
should suffice to protect unbelievers from discrimination, ill-treatment,
or coercion (from test oaths, for example).463 There should be no
doubt that government action that abridges the unbeliever's right not
to engage in or support a religious practice is unconstitutional. By
1789, it was generally agreed that compelled homage is of no value
to God or to man. In Madison's words, "[i]t is the duty of every man
to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes
to be acceptable to him."464
As a practical matter, the question whether the free exercise clause
protects atheists arises only with reference to claims for exemption.
461 See J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note iog, at 184-85.
462 See supra text accompanying notes 121 & 213.
463 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (ig6i). In Torcaso, the Court did not specify
which of the two religion clauses the test oath violated. Under the analysis here, a test oath is
an establishment of religion under any circumstances, since it coerces an affirmation of a religious
belief. However, a test oath is a violation of the free exercise rights only of those whose religions
forbids taking the oath.
464 J. MADISONm, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1o9, at 184.
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If it is true that the right to exemption from generally applicable laws
on ground of conflict with religious doctrine is confined to those who
have duties arising from their religious beliefs, then it has no appli-
cation to unbelievers. Unbelievers undoubtedly make judgments of
right and wrong that sometimes conflict with generally applicable law.
But if these do not stem from obedience to a transcendent authority
prior to and beyond the authority of civil government, they do not
receive exemption under the free exercise clause. To subject an atheist
to civil disabilities would be a violation of free exercise; but to require
an atheist who objects to war on secular grounds to go to war would
not, since his conduct is not (and by definition could not be) motivated
by his religious belief.
4. The Militia Exemption Clause. - Although the debates in the
First Congress over the free exercise clause itself did not explicitly
raise the question of exemptions, the question arose during the debate
over what would become the second amendment, in connection with
service in the state militias. Three states (North Carolina, Virginia,
and Rhode Island) had proposed that "any person religiously scrupu-
lous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an
equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead."465 Madison's
draft bill of rights contained a similar proposal, appended to what is
now the second amendment, although Madison left the requirement
of a substitute to legislative discretion. 466 The Select Committee pro-
posed and the House of Representatives debated a more generous
exemption: "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms. '467 The proposal was quite controversial; it passed the
House by a mere 24-22 vote and was rejected by the Senate. Since
this is the only discussion in the First Congress specifically bearing on
religious exemptions from generally applicable legal duties, it warrants
detailed consideration.
The most eloquent defender of the proposal, Representative Elias
Boudinot of New Jersey, Presbyterian and later President of the Amer-
ican Bible Society, hoped "that in establishing this Government, we
may show the world that proper care is taken that the Government
may not interfere with the religious sentiments of any person. 468 He
argued that it would be both pointless and unjust to compel "men
who are conscientious in this respect . . . to bear arms, when, ac-
cording to their religious principles, they would rather die than use
them. " 4 6 9
465 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 165, at 335 (quoting from the Rhode Island ratification
of the Constitution, May 29, 1790).
466 "[No person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person." i ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789).
467 Id. at 778 (Aug. I, 1789).
468 Id. at 796 (Aug. 20, 1789).
469 Id.
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One may wonder why, if this is so, objectors were not protected
under the free exercise clause without need for a separate provision. 470
There are at least three possible answers. First, the militias are arms
of the state governments except when in actual service; thus, the free
exercise clause probably did not apply to them. Second, it does not
necessarily follow from the fact of free exercise exemptions that the
particular case of military service will be held protected. That deter-
mination will depend, in part, on the judiciary's assessment of the
governmental interest in conscription. Thus, even if Boudinot ex-
pected conscientious objection from military service to be protected
under the free exercise clause, it was prudent to spell it out. Third,
as Boudinot pointed out, if Congress struck out the militia exemption
clause, this would create an inference that there is an intention in the
general government to compel all its citizens to bear arms. Indeed,
some scholars have cited Congress' rejection of the militia exemption
clause as conclusive evidence that there is no constitutional right to
conscientious objection from military service.47 1
The significance of Boudinot's position for present purposes is that
he, with a majority of the House, considered exemption from a gen-
erally applicable legal duty to be "necessary" to protect religious free-
dom. Whether or not the particular application of this principle to
bearing arms would be accepted by the Senate (it was not)472 or the
courts (it was not),4 73 it strongly suggests that the general idea of free
exercise exemptions was part of the legal culture.
Opposition to the militia exemption clause arose on two grounds.
First, James Jackson, Revolutionary War hero and representative
from Georgia, commented that it would be "unjust" to require "one
part" of the nation "to defend the other in case of invasion." 474 If he
had left it at that, this argument would resemble the modern anti-
exemptions view that to exempt some citizens from legal obligations
on religious grounds constitutes an unconstitutional preference for
religion. 475 Jackson went on to propose, however, that the militia
exemption clause be amended by inserting at the end of it, "upon
paying an equivalent, to be established by law."476 This demonstrates
that Jackson's objection was not to the principle of exemption, but to
the extent of the accommodation in this particular case. Taken as a
470 See Marshall, supra note 17, at 76 ("[The fact that a conscientious objection amendment
was proposed suggests that the free exercise clause was not thought, by itself, to provide for
religious exemptions from neutral laws.").
471 See W. BERNs, supra note 13, at 54-55; M. MALBIN, supra note 17, at 39-40 & n.4.
472 See x ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (remark of Rep. Jackson, Aug. 17,
1789).
473 See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 6o5, 623-25 (1931).
474 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (remark of Rep. Jackson, Aug. 17, 1789).
475 See Marshall, supra note 17, at 30-35.
476 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (remark of Rep. Jackson, Aug. 17, 1789).
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whole, Jackson's position must be counted as favoring exemptions for
religious conscience, but balancing the interests of believers and non-
believers somewhat differently.
The most cogent argument against the militia exemption clause
came from Egbert Benson of New York. Benson argued that "[n]o
man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persua-
sion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the
discretion of the Government." 477 Benson did not oppose religious
exemptions in principle, however. On the contrary, he had "no reason
to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to
indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but
they ought to be left to their discretion." 478 Though he considered
religious exemption from military service "humane" and "benevolent,"
he did not think it fell within the class of natural rights. Accordingly,
he could not support its inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
Benson's position is a sophisticated version of the "judicial re-
straint" or "separation of powers" argument against recognizing ex-
emptions under the free exercise clause. He distinguished between
the functions of the legislature and the judiciary, confining the latter
to enforcing natural law positively enacted in the Constitution. There
is no doubt that Benson, like the other participants in the debate,
understood that by constitutionalizing the principle of militia exemp-
tions they were transferring decisionmaking authority from the legis-
lature to the courts. Benson felt that "[i]f it stands part of the con-
stitution, it will be a question before the Judiciary on every regulation
you make with respect to the organization of the militia. '479 No one
challenged this assumption. Marbury v. Madison480 was thirteen
years in the future, but Benson and the others clearly anticipated that
governmental action would be judicially reviewable under the Bill of
Rights.
Nonetheless, Benson's position was ambiguous on the key question
of interest here. Did he believe there is no natural right to exemption
from militia service because there is no natural right to exemption
from any generally applicable law? Or did he believe there is no
natural right to exemption from militia service because the govern-
ment's interest is potentially compelling, and the degree of necessity
for universal military service must be left to legislative discretion?
The latter seems slightly more probable. Benson stated he "would
477 Id. at 780 (motion of Rep. Benson, Aug. 17, 1789).
478 Id. This point was echoed by Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania, who said that he conceived
exemption from militia service "to be a legislative right altogether." Id. at 796 (objection of
Rep. Scott, Aug. 20, 1789). His main "design," though, was to ensure that exemptions were
not extended to the nonreligious. See id.
479 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 17, 1789).
480 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (2803).
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always leave it to the benevolence of the Legislature, for, modify it
as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner as
to clear it from ambiguity."48' Although this statement is far from
conclusive, it suggests that Benson's opposition to the exemptions was
based on the impossibility of capturing in language the great variety
of circumstances that would influence the grant or denial of exemp-
tions in any particular case in the future. If so, it does not necessarily
imply that he would disagree with the modern construction of the free
exercise clause.
C. Early Judicial Interpretation
The religion clauses of the federal and state constitutions did not
engender many lawsuits in the early years of the Republic, and fewer
still raised the question of free exercise exemptions. The largest vol-
ume of litigation was over the competency to testify in court of those,
like Universalists, who did not believe in a future state of rewards
and punishments. There were also a number of blasphemy prosecu-
tions that raised issues under the religion clauses. Since both of these
categories of cases involved laws specifically directed at religion, they
did not raise the exemption question.
The free exercise clause of the federal Constitution generated no
reported decisions at all until 1845. Permoli v. Municipality No. T,482
the Supreme Court's first free exercise case, involved a municipal
ordinance prohibiting open-casket funerals by Catholic priests except
when performed at a single city-approved obituary chapel. In sub-
stance (though not in form), this was a generally applicable regulation,
since the Protestants conducted services for the dead at graveside,
leaving Catholics the only denomination performing open-casket fu-
nerals in the area to which the prohibition applied. Justice Catron's
opinion for a unanimous Court is uninformative about the meaning
of the free exercise clause. It holds only that "[t]he Constitution makes
no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws. '483
But it is suggestive that counsel for the city felt it necessary to defend
the ordinance under the "law of necessity" in light of its purpose to
prevent the spread of yellow fever.484 This may indicate that the legal
profession believed that interference with religious activities required
compelling justification.
481 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779-8o (J. Gales ed. 1834) (statement of Rep. Benson, Aug. 17,
1789).
482 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845).
483 Id. at 6og.
484 See id. at 6oi (argument of counsel).
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In the state courts, there was only one reported case involving a
religious exemption claim during the twenty years following ratifica-
tion of the first amendment. Unfortunately, it is nothing more than
a cryptic paragraph in Dallas' reports from the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 485 The reporter's summary of the case states the hold-
ing as follows: "A Jew refusing to be sworn as a witness, because it
was Saturday, his Sabbath, the Court fined him £ IO."486
The earliest state court decision expressly addressing the exemption
question was the case with which this Article began, People v. Phil-
ips.487 It involved the exemption of a Catholic priest from compliance
with a subpoena requiring him to testify to matters he heard in the
confessional. Noting that "this is a great constitutional question,
which must not be solely decided by the maxims of the common law,
but by the principles of our government, '48 8 the court (through the
Honorable DeWitt Clinton, then mayor, later governor, and candidate
for President against Madison in 1812) construed the New York Con-
stitution to hold that the priest must be exempted from the subpoena
requirement. "It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its
ordinances should be administered - that its ceremonies as well as
its essentials should be protected," the court noted. "To decide that
the minister shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to
declare that there shall be no penance; and this important branch of
the Roman Catholic religion would be thus annihilated. 48 9 The court
thought it so obvious that "[e]very man who hears me will answer in
the affirmative" that a law of the state that prevented administration
of one of the Protestant sacraments would be unconstitutional. The
same right belongs to the Catholics. 490
The court's argument bears on the issue of neutrality among reli-
gious beliefs. The court did not believe it was granting Catholics a
benefit to which persons of other beliefs are not entitled. Rather, it
saw the exemption as necessary to ensure that Catholics are treated
no worse than Protestants would be treated under comparable circum-
stances. Since it was inconceivable that the Protestant majority of
New York would so seriously interfere with the administration of
48S See Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793).
486 2 Dall. at xv. The full case description suggests, however, that the actual outcome was
less repressive than the holding. It recounts that the witness was fined for his refusal to testify,
but that the defendant waived the benefit of his testimony, whereupon the fine was discharged.
See Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. at 213.
487 Court of General Sessions, City of New York (June 14, 1813). This case was not officially
reported, but a full record of the arguments and opinion are found in W. SAMPSON, supra note
i, at 9, excerpted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note i, at 199.
488 Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note x, at 2o6.
489 Id. at 207.
490 Id.
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Protestant sacraments, the court had the responsibility of extending
the same right to the Roman Catholic minority.
The court responded in two ways to the prosecutor's argument
that "the peace or safety of the state"491 requires enforcement of the
subpoena. First, it noted that as a functional matter priest-penitent
confidentiality often served as an "instrument of great good":492 "The
sinner may be admonished and converted from the evil of his ways:
Whereas if his offence was locked up in his own bosom, there would
be no friendly voice to recall him from his sins . . . . 493 The question
is not whether concealment of information is a public injury in any
particular case, but whether "the natural tendency of it is to produce
practices inconsistent with the public safety or tranquility. "494 Second,
the court argued that the proviso applies to "acts committed, not to
acts omitted." 495 The state may override free exercise claims when
the claimant's actions would injure the public, but it may not do so
to compel affirmative public benefits.
The very fact that the court evaluated the strength of the govern-
ment's interest in enforcing a subpoena under the "peace or safety"
standard confirms that such state provisos were understood to limit
legislative authority from encroaching on religious liberty even through
generally applicable laws. The court concluded as follows:
Although we differ from the witness and his brethren, in our religious
creed, yet we have no reason to question the purity of their motives,
or to impeach their good conduct as citizens. They are protected by
the laws and constitution of this country, in the full and free exercise
of their religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize
the application of insult to their faith, or of torture to their con-
sciences. 496
Four years after this decision, another New York municipal court
distinguished the Philips decision and denied the motion of a defen-
dant in a murder trial to bar testimony of a Protestant clergyman to
whom he had confessed while in prison. 497 The clergyman informed
the court that he had no objection to testifying, whereupon the court
ruled "that the testimony was admissible, and took distinction between
auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline,
according to the canons of the Church, and those made to a minister
491 Id. at 207-o8.
492 Id. at 208.
493 Id.
494 Id.
49S Id.
496 Id. at 209. By "country," the court presumably meant New York.
497 See People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817), reprinted in Privileged
Communications to Clergymen, supra note i, at 209.
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of the gospel in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser. '498 The
logic appears to be that no violation of religious tenets was involved.
In response to this decision, the New York legislature passed a statute
forbidding any minister or priest "of any denomination whatsoever"
from disclosing "any confessions made to him in his professional char-
acter. " 4 9 9
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused,
without explanation, to overturn a criminal conviction based on a
confession made by a man to the members of his church.500 The
defendant had contended that it would be "in some shape an infringe-
ment of the rights of conscience, to make use of confessions, made
under these circumstances . . . [where] in a theological view, he is
obliged in conscience to perform it."5° 1 Counsel for the prosecution
argued that the defendant's confession was "purely voluntary" and
was not "required by any known ecclesiastical rule"50 2 but did not
contest the validity of the defendant's interpretation of freedom of
conscience.50 3 It is, of course, impossible to tell whether the Supreme
Judicial Court accepted the defendant's legal theory, since it stated no
reasons for its decision. But it is noteworthy that the prosecution
confined its argument to the facts and did not contest the defendant's
interpretation of constitutional principles.
The most interesting line of cases arose in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The first, Commonwealth v. Wolf,5 0 4 involved a chal-
lenge by a Jewish merchant, Abraham Wolf, to Pennsylvania's Sunday
closing law, on the ground that as applied to one who observed
Saturday as his day of rest and worship, it conflicted with the com-
monwealth's constitutional protection of the rights of conscience. The
challenge was rejected, but on grounds that would admit the principle
of free exercise exemptions. The dispositive question as the court
posed the case was not whether the state constitution required ex-
emptions, but whether the law conflicted with Wolf's religious con-
science. Wolf's attorney conceded that Jewish doctrine does not "im-
mediately" require work on Sunday; it is possible for a Jewish
merchant to comply with the Sunday closing law without violating
religious duty. But the attorney attempted an ingenious argument
that enforcement of the Sunday closing laws, in conjunction with the
498 Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note i, at 211.
499 N.Y. REV. STAT. 1828, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, § 72.
500 Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. x61 (i8i8).
501 Id. at 161.
502 Id. at 161-62.
503 There was no doubt that the defendant's claim was understood to be based in part on
the Massachusetts Constitution. Counsel for the prosecution referred to the claim as a "legal or
constitutional principle." Id. at 161.
504 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817).
15o6 [Vol. io"i4o9
ORIGINS OF FREE EXERCISE
Jewish law forbidding work on Saturday, would force the plaintiff to
violate the fourth commandment: "six days shalt thou labour, and do
all that thou hast to do."505 The court rejected this argument not in
theory, but on the facts: "the Jewish Talmud, containing the traditions
of that people, and the Rabbinical constitutions and explications of
their law, asserts no such doctrine. °50 6 If there were no such doctrine,
there would be no burden on Wolf's liberty of conscience and hence
no ground for granting an exemption. The unstated assumption was
that if the law had required Wolf to violate his conscience, he might
have had a claim. s0 7
The next two Pennsylvania cases, Commonwealth v. Lesher0 8 and
Simon's Executors v. Gratz,50 9 both contain opinions by Chief Justice
John Bannister Gibson, a highly regarded jurist who is best known
today for his dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub,510 in which he
rebutted Chief Justice Marshall's position in Marbury that the judi-
ciary has authority to declare void unconstitutional acts of the legis-
lature.51' Gibson also was the foremost judicial opponent of free
exercise exemptions in the nineteenth century. His decision in Simon's
Executors was the leading precedent in the thirteen original states
prior to the Civil War for the proposition that free exercise does not
include the right of exemption from generally applicable law. An
examination of Gibson's opinions in Lesher and Simon's Executors
shows that his rejection of constitutional judicial review and his po-
sition on free exercise exemptions were closely related.
In Lesher, a prospective juror had been excluded for cause from
jury service in a capital case, on the basis of his religious objection
to capital punishment.51 2 The defendant was convicted and appealed
on the ground that the juror's exclusion had been unlawful.51 3 On
appeal, the majority affirmed the conviction on the basis of the state's
interest in obtaining a trial in which the jurors complied with the law,
without finding it necessary to address the religion clauses of the state
constitution.5 1 4 Gibson dissented on the ground that religious scruples
SOS Id. at 5o.
506 Id.
507 The case was a precursor to Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (ig6i), in which the
United States Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to a Sunday closing law by a Jewish
merchant. Whether such a challenge should succeed under the modern doctrine of free exercise
exemptions is a close question. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 2o, at 41-42.
5O 17 Serg. & Rawle i55 (Pa. 1828).
S09 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831).
510 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
s1 See id. at 356 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). Gibson added one caveat: the judiciary could
declare state laws that violate the federal Constitution void, there being an express grant of
such power under the supremacy clause. See id. at 356-57.
512 See Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle at 155.
S13 See id.
S14 See id. at i56-60.
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cannot be a basis for exemption from a civic duty, such as jury
service.515
Gibson's Lesher dissent formed the basis for a majority holding in
Simon's Executors. In that case, a contract action had been set for
trial on a Saturday and the plaintiff, Levi Philips, who was Jewish,
moved for a continuance on the ground that "he had scruples of
conscience against appearing in court to-day, and attending to any
secular business; and that he believes his presence and aid will be
material in the progress of the cause. 516 The motion was denied;
Philips' counsel took a nonsuit and appealed on the basis of the liberty
of conscience clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 17 The decision
was affirmed, in another opinion by Gibson.518
In his Simon's Executors opinion, Gibson expressly disapproved
the New York precedent of People v. Philips,5 19 which had been cited
by counsel for the defendant:
No one is more sensible than I, of the benefit derived by society from
the offices of the Catholic clergy, or of the policy of protecting the
secrets of auricular confession. But considerations of policy address
themselves with propriety to the legislature, and not to a magistrate
whose course is prescribed not by discretion, but rules already estab-
lished.5 20
In his Lesher dissent, Gibson defined the "rights of conscience" as
follows:
Simply a right to worship the Supreme Being according to the dictates
of the heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever on the
subject of religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act for conscience
sake, the doing or forbearing of which, is not prejudicial to the public
weal.52 1
Relying on the authority of Jefferson (about whom he said "a more
resolute champion of toleration perhaps never lived"5 22), Gibson ar-
gued that "were the laws dispensed with, wherever they happen to
be in collision with some supposed religious obligation, government
would be perpetually falling short of the exigence."52 3 Since jury
515 See id. at 16o-6i (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
S16 Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 412 (Pa. 1831) (quoting the deposition of
Levi Philips). Presumably, this was an attempt to relitigate Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213
(Pa. 1793), see supra p. 1504, by a relative of the original party.
S17 See Simon's Executors, 2 Pen. & W. at 414.
S18 See id. at 416-18.
S19 See supra pp. 1504-05.
S20 See Simon's Executors, 2 Pen. & W. at 4r4.
S21 Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 16o (Pa. z828) (Gibson C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
S22 Id.
S23 Id. at 161.
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service is a general obligation on all citizens, and the legislature had
enacted no exemption, there was no legal basis for excusing the juror.
Gibson did not engage in any analysis of whether an exemption in
the case would in fact be "prejudicial to the public weal,"5 24 appar-
ently considering existence of the law conclusive as to its necessity.
Indeed, he went out of his way to opine that the effect of refusing to
exclude a juror with religious scruples against capital punishment was
to grant the accused an "unreasonable advantage[]."5 25 "No one," he
said, "is more thoroughly convinced of the . . . abstract propriety of
the objection to the juror here, '5 26 but for Gibson the remedy lay with
the legislature.5 27
In Simon's Executors, Gibson explained the theoretical basis for
his position. "Rightly considered," he said, "there are no duties half
so sacred as those which the citizen owes to the laws."5 28 "That every
other obligation shall yield to that of the laws, as to a superior moral
force," he wrote, "is a tacit condition of membership in every society,
whether lay or secular, temporal or spiritual, because no citizen can
lawfully hold communion with those who have associated on any other
terms."5 29 Gibson's statement may be contrasted with Madison's po-
sition in the Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison contended that
religious duty "is precedent both in order of time and degree of obli-
gation, to the claims of Civil Society."5 30 Gibson held that a person
entering into civil society must assume the obligation of yielding to
all the laws, because no other form of association is possible. Madison
held that "every man" who becomes a member of a civil society "must
always do it with a reservation . . . of his allegiance to the Universal
Sovereign."'531 What Gibson said is impossible, Madison said is nec-
essary. Gibson's view of the nature of religious freedom thus conflicts
directly with that of one of the leading framers of the federal free
exercise clause.
Gibson's rejection of the principle of judicial review, as explained
in Eakin v. Raub,5 32 provides further reason to doubt that he repre-
sented the prevailing view on the interpretation of free exercise. Like
Locke, Gibson believed in legislative supremacy. In Lesher, he attri-
buted his conclusion to his "horror of judicial legislation"5 33 and said
S24 Id. at 16o (emphasis omitted).
52s Id. at r64.
526 Id.
S27 See id.
528 Simon's Executors v. Graz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831).
529 Id.
530 J. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note iog, at 184-85.
531 Id. (emphasis added).
532 See Eakin v. Raub, r2 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
533 Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 164 (Pa. 1828) (Gibson, C.J., dissent-
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that he "would suffer any extremity of inconvenience, rather than step
beyond the legitimate province of the court."534 As discussed above,
the advent of judicial review had transformed a principle of free
exercise previously enforced solely through legislative action into one
enforceable through the courts. 535 Since virtually all of the framers
and ratifiers of the first amendment expected and intended their work
to be judicially enforceable, Gibson's contrary position was almost
surely idiosyncratic.
Seventeen years after Simon's Executors, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court had its next free exercise exemptions case, Specht v.
Commonwealth.536 Like Wolf, it involved a challenge to enforcement
of the Sunday closing law by a sabbatarian, in this case a member of
the Seventh Day Baptist Congregation. Also as in Wolf, the challenge
was rejected. Toward the beginning of the opinion, the court stated
that "conscientious doctrines and practices can claim no immunity
from the operation of general laws made for the government and to
promote the welfare of the whole people," 537 citing Gibson's opinions
in Lesher and Simon's Executors. Toward the end of the opinion,
however, the court appeared to reject the claim on the facts, much as
it had in Wolf. The court described the effect of the Sunday closing
law on sabbatarians as "an incidental worldly disadvantage, tempo-
rarily injurious"5 38 and stated that if a person were under a religious
duty both to observe Saturday as a sabbath and to work six days out
of the week, "the law which compels him to inaction upon one of the
six, might well be regarded as an invasion of his conscientious con-
viction." 39 Thus, having restated the no-exemptions precedent, the
court narrowed its holding to the facts of the case, leaving open the
possibility that an exemption might be granted when an actual conflict
arose.
The only other religious exemption decision located from this pe-
riod is State v. Willson,540 an 1823 decision by the Constitutional
Court of South Carolina. In that case, a member of "the sect of
christians usually called Covenanters" refused on ground of religious
conscience to serve as a grand juror and prosecuted an appeal as a
test case. 541 The court unanimously rejected the claim that "a fixed
& scrupulous moral objection to the discharge of a duty required by
law, which springs conscientiously from the religious tenets of a man,
534 Id.
131 See supra pp. 1444-45.
536 8 Pa. 312 (1848).
537 Id. at 322.
538 Id. at 325.
539 Id. at 326.
540 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393 (1823).
541 Id. at 394.
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amounts to a justification for refusing to perform the duty so re-
quired."542 The court observed that all religions required "a ready
obedience to the laws of the country" and urged the Covenanter to
"'obey the powers that be."''543 In addition, the court expressed con-
cern that if the sincere objections of believers were indulged, it would
open the gates to the "hipocritical" and the "deceitful."5 44 Oddly, the
court neither quoted nor cited the free exercise provision of the South
Carolina Constitution.
The court's first argument in Willson proves either too much or
too little. On the one hand, it suggests that there can be no religious
limitation on the powers of the government, since obedience to all
laws is a sacred obligation of the citizen. On the other hand, it
disregards the possibility that free exercise limitations are themselves
a part of the law, and that to rely on constitutional protections does
not constitute disobedience to the law. The court's second argument
resembles criticism of the "sincerity" requirement under modern free
exercise doctrine 45 and contains an implicit bias in favor of familiar
religious practices and against religious practices that are not widely
held and hence suspect.
It is surprising that cases involving jury service did not arise more
often, since Quakers as well as Covenanters refused jury service and
were not shy about pressing their claims in court. The explanation is
probably that trial judges were vested with broad discretion to excuse
jurors and usually did so in cases of religious objection. Indeed, such
a de facto exemption had occurred in Lesher, and the court in Willson
noted that it often occurred in South Carolina, as well. 5 46 The Willson
case itself was taken to the constitutional court simply to "settle a
principle." 547 This strongly suggests that the actual practice favored
exemptions, even though the appellate decisions went the other way.
D. Summary of the Evidence
While the historical evidence is limited and on some points mixed,
the record shows that exemptions on account of religious scruple
should have been familiar to the framers and ratifiers of the free
exercise clause. There is no substantial evidence that such exemptions
were considered constitutionally questionable, whether as a form of
establishment or as an invasion of liberty of conscience. Even oppo-
nents of exemptions did not make that claim. The modern argument
S42 Id.
S43 Id. at 396.
544 Id. at 394.
545 See Marshall, supra note 17, at 27-30.
546 See Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) at 395-96.
547 Id. at 394.
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against religious exemptions, based on the establishment clause, is
thus historically unsupportable. Likewise unsupportable are sugges-
tions that free exercise of religion is limited to opinions or to profession
of religious opinions, as opposed to conduct.
It is more difficult to claim, on this evidence, that the framers and
ratifiers specifically understood or expected that the free exercise clause
would vest the courts with authority to create exceptions from gen-
erally applicable laws on account of religious conscience. Exemptions
were not common enough to compel the inference that the term "free
exercise of religion" necessarily included an enforceable right to ex-
emption, and there was little direct discussion of the issue. Without
overstating the force of the evidence, however, it is possible to say
that the modern doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent
with the original understanding than is a position that leads only to
the facial neutrality of legislation.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinning of
the free exercise clause, best reflected in Madison's writings, is that
the claims of the "universal sovereign" precede the claims of civil
society, both in time and in authority, and that when the people vested
power in the government over civil affairs, they necessarily reserved
their unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, in accordance
with the dictates of conscience. Under this understanding, the right
of free exercise is defined in the first instance not by the nature and
scope of the laws, but by the nature and scope of religious duty. A
religious duty does not cease to be a religious duty merely because the
legislature has passed a generally applicable law making compliance
difficult or impossible.
The language of the free exercise and liberty of conscience clauses
of the state constitutions, from the early Rhode Island, Carolina, and
New Jersey charters to the new constitutions passed after i776,
strongly supports this hypothesis. These constitutions curtailed free
exercise rights when they would conflict with the peace and safety of
society. These "peace and safety" provisos would not be necessary if
the concept of free exercise had been understood as nothing more than
a requirement of nondiscrimination against religion.
Moreover, in the actual free exercise controversies in the colonies
and states prior to passage of the first amendment, the rights of
conscience were invoked in favor of exemptions from such generally
applicable laws as oath requirements, military conscription, and min-
isterial support. Many of the framers, including Madison, a majority
of the House of Representatives in the First Congress, and the mem-
bers of the Continental Congress of 1775, believed that a failure to
exempt Quakers and others from conscription would violate freedom
of conscience. These experiences, while not so frequent or notorious
as to warrant firm conclusions, nonetheless suggest that exemptions
were part of the legal landscape. They are sufficient to shift the
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burden of persuasion to those who contend that the free exercise clause
precludes exemptions.
The history subsequent to adoption of the first amendment is
inconclusive but tends to point against exemptions. One lower court
in New York squarely adopted the exemptions interpretation, and the
supreme courts of Pennsylvania and South Carolina rejected it. None
of these decisions was handed down within twenty years of the first
amendment, and they are therefore weak indicators of the original
understanding. The Pennsylvania holding is entitled to especially little
weight s ince it was connected to a rejection of constitutional judicial
review in general. Indeed, the contrast between the rationale of Chief
Justice Gibson for the Pennsylvania court and the rationales offered
by Madison for religious liberty tends, if anything, to reinforce the
conclusion that Madison's position requires exemptions.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEW AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
The free exercise clause may well be the most philosophically
interesting and distinctive feature of the American Constitution.
Viewed in its true historical light, as the product of religious pluralism
and intense religious sectarianism in the American states and colonies,
with limited influence from the rationalistic Enlightenment, the free
exercise clause represents a new and unprecedented conception of
government and its relation to claims of higher truth and authority.
Until the Protestant Reformation, the separation of church and
state was the product not of theory or design but of geopolitical reality.
It was graphically illustrated by the throne of St. Peter in Rome and
the throne of the king in each of the nation-states of Christendom.
At times, the church was under the domination of the state; at times,
though more rarely, the state was under the domination of the church.
More often, the church and the state were independent powers, sup-
ported by different claims of authority, acting in varying degrees
antagonistically or cooperatively one with the other. This separation,
a product of a "catholic" church in a post-imperial world, was instru-
mental in staving off incipient despotism. Mankind's two great loy-
alties, to God and to country, were of necessity divided; claims of
ultimate right were pitted against the power of the state. "'To that
conflict of four hundred years,"' according to Lord Acton, "'we owe
the rise of civil liberty."'5 48
The Reformation introduced religious factions to Western Europe,
and with them, two novel dangers to public peace and freedom. First,
548 B. TIERNEY, Medieval Canon Law and Western Constitutionalism, in CHURcH LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES, pt. XV, at 8 (1979).
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the rivalry among religious sects broke out into bloody warfare, both
between countries, as in the Thirty Years War, and within countries,
as in the English Civil War and the Huguenot wars in France. Sec-
ond, as the universal church was sundered, it became possible to form
national churches, such as the Church of England, which could be
more easily dominated by the government.5 49 Thus, a complete and
enduring fusion of earthly and spiritual authority became a serious
possibility for the first time since the fall of Rome.
The Enlightenment writers on the subject tended to concentrate
on the danger of religious rivalry. Sectarian intolerance and struggle
for hegemony was a major cause of unrest, violence, rebellion, and
persecution. There were two promising ways to ameliorate and, if
possible, eliminate such violence and persecution, and both had pro-
ponents among the thinkers of the Enlightenment. One solution was
to suppress religious differences by establishing a national church and
supporting it with public funds. This solution was proposed by
Hobbes,550 the youthful Locke,551 and Hume,55 2 among others. It
would have two advantages: by unifying religion, it would reduce
religious factionalism, and by guaranteeing financial support to the
clergy, it would cause them to become indolent and subservient. The
difficulty with this solution was that it would enrage dissenters from
the established church (or at least the most intense among them) and
might well exacerbate religious unrest. For this reason, the mature
Locke proposed the second approach: to extend toleration to all (except
Catholics and atheists), on condition that each religion adopt toleration
as one of the tenets of its faith. Toleration, it was hoped, would calm
the fevers of religious dissension. To the Enlightenment skeptic, con-
vinced of the absurdity of the more intense varieties of religious
expression and likewise convinced of the power of reason, this ap-
proach seemed to offer the additional advantage that reason, and with
it rational religion, would prevail over the sectarians. Hence Jeffer-
549 See F. MAKOWER, supra note 45, at 97 ("In the sixteenth century the reformation robbed
the church almost wholly of its independence.").
550 See T. HOBBES, supra note Ii9, pt. III, ch. 42, at 293-95; see id. at 293 ("[T]he Right
of Judging what Doctrines are fit for Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is in all Common-
wealths inseparably annexed . . . to the Soveraign Power Civill.").
ss1 See J. LocKE, Two TRACTS ON GOVERNMENT, supra note 118, at 124-27.
5s2 Hume wrote:
[E]cclesiatical establishments, though commonly they arose at first from religious view,
prove in the end advantageous to the political interests of society . . . . [T]he civil
magistrate [should] bribe their [the clergy's] indolence, by assigning stated salaries to their
profession, and rendering it superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to
prevent their flock from straying in quest of new pastures.
i D. HUME, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, ch. 29, at 552-553 (1851); see also D. HUME, Idea of a
Perfect Commonwealth, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 512, 520 (E. Miller ed.
x985).
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son's hope that with religious freedom in America, all would become
Unitarians.55 3
An aggressive interpretation of the free exercise clause would be
incompatible with the Enlightenment theory of toleration. Free ex-
ercise exemptions are likely to encourage dissident sects to maintain
practices at variance with the mores of society, and thus perpetuate
the very religious factionalism that is the root of the problem. While
deliberate oppression of minority religious groups is counterproduc-
tive, indirect measures that increase the cost and inconvenience of
exotic religious practices likely will dampen the enthusiasm for reli-
gious differentiation and thereby reduce religious strife.
As with the establishment solution, however, the toleration solution
seemed less than realistic from the American side of the Atlantic. Too
many Americans had come to these shores precisely because they could
not practice their faith in the controlled environs of Europe. Too
many sectarians were spreading their views, and religious factionalism
was already too deeply ingrained. Dissenters were a vexatious mi-
nority in Britain; in America they were (in the aggregate) a large
majority, divided into many sects. And experience had shown that
Americans were attracted - not repulsed - by the "irrational" surges
of enthusiastic religion that peaked in the Great Awakening.
Madison, for one, grasped that the United States was not amenable
to the Enlightenment solutions.5 54 In a letter to Jefferson, he stated
that "[h]owever erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dissention
and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman or the benevo-
lent philosopher, the bulk of mankind, who are neither Statesman nor
philosophers, will continue to view them in a different light."555 Re-
ligious sectarianism will not go away. Universal Unitarianism, even
if desirable, is not going to come about. The Madisonian contribution,
familiar to us from The Federalist Nos. io and 51, is to understand
factions, including religious factions, as a source of peace and stability.
If there are enough factions, they will check and balance one another
and frustrate attempts to monopolize or oppress, no matter how in-
tolerant or fanatical any particular sect may be.
This point of view is consistent with an aggressive interpretation
of the free exercise clause, which protects the interests of religious
minorities in conflict with the wider society and thereby encourages
the proliferation of religious factions. To increase the number of
religious sects and the vigor of the small ones will not, as Locke
S53 See supra text accompanying note 211.
ss4 On the difference between American styles of thinking and the ideas of the European
Enlightenment in other contexts, see D. BOORSTIN, cited above in note 155, at 149-52.
S55 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 2787), reprinted in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note iog, at 17, 29.
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appeared to believe, exacerbate the problem of religious turmoil.
More likely, it will make religious oppression all the more impossible
and therefore all the more unprofitable to attempt. Rather than try
to foster an ecumenical spirit, the state allows each sect to promote
its own cause with zeal. The Madisonian perspective points toward
pluralism, rather than assimilation, ecumenism, or secularism, as the
organizing principle of church-state relations. Under this view, the
Supreme Court errs if it attempts to calm or suppress religious fervor
by confining it to the margins of public life. It should welcome
religious participation in all its diversity and dissension. The Court
should not ask, "Will this advance religion?," but rather, "Will this
advance religious pluralism?" The Court should not ask, "Will this
be religiously divisive?," but rather, "Will this tend to suppress ex-
pression of religious differences?" Most of all, the Court should extend
its protection to religious groups that, because of their inability to win
accommodation in the political process, are in danger of forced assim-
ilation into our secularized Protestant culture. The happy result of
the Madisonian solution is to achieve both the unrestrained practice
of religion in accordance with conscience (the desire of the religious
"sects") and the control of religious warfare and oppression (the goal
of the Enlightenment).
So understood, the free exercise clause also makes an important
statement about the limited nature of governmental authority. While
the government is powerless and incompetent to determine what par-
ticular conception of the divine is authoritative, the free exercise clause
stands as a recognition that such divine authority may exist and, if it
exists, has a rightful claim on the allegiance of believers who happen
to be American citizens. The actual occasions for free exercise ex-
emptions may be rare now, as in our early history; but the importance
of the principle outstrips its practical consequences. If government
admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it also
admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is
partial and instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the
people is, in principle, subordinate to the commands of God, as heard
and understood in the individual conscience. In such a nation, with
such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a philosophical impossi-
bility.
Dissenting in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,556
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote:
The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabil-
ities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not
civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
Ss6 3i9 U.S. 624 (I943).
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dogma. .... Otherwise each individual could set up. his own censor
against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good
by those whose business it is to make laws.55 7
So saying, Justice Frankfurter overlooked the unique American con-
tribution to church-state relations and embraced instead the Enlight-
enment ideal of Locke and Jefferson. Locke and Jefferson may well
have been animated, in Justice Frankfurter's words, by the "freedom
from conformity to religious dogma." But that is not what the Bap-
tists, Quakers, Lutherans, and Presbyterians who provided the polit-
ical muscle for religious freedom in America had in mind. To them,
the freedom to follow religious dogma was one of this nation's foremost
blessings, and the willingness of the nation to respect the claims of a
higher authority than "those whose business it is to make laws" was
one of the surest signs of its liberality.
557 Id. at 653 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
